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Since the 2008 global financial crisis, a major challenge for the Board of 
Directors (BoD) and risk managers of large, public corporations has been to 
clearly define and articulate their company‟s risk appetite. Considered as a 
business imperative to ensure successful enterprise risk management, risk 
appetite has been widely discussed among practitioners and, more recently, 
academics. Whilst much emphasis has been placed upon defining risk 
appetite and identifying the ways in which an organisation‟s risk appetite 
statement can be articulated, the literature has largely ignored the critical 
idea that risk appetite is not a „static picture‟, but changes over time 
according to a variety of factors residing in the organisation‟s internal and 
external contexts. Using the international hotel industry as research context, 
this study explores the underlying factors that shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite. Building on the „living organisation‟ thinking and employing the 
„living composition‟ model as a conceptual lens, this thesis integrated 
several strands of literature related to risk appetite, organisational risk taking 
and individual risk taking, and developed a conceptual framework of factors 
that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
Given the scarcity of risk appetite research, an exploratory, qualitative 
approach was adopted and the fieldwork was conducted in two stages: stage 
one served to gain a generic-business perspective of the main factors that 
shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. Data was gathered from ten risk 
consultants using unstructured in-depth interviews. The findings were 
subsequently validated and further explored in stage two, which involves a 
case study of two publicly listed international hotel companies with different 
risk appetites. Questionnaires and follow-up semi-structured interviews 
were used to collect data from sixteen corporate executives and risk 
managers in order to understand the factors that shape their organisation‟s 
risk appetite. 
The findings indicated that an organisation‟s risk appetite is collectively 
shaped by a set of „organisational‟, „environmental‟ and „decision-maker‟ 
factors. While most factors are shared between the case organisations, the 
significance of each factor to risk appetite, the ways in which each factor 
shapes the risk appetite and the interrelationships among different factors 
are dissimilar. This led to the development of a „living organisation‟ 
framework of factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite, which is a 
key contribution to knowledge of this study. The findings also revealed how 
corporate executives and risk managers understand the concept of risk 
appetite, thus contributing to the literature with an „end user‟ perspective of 
risk appetite definition, as well as a unique „black hole‟ analogy of risk 
appetite. Not only can the findings facilitate a more accurate and meaningful 
articulation of an organisation‟s risk appetite statements, they also highlight 
the need for corporate executives and risk managers to regularly monitor 
and update their organisations‟ risk appetite. To this end, the „living 
organisation‟ framework of factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite 
provides a basis for the development of a risk appetite monitoring system, as 
well as a tool for modifying the risk appetite. 
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1.1 Problem definition 
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, a major challenge for the Board of 
Directors (BoD) and risk managers of large, public corporations has been to 
determine and articulate their organisation‟s risk appetite statement (Baldan 
et al., 2016; Gontarek, 2016; Lam, 2014). Recognised as a business 
imperative to ensure effective risk decision making, risk appetite is often 
defined as the types and amount of risk an organisation is willing to take to 
achieve its strategic objectives (Alix et al., 2015; Bromiley et al., 2015; 
Lamanda and Voneki, 2015). The origin of the term can be traced back to 
the „Turnbull Report‟, which was designed to guide UK public companies to 
conform to the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Carey, 2000). 
The report suggested that BoDs should define and articulate their 
organisation‟s „risk appetite‟. Subsequent US and UK regulations, such as 
the „Sarbanes-Oxley Act‟ (Bargeron et al., 2010), the „COSO‟ risk 
management guide (COSO, 2009), the Standard & Poor‟s credit rating 
criteria (Standard & Poor‟s, 2006) and the British Risk Management 
Standard „BS 31100‟ (BSI, 2008), have all highlighted the need for 
organisations to recognise and explicitly articulate the amount of risk they 
are willing to take. The consequences of failure to meet such a need were 
demonstrated by the collapse of many corporations during the 2008 global 
financial crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Power, 2009). 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, more regulations in relation to risk 
appetite were introduced and enforced in a variety of business sectors. Some 
notable examples include the international banking regulation, „Basel III‟ 
(Weydert, 2010), the European Union insurance company regulatory 
standards, „Solvency II‟ (FSA, 2011), and the revised corporate governance 
guidance for all listed companies in the UK, „UK Corporate Governance 
Code‟ (FRC, 2014). Nevertheless, in order for these regulations to have any 
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real effect, organisations need appropriate guidance and support for the 
determination and articulation of their risk appetite statement. 
Unfortunately, the regulators have failed to provide any useful help in this 
regard (Gontarek, 2016; Lam, 2014), which has led to a number of risk 
practitioners and scholars devising and promoting their own methodologies 
(e.g. Alix et al., 2015; Baldan et al., 2016; Dillon et al., 2011; FSB, 2013; 
Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012). 
However, a common issue across most methodologies appears to be an 
overemphasis of the role of organisational factors in determining the risk 
appetite, whereas the potential impact of the dynamic and complex 
environment on risk appetite has not been sufficiently recognised (Berlinger 
and Varadi, 2015; Lam, 2014; Palmer and Wiseman, 1999). If these „partial‟ 
methodologies were adopted by organisations, not only would it result in an 
ill-defined risk appetite statement, it would also instil a bias among top 
decision makers that risk appetite is only determined by internal factors of 
an organisation. This inward view can hinder effective risk decision-making 
in the turbulent business environment. 
Compared to the overemphasis of organisational factors in determining the 
risk appetite, a more alarming issue is that many regulators, risk 
practitioners and scholars appear to have overlooked the idea that an 
organisation‟s risk appetite is not static, but continually changes according 
to what is happening in the organisation‟s internal and external contexts 
(Georgousopoulou et al., 2014; Gontarek, 2016; Lam, 2014). In other 
words, an organisation senses the internal and external changes and adapts 
its risk appetite accordingly. This dynamic nature of risk appetite indicates 
that the particular types and amount of risk an organisation is willing to take 
as stated in the risk appetite statement are unlikely to remain the same at a 
later point in time. Thus, any continuous use of the „out-of-date‟ risk 
appetite statement would lead to inappropriate or even disastrous decisions. 
For example, studies (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Nord and Smith, 2009) 
investigating the causes of 2008 financial crisis discovered that the amount 
of risk many large investment banks were taking at the time of the crisis was 
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significantly higher than what was allowed in their risk appetite statements. 
While this inconsistency could be the result of extreme risk-seeking actions 
from certain individuals, it is more probable that the risk appetite of those 
organisations had undergone a substantial change without being properly 
recognised by their senior decision makers. Therefore, rather than increasing 
the pressure for organisations to produce a risk appetite statement, it is more 
sensible for corporate governance regulators to realise and promote the idea 
that an organisation‟s risk appetite is in constant change and needs to be 
closely monitored and regularly updated. 
In order to monitor changes in an organisation‟s risk appetite, it is necessary 
to understand the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
Surprisingly, despite a growing research interest on risk appetite (Alix et al., 
2015; Aven, 2013; Baldan et al., 2016; Bromiley et al., 2015; Gontarek, 
2016; Lamanda and Voneki, 2015), no empirical study has been undertaken 
to investigate the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. Although 
some risk practitioners have identified several likely factors, such as risk 
capacity (Shortreed, 2010), risk culture (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012; 
Rittenberg and Martens, 2012), objectives (Dillon et al., 2011; EY, 2010), 
decision-maker risk propensity (Allan et al., 2011) and stakeholder demands 
(Carothers, 2011), they have been unable to explain in detail how and why 
these factors influence the risk appetite. They have also failed to distinguish 
the relative significance of the factors to risk appetite, hence giving rise to a 
misconception that all factors are equally important in shaping the risk 
appetite (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012; Lam, 2014). Additionally, 
existing factors are mostly confined to the internal context of an 
organisation, and potential factors that reside in an organisation‟s external 
environment remain largely underexplored (Berlinger and Varadi, 2015; 
Georgousopoulou et al., 2014). 
These abovementioned limitations highlight a knowledge gap in the current 
risk appetite literature, which is a lack of an in-depth understanding of the 
factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. In particular, little is 
known about what internal and external factors shape an organisation‟s risk 
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appetite and in what ways, and whether the factors are equally important or 
that some are more important than others. Filling this gap will not only help 
organisations develop more accurate risk appetite statements, it will also 
help senior decision makers and risk managers better understand the 
relationships between risk appetite and various elements of an 
organisation‟s internal and external contexts. Such an enhanced 
understanding can facilitate a more effective monitoring of changes in risk 
appetite, and also allow the identification of an organisation‟s risk appetite 
„levers‟, i.e. the factors over which the organisation has direct control. The 
levers could be used by senior decision makers and risk managers to 
proactively modify the organisation‟s risk appetite, thus ensuring the risk-
taking decisions are made more confidently and have taken into account the 
internal and external changes. Filling the gap could also benefit corporate 
governance regulators and consulting firms in providing more effective 
guidance on risk appetite. Hence, three main research questions are 
formulated for this study: 
1. What (internal and external) factors influence an organisation‟s risk
appetite?
2. How do these factors influence the risk appetite?
3. Which factors are the most important in shaping the risk appetite?
To answer these questions, this research seeks to conduct a comprehensive 
literature search to identify any internal and external factors that could shape 
an organisation‟s risk appetite. Potential factors are then categorised and 
mapped onto a conceptual framework (Figure 2.4, p. 74), which is validated 
and enriched by a group of world-renowned risk consultants. The revised 
framework is evaluated and further explored with corporate executives and 
risk managers of two large international hotel companies, where the 
significance of the factors to risk appetite and the ways in which they shape 
the risk appetite are established. A final framework of factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite (Figure 5.1, p. 185) – is then developed, which 
is the study‟s main contribution to knowledge. 
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1.2 Key concepts underpinning the research 
As stated in the preceding paragraph, this research builds on a thorough 
review of the literature to identify potential factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. Due to the scarcity of risk appetite research, the 
literature search focused on the generic risk taking literature, where similar 
concepts such as risk propensity and risk behaviour appear particularly 
useful to understand risk appetite. Examining these concepts and relating 
them to risk appetite can better position this study in the wider academic 
literature, given that risk appetite is a concept very much originated from 
and discussed among practitioners (Bromiley et al., 2015; Lam, 2014). 
Thus, this section explains the key concepts that underpin this research: 
organisational risk propensity, organisational risk behaviour, individual risk 
propensity, and the „living organisations‟ thinking. 
Organisational risk propensity 
Central to the concept of risk appetite is the notion of organisational risk 
taking (Aven, 2013; Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012; Lam, 2014). Whilst 
few studies have been conducted on risk appetite, more research has been 
undertaken in the broader organisational risk taking literature, examining 
how and why organisations take risks and the factors that drive risk taking 
(e.g. Baixauli-Soler et al., 2015; Berger et al., 2014; Bhagat et al., 2015; 
Dhouibi et al., 2016; Harwood et al., 2009). Unfortunately, organisational 
risk taking research involves an imprecise vocabulary (Roszkowski and 
Davey, 2010). Several terms are often used interchangeably to describe the 
willingness of an organisation to take risks, which include risk propensity 
(Cho and Lee, 2006; Das and Teng, 2001; Harwood et al., 2009; Walls and 
Dyer, 1996) and risk tolerance (Kwak and LaPlace, 2005; Roszkowski and 
Davey, 2010; Walls, 2005a) as the most common ones. The term risk 
propensity, in particular, conveys a very similar, if not identical, meaning to 
risk appetite. Whilst risk appetite is mostly defined as the amount of risk an 
organisation is willing to take (Aven, 2013; Baldan et al., 2016; Lam, 2014), 
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risk propensity is often referred to as the degree to which an organisation is 
willing to take risks (Cho and Lee, 2006; Harwood et al., 2009; Pablo and 
Javidan, 2002; Walls, 2005a;). This similarity has even led Harwood et al. 
(2009) to suggest that risk propensity and risk appetite are two terms 
representing the same concept in different contexts: risk propensity is the 
academic term and risk appetite is the term used by practitioners. Given that 
research on organisational risk propensity offers useful insights into the 
factors that influence an organisation‟s willingness to take risks, this 
research concurs with Harwood et al. (2009) and builds on organisational 
risk propensity literature to explore the factors that shape an organisation‟s 
risk appetite. 
Organisational risk behaviour 
Apart from drawing on organisational risk propensity research, this research 
also draws on findings from studies investigating the factors that influence 
an organisation‟s risk behaviour. Although risk behaviour and risk 
propensity have been recognised as closely-related but different concepts 
(Das and Teng, 2001; Kull et al., 2014; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Sitkin and 
Weingart, 1995; Zheng and Prislin, 2012), i.e. risk propensity represents an 
organisation‟s intention to take risks and risk behaviour refers to the 
organisation‟s actual behaviour, several scholars (e.g. Baixauli-Soler et al., 
2015; Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Desai, 2008; Dhouibi et al., 2016; 
Panzano and Roth, 2006) did not distinguish these two terms and used both 
interchangeably in their studies of organisational risk behaviour. Despite 
this, their insights into the factors that drive an organisation‟s risk-taking 
behaviour seem particularly useful to aid the understanding of factors that 
shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
Individual risk propensity 
Although the literature on organisational risk propensity and risk behaviour 
is useful to explore the factors that influence risk appetite, the size of this 
literature is relatively small. An analysis of the risk taking literature beyond 
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organisational boundary reveals that there is a more substantial, multi-
disciplinary literature focused on understanding the risk taking of human 
beings. Scholars from various fields, such as psychology (Mata et al., 2016; 
Pauley et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2009), finance (Al-Ajmi, 2008; Anbar and 
Eker, 2010; Riley and Russon, 1995) and strategy (Bernard et al., 2007; Das 
and Teng, 2001; Zheng and Prislin, 2012), have conducted large-scale 
quantitative studies to examine the internal and external factors affecting an 
individual‟s willingness to take risks. In this literature, the concept of 
individual risk propensity, also known as risk tolerance in some studies 
(Faff et al., 2009; Neelakanta, 2010; Pauley et al., 2008; Roszkowski and 
Davey, 2010), is defined in the same way as organisational risk propensity, 
albeit that the focus is on human beings rather than organisations. Despite 
this difference in the level of analysis, the valuable insights offered in this 
literature have led several researchers (e.g. Baird and Thomas, 1985; Saini 
and Martin, 2009; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) to argue that parallels can be 
drawn between individuals and organisations regarding the factors that 
influence risk propensity. As Saini and Martin (2009: 594) argued: 
„conceptualisations of risk propensity at the individual level can be 
extended to the organisational level‟. 
The „Living organisations‟ thinking 
Nevertheless, without an appropriate conceptual basis, it can be problematic 
to apply individual-level research findings to analyse organisational-level 
phenomenon. The „living organisations‟ thinking (de Geus, 1997; Maula, 
2006; Wolfe, 2011), which is underpinned by the living systems theory 
(Miller, 1978; Miller and Miller, 1990) and the autopoiesis theory 
(Maturana and Varela, 1980), offers a solid conceptual basis that supports 
this transition. The „living organisations‟ thinking represents a group of 
beliefs that views organisations as same as human beings (de Geus, 1997; 
Maula, 2000; Tracy, 1994; Vancouver, 1996; Wheatley and Kellner-Rogers, 
1995; Wolfe, 2011). Informed by the „living organisations‟ thinking, the 
„living composition‟ model (Maula, 2006) provides a robust theoretical 
framework that not only enables the application of research findings on the 
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risk propensity of individuals to the organisational context, but also offers a 
unified structure that allows the categorisation of a wide range of internal 
and external factors into an interconnected whole. The „living composition‟ 
model forms the basis of the „living organisation‟ framework of factors that 
shape an organisation‟s risk appetite (Figure 5.1, p. 185), which is the main 
contribution to knowledge of this study. 
1.3 Research context 
To fill the knowledge gap relating to the factors that shape an organisation‟s 
risk appetite (p. 3), this research has focused on companies from the 
international hotel industry. The key reasons informing such a choice are: 
1) The global business environment and the international hotel industry
have become highly uncertain with many risks threating the
performance and survival of hotel companies.
A decade and a half into the 21st century, international hotel companies are 
competing in an environment with an unprecedented level of risks: rising 
political tensions and terrorism activities (Langford, 2016; McGuire, 2015), 
an unbalanced global economy (Brandau, 2016), a greater shortage of 
skilled labour (Langford, 2016; McGuire, 2015), emerging disruptive 
technologies (Brandau, 2016; EY, 2016) and increasing occurrences of 
severe weather conditions/natural disasters (Bremner et al., 2015; EY, 
2016). At the industry level, there is intensifying rivalry among the leading 
hotel companies, fuelled by increasing business consolidations (Geerts, 
2016) and constant product and service innovations (Euromonitor, 2015; 
Langford, 2016). While these risks threaten the performance and viability of 
the hotel companies, they also present opportunities (Andersen and 
Schroder, 2010; Hillson, 2002), if exploited, can lead to the development of 
competitive advantages and ultimately more sustainable and responsible 
businesses (Geerts, 2016; Green, 2016). To compete and thrive in such a 
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turbulent but exciting environment, risk taking is inevitable and necessary 
(Desai, 2008; Hernandez-Perlines, 2016). 
2) Major hotel companies are taking greater risks to compete against
each other, highlighting the need to better understand their risk
appetite.
Recently the international hotel industry has witnessed a surge of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As), an activity that is generally considered as 
rewarding but highly risky. For example, Accor spent $3 billion in 2016 to 
acquire Fairmont Raffles and Onefinestay (Smith et al., 2016; Ting, 2016), 
which suggests a risky investment given the high possibility of failure for 
most M&As (Bhimani et al., 2015; Quek, 2011; Saunders et al., 2009). 
Similarly, Marriott completed the acquisition of Starwood in September 
2016 in a record-breaking $12.4 billion deal (Marriott, 2016), which made 
Marriott the world‟s largest hotel company. However, the sheer size of the 
financial investment and the complexities of post-acquisition integration 
(Bedford and Ehlert, 2011; Koerniadi et al., 2015) meant that Marriott had 
taken a significant level of risk (Higley, 2016; McNew, 2016). The 
acquisition of Starwood can be considered as even more risky for Marriott, 
given that this deal came only two years after the company had purchased 
the Protea Hotels to become the largest international hotel chain in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Cohen, 2014), a high-risk market where other industry 
rivals are less inclined to enter (Blitz and Blas, 2014; Salazar, 2008; 
Sotunde, 2013). 
A likely motive underpinning the increasing risk taking of international 
hotel companies could be the decision makers‟ optimism that the more risk 
a company takes, the more reward it will receive (Chen, 2013; Villar et al., 
2012). However, every company has a „limit‟ in risk taking, over which 
more risk can no longer generate reward, but increases the vulnerability of 
the company (Andersen and Bettis, 2014; Green, 2016). Also, finite 
financial and human resources within a company mean that desired level of 
risk taking cannot always be supported (Bromiley and Rau, 2014). As such, 
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hotel companies need to take a strategic and calculated approach to risk 
taking, one that is not only justified by the resources of the company, but 
also informed by an understanding of the company‟s wider context 
(Damodaran, 2008; Lam, 2014; Shefrin, 2016). This „smarter‟ approach to 
risk taking requires the decision makers to be conscious of the types of risk 
their company is willing to take and the amount it is comfortable with 
(Baldan et al., 2016; Berlinger and Varadi, 2015; Lam, 2014). In other 
words, they need to understand their company‟s „risk appetite‟. 
1.4 Research aim and objectives 
Based on the preceding discussion, the overall aim of this research is: 
„To identify and evaluate the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite in the context of the international hotel industry.‟  
In order to achieve the research aim, five research objectives are identified: 
1. To understand the concept of risk appetite and its theoretical
underpinnings by critically reviewing the generic risk taking
literature and the specific risk appetite literature.
2. To identify the factors that could shape an organisation‟s risk
appetite by analysing both the practitioner and academic literature
and drawing upon the „living organisations‟ thinking.
3. To explore the factors which shape an organisation‟s risk appetite
and evaluate their importance by conducting qualitative empirical
research in the international hotel industry.
4. To explain the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite.
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5. To make a theoretical contribution to knowledge by proposing a
framework for the analysis of an organisation‟s risk appetite in the
context of the international hotel industry.
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis comprises six chapters. Chapter one presents an overall 
introduction, which identifies the research gap and explains how the 
research seeks to fill the gap. It also identifies the research aim and 
objectives. Chapter two addresses the first two research objectives, 
reviewing the literature on risk appetite, risk propensity and „living 
organisations‟ and proposing a conceptual framework for the primary 
investigation of factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. Chapter 
three explains in detail the methodology of this research and how the 
primary data was collected and analysed. Chapter four presents the main 
research findings, which are discussed in the context of the literature in 
Chapter five. Chapter six presents the conclusions of the research, 
highlighting the contributions to theory, practitioners and methodology. 
Limitations of the research and further research directions are discussed, and 





This chapter presents the literature review of the research and addresses the 
first two objectives of the research. The chapter starts with a critical 
discussion on the concept of „risk‟ and „risk taking‟, followed by a review of 
the main theories underpinning the risk taking of individuals and 
organisations. The concept of risk appetite is introduced and the knowledge 
gap is highlighted. The chapter then examines the practitioner and academic 
literature to identify potential factors that shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite. Following a discussion of the „living organisations‟ thinking and 
specifically the „living composition‟ model as a robust conceptual basis for 
this research, the chapter draws together the literature findings and proposes 
a conceptual framework of factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
Figure 2.1 (p. 13) presents a literature map illustrating how different 
components of this chapter are connected. 
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2.1 Understanding risk, risk taking and risk appetite 
2.1.1 The concept of risk 
Risk is a term originated from 16
th
 century Spanish and Portuguese
languages that means „sailing in unchartered waters‟ (Denney, 2005: 9). 
While it is generally viewed as „the possibility of meeting danger or 
suffering harm‟ (Livingstone, 2008: 570), scholars of different disciplines 
define it differently, and there seems no widely agreed definition that can be 
applied to every context (Power, 2007). For example, in finance, risk is 
viewed as a precise technical term for the probabilistic distribution of future 
market returns (Bender, 2014; Damodaran, 2008). Economics scholars 
consider risk as the variability of profits (Bowman, 1982; Sargent and 
Vilmunen, 2013). Management researchers see risk as the subjective 
judgement of the personal or organisational consequences resulting from a 
specific decision or course of action (Friberg, 2015; Shefrin, 2016). Even 
within a discipline there is often no consensus on risk definitions (Hopkin, 
2013; Lam, 2014). 
In an attempt to achieve a more unified understanding, some researchers 
began to seek commonalities from various risk definitions. Vlek and Stallen 
(1980) for example, identified six mostly adopted risk definitions: 1) the 
probability of loss; 2) the size of credible loss; 3) the expected loss; 4) the 
variance of the probability distribution over the probability of all possible 
consequences; 5) the semi-variance of the utility distribution and; 6) a linear 
function of the expected value and the variance of the distribution of 
consequences. While these six definitions have effectively summarised the 
scholarly thinking before the nineteen-eighties, more contemporary thinking 
of the risk concept concentrates on a debate of two perspectives: the 
probability and the combination perspectives (Coleman, 2009). The 
probability perspective views risk as a one-dimensional concept, referring 
merely to the probability of an undesirable event happening to either 
individuals or businesses (Adams, 1995; Breakwell, 2007; Yates and Stone, 
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1992). The more complicated combination perspective considers risk as a 
two-dimensional concept, including a combination of both the probability of 
an undesirable event happening as well as the magnitude of the potential 
loss (Friberg, 2015; Hopkin, 2013; Loosemore et al., 2006).  
While the probability perspective is straightforward to understand and 
communicate, it has been criticised for its inability to accurately estimate 
rare risks (e.g. natural disasters) and for its negligence of the magnitude of 
potential losses (Hillson, 2009; Loosemore et al., 2006; Zinn and Taylor-
Gooby, 2006). Nevertheless, the combination perspective, which endorses 
the mixture of probability and magnitude, is not without questions. One 
question is how the probability and magnitude of the potential loss can be 
combined (Douglas, 1992; Hillson, 2009). It is unclear whether the 
probability and the magnitude should be multiplied or added, i.e. Risk (R) = 
Probability of loss (P) × (or +) Magnitude of loss (M). There appears to be a 
tendency towards multiplication, but there is also a further question as to 
whether the probability and the magnitude carry equal weight for the overall 
level of risk (Llewellyn, 2003). In other words, is a high probability (80%) 
and low magnitude (£20) risk equivalent to a low probability (20%) and 
high magnitude (£80) risk, since both risks have the same overall outcome, 
i.e. £16? Based on Tversky and Kahneman‟s (1992) loss aversion theory, it
is possible to argue the magnitude of the loss is valued more than the 
probability, as people tend to avoid (more) loss and heavier potential losses 
tend to hurt more, thus in the above example the £80 risk with 20% 
probability carries more weight. 
Apart from the above dimensional debate, another debate concerns whether 
risk has a purely negative or a negative-and-positive connotation, where the 
positive connotation is the rewards. Although the negative view dominated 
the pre-2000 era (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981; Slovic, 1987), a shift to a 
negative-and-positive view had prevailed in the post-2000 period. In 
addition to business and management researchers, scholars from other 
disciplines have also supported the mixed view of the risk nature. For 
example, social scientists argued that risk does not always involve loss and 
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should not be conceptualised negatively (Denney, 2005; Douglas, 1992; 
Giddens, 1998; Zinn, 2008; Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006); instead, risk is 
the „driving force behind global capitalist development, a dynamic positive 
force for good, and a prerequisite to participation in a technologically 
based global era.‟ (Denney, 2005: 11). Psychologists (e.g. Trimpop, 1994) 
also postulated that if risk is only defined as a potential loss, then the 
potential gain is likely to be missed. However, issues associated with this 
negative-and-positive view of risk have also been recognised. Loosemore et 
al. (2006: 13) stated that „the problem for an organisation in making risk an 
umbrella term, which encompasses both threat and opportunity, is that 
people focus on the former and ignore the latter‟. The eventual results of 
doing so might be lost opportunities and under-performance (Chapman and 
Ward, 2002; Loosemore and Lam, 2004). 
A third debate on the risk concept relates to whether risk is an objective or 
subjective construct. An interesting distinction noted in the risk literature 
between objective and subjective risk, according to Trimpop (1994), is that 
objective risks are those calculated by risk experts, while subjective risks 
are those estimated and experienced by ordinary people. Not surprisingly, 
this distinction has received much criticism. Many scholars argue that an 
objective risk is in itself a subjective judgement of the risk experts, and the 
very gathering and interpretation of statistical data for risk assessment is 
also subjective (Fischhoff et al., 1984; Sjoberg, 1980). In fact, risk cannot 
exist independently of people‟s minds and values (Adams, 1995; Coleman, 
2009; Llewellyn, 2003). However, the judgement of a risk may vary 
considerably across individuals. A particular risk event that is judged to 
pose a threat to an individual or a business may be seen as an opportunity by 
others (Loosemore et al., 2006). 
Given the above discussion, this research adopts the more popular 
combination perspective, negative-and-positive connotation and the 
subjective nature view of risk. Therefore, the term risk is defined in this 
thesis, as „a potential future event which is uncertain in its probability and 
magnitude of loss and gains, and may thus adversely or positively affect the 
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achievements of a person‟s or an organisation‟s objectives.‟ There are four 
essential elements in this definition. The first is „uncertainty‟, implying that 
the lack (or absence) of information on a future event makes the probability 
and magnitude unpredictable (Hillson, 2002). A certain and predictable 
future event is not a risk but an issue. The second is „event‟. Many scholars 
tend to equate risk with loss, which is mistakenly focused on the 
consequences of the risk event, rather than the particular event itself 
(Loosemore et al., 2006). The third is „future‟. Risk is essentially forward-
looking and only concerns events that may happen in the future. Past events 
are not risks but actual problems. The fourth is „objectives‟. A future event 
that has no potential impact on the achievements of individual or business 
objectives is not considered as a risk (Hillson, 2009). 
Having discussed the concept of risk, the following section explains the 
notion of risk taking, which is integral to most human and business activities. 
2.1.2 Risk taking 
Researchers and practitioners have long understood that the opportunities 
presented by risks could lead to substantial rewards. In a personal context, 
for instance, these rewards may be higher sensation or satisfaction (Horvath 
and Zuckerman, 1993; Zukerman, 1994); in a business context, these 
rewards may typically be higher profits. While some argue that risks always 
exist in human activities (Adam, 1995; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986), 
this research believes that it is the potential rewards that motivate 
individuals and businesses to willingly take on risks. There is a wealth of 
anecdotal evidence in the business world to show that risk taking can be 
highly rewarding, such as the initiative of Microsoft in designing the 
„Windows‟ operating system, Toyota‟s move in designing a hybrid car 
model, Google‟s early decision to charge advertisers on the number of site 
visits (Damodaran, 2008). More rigorous academic evidence has also 
demonstrated that risk taking is positively linked with reward. For example, 
in a study of 50 largest US oil companies between 1981 and 2002, Walls 
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(2005b) found that companies that took more risks tend to generate much 
higher returns than those that took fewer risks.  
Nevertheless, there is also evidence that risk taking may not necessarily 
result in increased rewards. The famous „Bowman‟s Paradox‟ (Bowman, 
1980), which depicts a negative relationship between firm risk taking and 
financial return across many industries, contrasted the conventional notion 
that higher risk leads to higher returns and subsequently sparked numerous 
tests about the relationship between risk and reward (Bowman, 1982; 
Figenbaum, 1990; Figenbaum and Thomas, 1986, 1988). Figenbaum and 
Thomas (1988), for instance, separated firms into those that earn below and 
above target level returns and discovered a disparity in the risk-return 
relationship. Firms that earned below the target level became risk seekers 
and the relationship between risk and return was negative, whereas returns 
and risk were positively correlated for firms earnings above target level. 
While the controversies of risk and reward relationship remains, it seems to 
be increasingly accepted that there is a limit in firm risk taking, over which 
more risk taking will lead to reduced reward (Lam, 2014). This is where the 
concept of risk appetite comes in (section 2.2.3), which aims to set out the 
optimal level of risk for an organisation to take before starting to suffer any 
loss of reward. However, prior to examining the concept of risk appetite, it 
would be sensible to review the generic risk taking literature to better 
understand the key theoretical perspectives underpinning the risk taking of 
individuals and organisations. 
2.1.2.1 Individual risk taking theories 
Research that explains the individual risk taking in both simple and complex 
situations seems to have built upon three prominent theories, namely 




Expected utility theory (EUT) 
 
Originally developed by Bernoulli in 1738 and later updated by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern in 1947, EUT has long been regarded as one of 
the fundamental models explaining how individuals take risk (Bernard et al., 
2007; Schoemaker, 1982). In essence, EUT argues that people are rational 
decision-makers; when facing risky options, they will evaluate each option 
and choose the one that maximises their expected utility. It proposes a utility 
function that is uniformly concave, i.e. as one‟s wealth increases, one‟s 
marginal utility decreases. For example, the marginal utility of a £1 gain is 
much less for someone who has £1,000 than one who has only £10. Hence, 
a risk with a potential chance of a £1 gain is not very appealing for the one 
who has £1,000, compared with the one who has only £10. 
 
EUT had been a dominant normative and descriptive model of cognitive risk 
decision model for a few decades (Schoemaker, 1982) and served as the 
cornerstone for many studies, such as Swalm (1966) and Friend and Blume 
(1975), all of which found evidence that supports the theory. However, 
many scholars later discovered that in more complex situations individuals 
do not always behave according to EUT predictions (Machina, 1987; 
Schneider and Lopes, 1986; Schoemaker, 1982; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 
1983). What they found was that when potential losses are envisaged, most 
people prefer a risky option to a certain outcome of equal expected value, i.e. 
they are actively seeking risks facing a potential loss (Schneider and Lopes, 
1986). The finding demonstrates that EUT may have a poor predictive 
ability of individual risk taking in complex real-world settings (Bernard et 
al., 2007), and so scholars searched for alternative explanations of 
individual risk taking. 
 
Prospect theory (PT) 
 
One of the leading alternative explanations to EUT is developed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who found that given a choice between two 
risky options with an equal expected return, individuals are more likely to 
20 
choose the riskier alternative in the face of definite losses and choose the 
less risky one in the face of definite gains. They theorised this finding as the 
PT, which became arguably the most prominent theory explaining 
individual risk taking (Bromiley et al., 2001). PT posits that in choosing 
among risky alternatives, an individual will evaluate available choices 
according to a neutral reference point rather than weighing up the expected 
utility of each choice (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Evaluation outcomes 
that are below the reference point will be seen as losses, while outcomes 
that are above the reference point will be seen as gains. The individual will 
be risk-seeking if a loss is perceived, and conversely risk-averse if a gain is 
anticipated. This prediction challenges deeply the premise of the EUT, 
where individuals are thought to be rational and risk-averse at all times. 
Moreover, a key notion within the PT is loss aversion, which implies that 
individuals tend to value a certain amount of gain much less than the same 
amount of loss (Levy, 1992; West and Shelton, 1998). In other words, the 
pleasure of winning £10 would be simply outweighed by the displeasure of 
losing £10. 
PT has received significant research interest across economics, finance, 
psychology, and management fields, where numerous empirical tests have 
been conducted. While the theory has received considerable support 
(Baucells and Rata, 2006; Moreno et al., 2002; Schoemaker, 1990), it has 
also received a number of challenges. For example, Nwogugu (2005) 
claimed that the theory was developed using questionable methods and data. 
This view coincides with the argument that PT‟s laboratory-based 
experimental origin has little explanatory power for real life events (Levy, 
1992). Indeed, many scholars have found real world evidence that 
contradicts the PT. Thaler and Johnson (1990), for instance, investigated the 
effect of past outcomes on future risk taking and found that prior success 
tends to encourage an individual to take more risks in the future. Staw et al. 
(1981) argued that individuals will become more rigid and avoid taking any 
risks when threatened by potential losses. 
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Sensation-seeking theory (SST) 
Another different, but equally important theoretical explanation of 
individual risk taking is Zuckerman‟s (1994) SST. He argues that people‟s 
risk taking is motivated by the need to seek varied, novel, and complex 
sensations and experiences. Although not as popular as EUT or PT, research 
has confirmed SST‟s significance as a highly consistent predictor for 
various kinds of risk taking, including gambling and participation in high 
risk activities (Zuckerman and Kuhlman, 2000). For example, in a sample of 
223 undergraduate students, Wong and Carducci (1991) found that people 
with a high level of sensation seeking exhibit greater tendency to take in 
everyday financial risks. 
2.1.2.2 Organisational risk taking theories 
A number of theories have attempted to explain organisational risk taking. 
Among those, the behavioural theory of the firm (BTOF) and the threat-
rigidity thesis (TRT) appear to be the most salient. A strand of research has 
also applied the individual-level-oriented prospect theory (PT) in the context 
of organisations. This section critically evaluates these theories. 
Behavioural theory of the firm (BTOF) 
One prominent theoretical perspective on organisational risk taking is BTOF, 
which was developed by March and Simon (1958) and Cyert and March 
(1963). The theory predicts how a firm‟s behaviour will change when a gap 
exists between its expected performance and the aspiration level. When 
expected performance is higher than the aspiration level, the firm will stick 
to its established standard operating procedures in order to avoid 
unnecessary uncertainty. However, when expected performance is lower 
than the aspiration level, the firm will initiate searches to look for 
alternatives that will increase its performance (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Shimizu, 2007). It is assumed that this process of search (for changes) 
involves more risk for the firm, since the consequences of adopting any 
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alternative are uncertain. Therefore, the implication of this perspective on 
firm risk taking is that a firm will be risk-averse when the expected 
performance exceeds its aspiration level, and will be risk-seeking when the 
expected performance falls below its aspiration level. 
While BTOF has been supported by many organisational risk-taking studies 
(Chen and Miller, 2007; Ketchen and Palmer, 1999; Park, 2007; Wiseman 
and Bromiley, 1996), some scholars found that organisations may not 
necessarily be risk-seeking in the face of poor performance. For example, 
the longitudinal study of 1,237 family-owned firms in Spanish olive-oil 
mills by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) revealed that poor performing firms 
take less risk in the face of bankruptcy. This may be explained by March 
and Shapira‟s (1992) notion that an organisation‟s performance aspiration 
level is not static but adaptive: when the organisation approaches 
bankruptcy, the aspiration level can downshift to a survival level. In this 
situation, instead of being risk-seeking, an organisation will become more 
risk-averse, as its performance is still considered as exceeding the aspiration 
level, which is the bankruptcy.  
Threat-rigidity thesis (TRT) 
Another possible explanation of Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) in the preceding 
paragraph could be found in the TRT (Staw et al., 1981), which was an 
equally prominent theory designed to explain how organisations would 
adapt to failure or major unfavourable environmental changes. TRT suggests 
that an organisation will become rigid in the face of economic adversity, due 
to the restriction in information, control and resources. In such 
circumstances, organisations tend to exhibit a degree of rigidity, combined 
with an inability to act or innovate (Staw et al., 1981). This implies that an 
organisation will be risk-averse when its performance declines or when it 
experiences any adversity that threatens its performance. As this prediction 
directly contradicts the BTOF, it has sparked considerable research interest. 
A number of researchers in the areas of organisational decline and crisis 
management have found empirical support for TRT (Cameron et al., 1987; 
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Jung and Bansal, 2009). For example, Cameron et al. (1987), in their large 
scale study of 334 higher education institutions during times of decline, 
observed that organisations exhibit a significant resistance to change and 
become risk-averse. Jung and Bansal (2009) analysed 701 Japanese firms to 
uncover the relationship between firm performance and internationalisation 
(which is seen as a form a risk taking). They found that the more poorly a 
firm performs, i.e. below its aspiration level, the less likely it will 
internationalise. 
Bromiley et al. (2001) attempted to bridge BTOF and TRT, positing that the 
extent of poor performance may provoke different organisational risk-taking 
reactions. To this end, Shimizu‟s (2007) work adds some empirical insights 
to Bromiley et al. (2001). They found that when the performance is not far 
below the aspiration level, an organisation will first conduct a search for a 
quick solution by increasing its risk taking. When the performance is far 
below the aspiration level, the situation will be perceived as a serious threat, 
thus paralysing the organisation to the extent that they would not be 
motivated to search for a solution. 
Prospect theory (PT) 
Apart from BTOF and TRT, a number of scholars have demonstrated that 
PT, originally developed to explain the risk taking of individuals, can be 
successfully extended to the organisational context (D‟Aveni, 1989; 
Fiegenbaum, 1990) and even the national context (Jervis, 1992; McInerney, 
1992). For example, Fiegenbaum (1990) tested the PT in approximately 
3,300 firms across 85 industries. In line with the theory, he finds that 
organisations tend to be risk-seeking when expecting a return below the 
target, and be risk-averse when expecting a return that exceeds the target. 
However, the applicability of PT to the organisational context has received 
much criticism. For instance, in a comprehensive review of risk research in 
strategic management, Bromiley et al. (2001) claimed that many 
organisational studies applying the PT have failed to assess the theory‟s 
generalisability to other contexts. This suggests that any organisational 
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studies that wish to build on research findings relating to the individuals 
need to identify a robust conceptual basis that allows for the application of 
individual research to organisational contexts.  
2.1.3 Risk appetite 
During the last decade the term „risk appetite‟ has become a recurring topic 
among corporate governance regulators and increasingly appeared on the 
top of business agendas (Gontarek, 2016). Despite the inconsistency in its 
definition (Aven, 2013; Lam, 2014), risk appetite tends to manifest itself in 
the form of an official business statement, which outlines the types and 
amount of risk an organisation is willing to take in the achievement of its 
strategic objectives. A clearly defined and well-articulated risk appetite 
statement can benefit an organisation in six ways: 1) supporting the design 
of business strategy; 2) helping to achieve more effective allocation of 
resources; 3) providing guidance to decision making at all levels; 4) 
strengthening corporate governance and overview of risk; 5) facilitating risk 
communication and fostering a strong risk-aware culture and; 6) maximising 
stakeholder value (Allan et al., 2011; HM Treasury, 2004). However, a 2015 
survey (CRO Forum, 2015) shows that few companies are able to articulate 
a risk appetite statement that is meaningful to the whole organisation, and 
for those who claim to have one, the above benefits are rarely realised. 
Given the increasing regulatory requirements for organisations to produce a 
documented risk appetite statement (FRC, 2014; FSA, 2011; ISO, 2009; 
Weydert, 2010), organisations tend to employ consulting firms, but their 
approaches to risk appetite articulation differ considerably (Alix et al., 2015; 
Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012; Lam, 2014). In order to alleviate 
potential confusion, a shared understanding of the meaning of risk appetite 
and a unified approach to its articulation is needed (Baldan et al., 2016; 
Bromiley et al., 2015). 
Despite the significance of the concept, surprisingly, academic research on 
risk appetite remains limited. Many existing studies (e.g. Berlinger and 
Varadi, 2015; Howell and Krishnan, 2014) examine the concept of „investor 
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risk appetite‟ in the fields of finance and economics, which takes an 
individualistic view towards risk appetite, rather than viewing the concept as 
an organisational phenomenon as in the current study. Equally, „investor 
risk appetite‟ appears to focus almost exclusively on financial risk. Studies 
that do view risk appetite as an organisational construct are mostly 
conceptual, where the focus has been on highlighting the importance of risk 
appetite for organisations (e.g. Felton, 2010; Gontarek, 2016) and presenting 
approaches to developing a risk appetite statement (e.g. Alix et al., 2015; 
Baldan, et al., 2016; Lamanda and Voneki, 2015). An exception is the work 
of Aven (2013), who engaged in the debate around risk appetite definitions 
and defined the concept as an organisation‟s willingness to take risks in 
pursuit of value, which is rather different to the „mainstream‟ explanation 
(see p.1 for the definition of risk appetite). 
Given the increasing regulatory pressure for a risk appetite statement, more 
research is likely to be undertaken in order to develop a viable methodology 
for the articulation of an organisation‟s risk appetite. However, it is crucial 
that researchers take adequate consideration of an organisation‟s external 
environment and to explore how it could affect the organisation‟s risk 
appetite. This is an area that most risk practitioners and researchers have 
overlooked, as their methodologies for articulating the risk appetite (e.g. 
Alix et al., 2015; Baldan et al., 2016; FSB, 2013; Hillson and Murray-
Webster, 2012) are rather inward-looking and focus mostly on an 
organisation‟s internal context. Failing to adequately consider the potential 
effect of the external environment could not only result in an ill-defined risk 
appetite statement but also poor and ineffective risk decision making.  
Additionally, the growing regulatory demand for a documented risk appetite 
statement, together with the increasing consultancy and academic guidance 
on constructing such a statement, could contribute to a misconception 
among decision makers that the risk appetite statement is the „end product‟ 
or the „final step‟ of the risk appetite process. It appears that most regulators, 
risk practitioners and even academics (e.g. Baldan et al., 2016) have not 
considered the possibility that an organisation‟s risk appetite is in constant 
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change according to changes in the organisation‟s internal and external 
environments (Georgousopoulou et al., 2014; Gontarek, 2016). For example, 
Baldan et al. (2016) explicitly stated in their article that risk appetite is a 
„static picture‟ of an organisation‟s risk profile. However, as an 
organisation‟s internal and external environments are in constant change, it 
is unlikely that the types of risk an organisation is willing to take and the 
amount of risk that it feels comfortable with, will remain the same as 
defined in the risk appetite statement. Consequently, the continuous use of 
this inaccurate risk appetite statement may lead to inappropriate decisions. 
Therefore, while it is useful to articulate a risk appetite statement to guide 
decision making and satisfy the regulators, it is more crucial for decision 
makers to understand how a variety of internal and external factors may 
trigger changes to the organisation‟s risk appetite. 
Although research on risk appetite is growing, to date no empirical study 
has been undertaken to investigate the factors that shape an organisation‟s 
risk appetite. While a number of risk consultants have identified several 
possible factors, such as risk capacity (Shortreed, 2010), risk culture 
(Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012; Rittenberg and Martens, 2012), 
objectives (Dillon et al., 2011; EY, 2010), decision-maker risk propensity 
(Allan et al., 2011) and stakeholder demands (Carothers, 2011), it remains 
unclear as to how and why these factors influence the risk appetite. The risk 
consultants also failed to distinguish the relative significance of the factors 
to risk appetite, hence giving rise to the misconception that all factors are 
equally important in shaping an organisation‟s risk appetite (Hillson and 
Murray-Webster, 2012; Lam, 2014). Furthermore, the factors identified by 
risk consultants are mostly confined to the internal context of an 
organisation, and the effect of an organisation‟s external environment on the 
risk appetite remains very much underexplored (Berlinger and Varadi, 2015; 
Georgousopoulou et al., 2014). 
The above limitations highlight a knowledge gap within the risk appetite 
literature, which is a lack of an in-depth understanding of the significance of 
and the ways in which a set of internal and external factors shape an 
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organisation‟s risk appetite. Filling this gap will not only help the BoD and 
risk managers to better articulate their organisation‟s risk appetite and 
monitor potential changes, regulators will also find the findings useful in 
offering more effective guidance on risk appetite. In order to fill this gap, 
section 2.2 seeks to conduct a thorough review of the literature to identify 
factors that may shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
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2.2 Exploring the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite 
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the factors that might 
shape an organisation‟s risk appetite, three types of literature are critically 
examined: the practitioner risk appetite literature (section 2.2.1), the 
organisational risk taking literature (section 2.2.2) and the individual risk 
taking literature (section 2.2.3). 
2.2.1 Evidence from the practitioner risk appetite literature 
While the practitioner literature, also known as the „grey literature‟, has 
often been criticised for lacking credibility and academic rigour (Conn et al., 
2003), this research still includes this strand of literature in the review 
because the practitioner contributions are instrumental for the advancement 
of pertinent academic research (Conn et al., 2003; Power, 2007). This is true 
as increasing number of scholars have engaged with the key practitioners 
debates in their studies of risk appetite over the recent years (Alix et al., 
2016; Aven, 2013; Baldan, et al., 2016; Gontarek, 2016). Also, the quality 
of the practitioner literature is not necessarily inferior to academic studies, 
and it contributes to a full representation of the evidential base of a given 
topic (McAuley et al., 2000). Given that the existing academic research on 
risk appetite is almost non-existent, omitting the practitioner contributions 
would be problematic. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to thoroughly 
examine the practitioner literature on risk appetite, but with care and caution. 
According to Carothers (2011) and Hillson and Murray-Webster (2012), the 
factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite can be classified into three 
broad categories: organisational, decision-maker, and environmental. 
Organisational factors are internal and relate to an organisation‟s 
characteristics, functions and processes. Decision-maker factors are those 
relevant to the attributes of an organisation‟s top decision makers, who are 
predominantly the BoD and EC. Environmental factors, on the other hand, 
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are external factors over which an organisation has little or no control, and 
concern the features of the general business as well as the industry 
environment. These three categories provide a comprehensive coverage of 
the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite and the following 
review adopts this classification as a guiding structure. 
2.2.1.1 Organisational factors 
Risk capacity 
The most frequently highlighted factor that influences the risk appetite 
appears to be the organisation‟s risk capacity (Chatzinikoli and Toner, 2009; 
COSO, 2009; IRM, 2011; Rittenberg and Martens, 2012; Shortreed, 2010). 
Risk capacity refers to the absolute maximum amount of risk an 
organisation is able to bear in pursuit of its business objectives (Rittenberg 
and Martens, 2012), which is often expressed in financial terms, as the 
maximum amount of money an organisation can afford to lose (Barfield, 
2007; Carothers, 2011). It serves as the upper limit of an organisation‟s risk 
taking (EY, 2010), and it is argued that an organisation‟s risk appetite 
should always be set at a level that is below its risk capacity, otherwise the 
organisation may take on excessive risks and become vulnerable to 
bankruptcy. The outbreak of the 2008 global financial crisis was a very 
good example of this, in that the level of risks many banks were taking was 
significantly higher than their risk capacity (Senior Supervisors Group, 
2010). Nevertheless, it remains unclear as to how risk capacity could 
influence the risk appetite and so this is explored in this research. 
Risk culture 
Another factor which could have a profound impact on risk appetite is the 
organisation‟s risk culture. According to IRM (2012: 7), risk culture is „the 
values, beliefs, knowledge and understanding about risk shared by a group 
of people with a common purpose, in particular the employees of an 
organisation or of teams or groups within an organisation‟. While the 
30 
importance of risk culture to effective risk management is widely 
recognised (Gontarek, 2016; IRM, 2012), research that focuses on risk 
culture is lacking. A notable exception is the qualitative study of Power et al. 
(2013), which explored how risk culture is conceptualised and 
operationalised by organisations within the financial services industry. The 
study found that while financial organisations differ considerably in their 
approach to conceptualising and utilising risk culture, risk culture is a multi-
faceted phenomenon comprising attitudes, habits and behaviours of 
organisational members. 
While a number of practitioners have highlighted the possibility that the risk 
culture of an organisation could shape its risk appetite (Gontarek, 2016; 
Hillson and Murry-Webster, 2012; Power et al., 2013; Rittenberg and 
Martens, 2012), they have been unable to explain in detail how this might be 
the case. For example, although Gontarek (2016) argued that a robust risk 
culture is a prerequisite for developing and implementing an effective risk 
appetite framework in an organisation, his conceptual paper failed to 
articulate this idea further or even identity what a robust risk culture is. 
Power et al. (2013) concluded that the impact of risk culture on risk appetite 
remains a challenge for financial services organisations. This could be due 
to a lack of consensus on the meaning of risk culture (Hillson and Murray-
Webster, 2012; Levy et al., 2010), or because the concept is elusive and 
difficult to measure in practice (IRM, 2012). This research attempts to 
address these limitations and explore the influence of risk culture on risk 
appetite. 
Objectives 
An organisation‟s objectives are widely argued to influence its risk appetite 
(Carothers, 2011; Dillon et al., 2011; EY, 2010; IRM, 2011; Rittenberg and 
Martens, 2012). This is because risk appetite aims to assist an organisation 
in achieving its objectives (Dillon et al., 2011). If the objectives change, the 
corresponding risk appetite ought to change. Equally, setting an 
organisation‟s objectives is constrained by the risk appetite, because the risk 
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appetite dictates how risky the objectives can potentially be. Objectives in 
which the inherent risk level exceeds the risk appetite should be 
reconsidered (RIMS, 2012). However, the literature is inadequate in 
explaining how exactly objectives could shape the risk appetite, which is 
explored in this research. 
Risk management capability 
Another factor that is argued to shape the risk appetite is the organisation‟s 
risk management capability (Buehler and Pritsch, 2003; COSO, 2009; 
Stijnen, 2011), which refers to an organisation‟s ability to identify, assess, 
and manage risks, supported by its knowledge, skills, and effective risk 
management processes and systems (COSO, 2009; IRM, 2011). Although 
the literature does not explicitly specify the potential influence of risk 
management capability on risk appetite, it would be sensible to expect that 
the more capable an organisation in managing its risks, the higher risk 
appetite it will have. This proposed relationship is explored in this research. 
History of risk taking 
The practitioner risk appetite literature also suggests an organisation‟s 
history of risk taking is likely to influence its risk appetite. The history of 
risk taking refers to an organisation‟s past experiences of taking risks and 
the outcomes of taking those risks (Carothers, 2011). However, the 
practitioner literature does not explain how this factor may influence the risk 
appetite. It is possible to conjecture, though, that every organisation has an 
institutional memory, and if an organisation has been successful in taking 
certain risks, the risk appetite for those risks in the future may be higher, 
because the organisation would feel confident that it has effective 
knowledge and experience to take on and manage those risks. Conversely, if 
an organisation has been unsuccessful in taking some risks, its future risk 
appetite may accordingly be lower (Bouwan and Malmendier, 2015). But 
equally, if lessons have been learned from the failure, the future risk 
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appetite may not be affected. These propositions are explored in this 
research. 
2.2.1.2 Decision-maker factors 
Risk propensity of the top decision makers 
In addition to organisational factors, factors pertinent to an organisation‟s 
decision makers could also influence the risk appetite. Notably, the risk 
propensity of the top decision makers (Allan et al., 2011; Hillson and 
Murray-Webster, 2012), particularly the CEO and the BoD, is argued to 
exhibit a strong influence. This is due to the fact that risk appetite is 
developed with close involvement of the CEO and the BoD, so that 
inevitably they will align the organisation‟s risk appetite with their own risk 
propensity (Stijnen, 2011). For example, it is very unusual to see a risk-
seeking organisation led by a very conservative CEO and BoD, in which 
case the organisation‟s risk appetite would not have been approved in the 
first place. As such, there appears to be a positive relationship between 
decision maker risk propensity and the risk appetite (Govindarajan, 2011), 
which is further explored in this research. 
2.2.1.3 Environmental factors 
Stakeholder demands 
Beyond the boundary of an organisation, there are few environmental 
factors that are envisaged to shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. One of 
the most important factors seems to be the demands or expectations of the 
stakeholders (Carothers, 2011; Govindarajan, 2011). Generally, 
stakeholders consist of shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, 
regulators and the wider community, all of whom have different demands 
and expectations about the organisation (Chatzinikoli and Toner, 2009). For 
example, shareholders may demand a maximum return on investment, 
employees may want a generous salary and a better working environment, 
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and customers may expect value-adding product and services. The problem 
is that these stakeholder demands may be competing: some demands may 
require a risk-seeking response while others may call for a risk-averse 
reaction (RIMS, 2012). Therefore, the stakeholder demands may have a 
mixed relationship, i.e. both positive and negative, with the risk appetite. 
This proposed relationship is explored in this research. 
Level of competition 
The literature suggests that the level of competition within the industry may 
be positively related with the risk appetite (Carothers, 2011; Shortreed, 
2010). This is because in order to outperform the competitors, a company 
normally needs to increase its level of investment and also pursue 
continuous innovation in its products and services, all of which creates 
further uncertainty and therefore requires a higher risk appetite (Carothers, 
2011). This positive relationship between the level of competition and the 
risk appetite is further examined in this research. 
Overall, the practitioner literature has suggested a number of potential 
factors that may shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. Table 2.1 (p. 34) 
offers a summary of these factors and how they are related with the risk 
appetite. 
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Table 2.1 Evidence from the practitioner literature on factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite 
Factors Relationship 




Risk capacity U Chatzinikoli and Toner, 2009; COSO, 
2009; IRM, 2011; Rittenberg and 
Martens, 2012; Shortreed, 2010 
Risk culture U Gontarek, 2016; Hillson and Murry-
Webster, 2012; Power et al., 2013; 
Rittenberg and Martens, 2012 
Objectives U Carothers, 2011; Dillon et al., 2011; 
EY, 2010; IRM, 2011; Rittenberg and 
Martens, 2012 
Risk management capability + COSO, 2009; Buehler and Pritsch, 
2003; Stijnen, 2011 
History of risk taking M Bouwan and Malmendier, 2015; 
Carothers, 2011 
Decision-maker factors 
Risk propensity of the top 
decision makers 
+ Allan et al., 2011; Govindarajan, 2011; 
Stijnen, 2011 
Environmental factors 
Stakeholder demands M Carothers, 2011; Govindarajan, 2011; 
RIMS, 2012 
Level of competition + Carothers, 2011; Shortreed, 2010 
Note: „+‟ indicates the factor is positively related with the risk appetite. 
„-‟ indicates the factor is negatively related with the risk appetite.  
„M‟ indicates both positive and negative relationships are likely.  
„U‟ indicates that the ways in which the factor shape the risk appetite is unknown. 
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2.2.2 Evidence from the organisational risk taking literature 
While studies on risk appetite are limited, more research has been 
undertaken in the broader organisational risk taking literature, examining 
how and why organisations take risks and the factors that drive risk taking 
(e.g. Baixauli-Soler et al., 2015; Berger et al., 2014; Bhagat et al., 2015; 
Dhouibi et al., 2016; Harwood et al., 2009). Within this broad literature, 
there is a range of studies that examined the factors that influence an 
organisation‟s risk propensity, which offer valuable insights for the 
understanding of the factors that shape risk appetite. As this research 
considers „organisational risk propensity‟ and „risk appetite‟ as two terms 
representing the same concept in different contexts (p.6): risk propensity is 
the academic term and risk appetite is the term used by practitioners, section 
2.2.2 reviews the organisational risk taking literature to identify the factors 
that influence organisational risk propensity. 
This section comprises four sub-sections: section 2.2.2.1 briefly reviews 
four key studies that are particularly relevant to achieve a unified 
understanding of the factors that shape organisational risk propensity. The 
remaining three sections present other key factors that shape organisational 
risk propensity in the groups of organisational, decision-maker and 
environmental factors. 
2.2.2.1 Four prominent studies of factors that influence 
organisational risk propensity 
Baird and Thomas (1985) 
Baird and Thomas‟s (1985) conceptual model of „strategic risk taking‟, 
shown in Figure 2.2 (p. 36), appears to be the one of the earliest studies 
seeking to understand the potential factors which influence an organisation‟s 
risk propensity. The model shows five categories of factors that jointly 
determine an organisation‟s willingness to take risks, including 
environmental, industry, organisational, decision maker, and strategic 
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problem. This categorisation appears to resonate well with that of the 
practitioner literature, thus demonstrating that organisational, decision 
maker, and environmental factors are valid considerations in risk appetite. 
Figure 2.2 Model of strategic risk taking 
COPYRIGHTED IMAGE REMOVED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION
(Source: Baird and Thomas, 1985: 237) 
However, this model has some weaknesses and caution is needed 
when using it to analyse an organisation‟s risk appetite. One is that the 
authors did not define or explain any of the factors, leading to 
difficulties in understanding and interpreting these factors. Moreover, 
each category and each factor within a category are assumed to carry the 
exact same „weight‟ in influencing the organisation‟s risk propensity. 
Furthermore, certain 
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factors in the model, such as „knowledge‟ and „framing‟, are identified 
through studies on individual risk taking, where the appropriateness of 
applying the findings to the organisational context is not addressed. 
Unfortunately, the contribution of Baird and Thomas (1985) seemed to be 
neglected by others and scholarly interests on factors influencing 
organisational risk propensity was reinstated in the work of Pablo and 
Javidan (2002). 
Pablo and Javidan (2002) 
Examining firms‟ M&A decisions, Pablo and Javidan (2002) developed a 
„risk propensity profile‟ to reflect the aggregated tendency of an 
organisation to take risks. Four categories of factors that might shape an 
organisation‟s risk propensity were proposed: 1) Executives‟ and directors‟ 
individual and team characteristics; 2) Organisational attributes; 3) Industry 
mindset; 4) Societal values and beliefs. These four categories lend support 
to Baird and Thomas‟s (1985) model. For instance, executives‟ and 
directors‟ individual and team characteristics are part of the decision maker 
factors. Organisational attributes belong to organisational factors. Industry 
mindset and societal values and beliefs could be seen as external factors 
over which the organisation has no control, and thus can be viewed as 
environmental factors. Despite these similarities, Pablo and Javidan (2002) 
proposed several new factors that were not covered by Baird and Thomas 
(1985), including senior management‟s risk taking propensity, BoD risk 
taking propensity, organisation‟s performance, shareholder requirements 
and uncertainty avoidance. Further, Pablo and Javidan (2002) offer some 
clarification on certain factors with regard to their expected influence on the 
organisational risk propensity (Table 2.2, p. 38). 
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Table 2.2 Pablo and Javidan‟s conceptualisation of factors that influence 
organisational risk propensity 










BoD risk taking 
propensity 
+ the BoD has the power to disapprove any 
risk taking decisions which do not 





Shareholder demands M If shareholders expect quick/stable 
dividends, they are likely to accept/reject 







Competition U N/A 
Uncertainty avoidance - Organisations in a country characterised 
by a high level of uncertainty avoidance 
tend to be conservative and have low risk 
taking propensities. 
Industry recipes * Industry „recipes‟ may contribute to the 
development of particular within-industry 
managerial orientations to what is 
appropriate risk. 
„+‟/ „-‟: positive/negative relationship between the factor and risk propensity 
„M‟: mixed relationships; „U‟: the relationship is unknown 
„*‟ refers to a special explanation 
(Source: Adapted from Pablo and Javidan, 2002) 
 
Although Pablo and Javidan (2002) is not as comprehensive as Baird and 
Thomas (1985) in terms of the range of factors, some factors, such as BoD 
risk taking propensity, shareholder requirements and competition, are 
consistent with the arguments in practitioner literature and are therefore 
further explored in this study. No explanations were provided for the other 
factors, namely the organisation‟s performance, senior management risk 
propensity and regulatory environment, however it is reasonable to expect 
that they may exert some influence on organisation‟s willingness to take 
risks. As such they are also included for further investigation. This study 
excludes two factors from Pablo and Javidan (2002), uncertainty avoidance 
and industry recipes. First of all, this study believes that the uncertainty 
avoidance of a country is unlikely to have a direct impact on the 
organisation‟s risk propensity. Instead, it is more likely to directly influence 
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the risk propensity of the BoD, which may in turn shape the organisation‟s 
risk propensity. With regard to the factor of industry recipes, it is unclear as 
to what exactly it entails due to a lack of definition from the authors, and 




Approximately at the same time as Pablo and Javidan (2002), Bhatta (2003) 
made another contribution to the topic of risk appetite. The research 
maintained that an organisation needs to take the right types and amount of 
risk in accordance with its risk appetite, which varies according to any 
single or combination of a number of factors (Table 2.3, p. 40). It is 
interesting to note that some proposed factors, such as organisational 
strategy, organisation‟s culture, and responsible minister‟s risk appetite, 
correspond well with the practitioner risk appetite literature. According to 
Bhatta (2003), „organisational strategy‟ equates to the factor of „objectives‟, 
while „the minister‟s risk appetite‟ equates to the factor of „risk propensity 
of the decision maker‟, who could be the CEO, the BoD or the EC. Other 
factors, such as the degree of organisational access to information and the 
age of the organisation, are also deemed important in potentially shaping an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. For example, the degree of organisational 
access to information, which coincides with the information systems in 
Baird and Thomas (1985), may positively influence the risk appetite. If an 
organisation can access to information quickly and efficiently, it is more 
likely to make timely and well-informed actions in response to risks, hence 
increasing its willingness to take risk. With regard to the organisation‟s age, 
Bhatta (2003) argued that it would negatively influence its risk appetite. 
This is rather interesting, as the relationship could also be positive, as older 
organisations are more likely to have more resources, be more experienced 
in taking risks, and have higher risk management capability and risk 





Some factors in Bhatta‟s (2003) work, such as the fuzziness of 
organisation‟s mandate, the intractability of the problem being dealt with 
and the manager‟s style, were not clearly defined and so the nature of the 
influence on risk appetite was vague. These factors have therefore been 
excluded from this investigation. 
 
Table 2.3 Bhatta‟s conceptualisation of factors that influence an 
organisation‟s risk appetite  
Factors Proposed influence on risk appetite 
Fuzziness in the 
organisational mandate 
The greater the fuzziness in the organisational mandate, the 
lower the risk appetite. 
Intractability of the 
problem being dealt with 
The greater the intractability of the problem the organisation is 
dealing with, the lower the risk appetite. 
Organisational objectives The more aggressive the organisational objectives, the greater 
the risk appetite. 
Degree of organisational 
access to information 
The greater the degree of organisational access to relevant 
information, the greater the appetite for risk. 
Organisation‟s behaviour 
and culture 
The more stable an organisation‟s behaviour and culture, the 
greater the risk appetite. 




The greater the responsible minister‟s risk appetite, the greater 
the risk appetite. 
Age of the organisation The greater the age of the organisation, the less the risk 
appetite. 
(Source: Adapted from Bhatta, 2003) 
 
Harwood et al. (2009) 
 
The works of Baird and Thomas (1985), Pablo and Javidan (2002) and 
Bhatta (2003) are all conceptual research. The study of Harwood et al. 
(2009) seems to be the first empirical research that holistically examines 
factors influencing organisational risk propensity. Using a grounded theory 
approach, they developed a framework, comprising ten constituents that 
determine an organisational risk propensity (Table 2.4, p. 42). Notably, the 
terms used by Harwood et al. (2009) to describe the ten constituents are 
largely different from those commonly seen in the literature, with one 
exception being the degree of regulation. The reason for this could well be 
the use of the grounded theory approach, which emphasises on preserving 
the perspectives of the original data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), so that the 
authors retained the term used by their informants. Despite this, based on 
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the explanations of Harwood et al. (2009) some corresponding parallels can 
be identified in the literature. For example, risk rhetoric is similar to the 
notion of framing, which is a factor in the model of Baird and Thomas 
(1985). Risk rewards may coincide with that of remuneration (Sanders and 
Hambrick, 2007). Risk review may be better termed as risk reporting 
(Deumes, 2008; Linsley and Shrives, 2005). Finally, management style, 
referring to the extent to which management actions are transparent in the 
organisation (Harwood et al., 2009), could be named as transparency of 
actions, a factor which is negatively associated with organisational risk 
propensity (Houston et al., 2010; John et al., 2008). The remaining 
constituents, risk approach, risk encouragement, risk perspective, risk 
rhetoric and risk ownership, are arguably the features or characteristics of an 
organisation‟s risk culture (Harwood et al., 2009), which has been 
recognised an important factor influencing an organisation‟s risk appetite 
(Gontarek, 2016; Hillson and Murry-Webster, 2012; Power et al., 2013; 
Rittenberg and Martens, 2012). 
 
According to Harwood et al. (2009), this framework can be used as a basis 
for a survey to measure an organisation‟s risk propensity. Each constituent 
represent a continuum ranging from risk-averse to risk-seeking. The 
organisation‟s risk propensity is the average of the sum of all constituents. 
While one may question this methodology, it does offer a viable means to 














Table 2.4 Constituents of organisational risk propensity  
Constituents Proposed influence on risk propensity 
Risk approach The extent to which risks are managed proactively, ranging from a 
reactive „crisis management‟ mode to a proactive „planned approach‟. 
The higher the extent, the higher the risk propensity. 
Risk horizon The period of time between identifying a potential risk and the 
expected or actual realisation of the risk, ranging from short term to 
long term. The longer the term, the higher the risk propensity. 
Management style The level of transparency of management actions. The lower the 
transparency, the higher the risk propensity. 
Degree of 
regulation 
The level of external regulation, ranging from „regulated‟ environment 




The level of support for risk taking, ranging from „cautious 
encouragement‟ to „positive encouragement‟. The more support for 
risk taking, the higher the risk propensity. 
Risk perspective Whether decision makers view risk as having „negative‟ or „positive‟ 
connotations. The more positive view, the higher the risk propensity. 
Risk reviews The frequency of reviews, updates and revisions of potential risks, 
ranging from „static‟, meaning the review is a one-off exercise, to 
„dynamic‟, which refers to ongoing updates and revisions. The more 
frequent of the review, the higher the risk propensity. 
Risk rhetoric The language and phraseology used by team members when 
communicating potential risks. Ranging from „indirect‟ 
communication, such as „If…then…‟ to „direct‟ communication. The 
more direct, the higher the risk propensity. 
Risk rewards Rewards for risk taking, ranging from „non-existent‟ to 
„proportionate‟. The higher the rewards, the higher the risk propensity. 
Risk ownership The nature of ownership that individuals have of the risks once they 
have been identified and allocated to their responsibility. Ranging 
from „forced‟ to „voluntary‟. The more voluntary, the higher the risk 
propensity. 
(Source: Adapted from Harwood et al., 2009) 
 
Overall, the abovementioned four key studies (Baird and Thomas, 1985; 
Bhatta, 2003; Harwood et al., 2009; Pablo and Javidan, 2002) contribute to 
a preliminary understanding of the „big picture‟ depicting the factors that 
could shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. In addition to these four studies, 
the broader organisational risk taking literature has suggested a number of 
other factors that may shape the risk appetite. In order to holistically analyse 
these factors, as with the practitioner literature they have also been grouped 
into organisational, decision-maker, and environmental factors. This 
categorisation has been supported by several organisational risk scholars 
(e.g. Baird and Thomas, 1985; Palmer and Wiseman, 1999). The following 





2.2.2.2 Organisational factors 
 
Performance of the organisation 
 
Due to the prominence of BTOF (Cyert and March, 1963) and TRT (Staw et 
al., 1981), an organisation‟s performance is perhaps the most studied factor 
that shapes an organisation‟s willingness to take risk. Performance refers to 
an organisation‟s actual performance compared to its aspirations, which is 
not limited to the financial sense. While there is general consensus that 
performance that meets or exceeds aspirations reduces the organisation‟s 
willingness to take risk (Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996), because 
organisations tend to avoid taking on extra risk that might undermine its 
current performance, disparity arises when considering the effect of 
underperformance on organisational risk propensity, i.e. the performance 
level is below the aspirations. 
 
There are two opposing perspectives in the literature concerning the effect 
of underperformance on the organisation‟s willingness to take risk. One 
perspective, which seems to reflect most empirical studies in this regard, 
suggests an increased organisational risk propensity in response to 
underperformance, because the potential return from taking on extra risks 
may compensate the organisation‟s underperformance (Bromiley, 1991; 
Chen and Miller, 2007; Greve, 1998). The other suggests that performance 
below aspirations will likely to reduce the organisational risk propensity, 
because poor performance will trigger a rigid and change-resistance 
response from the decision makers, who will then steer the organisation 
back to their established standard operating procedures and will operate in 
domains where the organisation is familiar with and has greatest control 
(Cameron et al., 1987; Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Jung and Bansal, 2009; 
Staw et al., 1981). 
 
Contributing to the above debate, Shimizu (2007) argues that it is possible 
for an underperforming organisation to exhibit both risk-seeking and risk-
averse behaviours, which depends on how big the performance gap is. When 
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performance is not far from the aspiration, organisations tend to view this 
gap as repairable by taking on additional risk. However, when the 
performance is far from the aspiration, organisations will no longer perceive 
the gap as repairable but instead as a threat to their survival, hence the 
willingness to return to basics and cut off risk-taking activities (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007). 
 
The presence of other organisational factors may also shape the effect of 
performance on organisational risk propensity. For example, Audia and 
Greve (2006) suggest that organisational size, measured by the amount of 
available resources, moderates the relationship between performance below 
aspirations and risk propensity. Specifically, large organisations, which tend 
to possess significant amount of resources and thus be buffered from the 
threat of failure, are more likely to make risk-seeking decisions in response 
to underperformance. On the contrary, small firms with limited resources 
are more vulnerable than large firms, and therefore are more likely to 
perceive a drop in performance as a step closer to organisational failure, 
thus triggering a reduced willingness to take risks. The effect of 




Another factor likely to influence risk propensity is an organisation‟s 
ownership structure, which depicts the types and composition of different 
shareholders within an organisation (Tricker, 2012). Typically, the 
shareholders can come from both inside and outside of the organisation. 
While inside owners often refer to executives and managers, outside owners 
could include individuals, families, and institutional investors. An 
organisation may be owned largely by either inside or outside owners, but 
the degree of their influence on organisational risk propensity varies 
(Mishra, 2011). For example, Saunders et al. (1990) compared the risk 
propensities of outsider-owned and insider-owned organisations, and found 
that the former are generally more risk-seeking than the latter. They argued 
that outside-owners are opportunistic and more inclined to take risks for a 
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higher and quicker return, whereas inside-owners have other key concerns 
such as the security of their job position (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; May, 
1995).  
 
With regard to an insider-owned organisation, the level of insider ownership 
has been found to be positively associated with the organisational risk 
propensity, i.e. the higher level of the insider ownership, the more risks an 
organisation tends to take (Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Carpenter, et al., 
2003). The reason may be that insiders have their personal wealth vested in 
the organisation, so that they want to take more risks to maximise the 
shareholder value (May, 1995; Saunders et al., 1990). For an outsider-
owned organisation, the relationship between the managerial ownership and 
the organisational risk propensity remains positive, but it seems that the 
outside owners have the major impact (Nguyen, 2012; Wright et al., 1996). 
For example, Mishra (2011) found that a company‟s risk taking is positively 
related with the number of large external shareholders. Further, different 
types of outside owners may influence the organisational risk propensity in 
different ways. For instance, family investors have been found to be rather 
conservative and thus impose a negative influence on organisational risk 
propensity, because they want to transfer their ownership to the next 
generation (Kraiczy et al., 2015; Paligorova, 2010). On the other hand, 
institutional investors, such as banks, mutual funds, and investment 
companies, are argued to demand quick returns (Oak and Upneja, 2009; 
Weissmann, 2012) and thus exhibit a positive influence on organisational 
risk propensity (Barry et al., 2011; García-Kuhnert et al., 2015). Overall, the 
effect of ownership structure on an organisation‟s risk appetite is explored 




Firm size is argued to have a positive relationship with an organisation‟s 
risk propensity (Wall, 2005a). Commonly measured by the total amount of 
available resources (Audia and Greve, 2006), large organisations have more 
resources than small organisations, which can be used to support desired 
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risk-taking activities and also buffer from potential failures. Therefore, the 
risk appetite of a large organisation is often found to be higher than a small 
organisation. For example, the study of 50 US-based companies in the 
petroleum industry by Wall (2005b) found a significant positive correlation 
between firm size and organisational risk propensity. 
 
Another explanation of the positive association between firm size and risk 
propensity is that large organisations may have a too-big-to-fail mentality 
(Bhagat et al., 2015; Chang, 2010; Mattana et al., 2015). This mentality 
assumes that the government and the public will intervene and save the 
organisation in case of a risk-taking failure (Mattana et al., 2015). A number 
of empirical studies in the banking sector have confirmed the existence of 
this mentality in large organisations and its effect on organisational risk 
propensity. For example, Gropp et al. (2014) and Volz and Wedow (2011) 
found that government‟s bailout guarantees of large banks in many 
countries has led to the formulation of this mentality in decision makers, 
which substantially increased the banks‟ willingness to take risks. The effect 
of firm size on an organisation‟s risk appetite is investigated in this research. 
 
Need for innovation 
 
Another factor that might influence an organisation‟s risk propensity is the 
organisation‟s need for innovation. While some scholars argue that 
innovation is an indicator of an organisation‟s risk propensity (Baysinger 
and Hoskisson, 1989; Chen, 2009), increasing evidence has shown that the 
increasing need for innovation requires an organisation to have a higher 
willingness to accept and engage in more risky product and service 
innovation trials, so that the organisation can maintain its competitive 
advantage over its rivals. As such, the need for innovation is positively 
associated with the organisational risk propensity. This relationship is 






Perceived level of risks in the external environment 
 
An organisation‟s perceived level of risks in the external environment may 
be negatively associated with its willingness to take risks. In other words, 
the higher the perceived risk in an organisation‟s external environment, the 
lower the propensity to take risk. For example, Panzano and Roth (2006) 
found that mental healthcare providers‟ propensity to adopt innovative 
mental health practices is negatively influenced by its perceived risk of their 
patients‟ acceptance resulted from adopting the practice. However, some 
scholars argue that an organisation‟s risk perception does not influence its 
risk propensity, but influences the actual risk behaviour. For instance, Kull 
et al. (2014) found that firms who perceive a higher level of risk in the 
external context chose more reliable, but also more expensive supplier, a 
behaviour considered to be risk-averse. The effect of perceived level of risks 





Corporate transparency refers to the extent to which relevant and reliable 
information about an organisation, such as its performance, governance, 
business model and strategy, is available to its external stakeholders 
(Bushman, 2015; Jayaraman and Kothari, 2013). Its potential effect on 
organisational risk taking is an under-researched topic and existing 
contributions are almost exclusively concentrated in the banking sector. The 
key argument is that transparency tends to undermine an organisation‟s 
willingness to take risks (Houston et al., 2010; Nier and Bauman, 2006; 
Wang et al., 2015). This is because increased transparency provides 
stakeholders with more information about the organisation, so that they can 
better monitor its performance and scrutinise the organisation‟s decisions 
(Jayaraman and Kothari, 2013; Leuz et al., 2009). The fear of stakeholders‟ 
reactions tends to discourage the decision makers from taking risks 




However, having a lower risk appetite due to increased transparency is not 
necessarily unfavourable. Several scholars pointed out that increased 
transparency could encourage the organisation to act more prudently and 
improve risk management practices, therefore avoiding careless risk-taking 
decisions (Dhouibi et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2015). For example, Bourgain 
et al. (2012) found that sufficient transparency is necessary to ensure safe 
risk management in banks. Hirtle (2007) discovered that greater information 
disclosure is associated with more efficient and better quality risk-taking, 
which subsequently improves the organisation‟s performance. Overall, the 
effect of transparency on an organisation‟s risk appetite is explored in this 
research. 
 
2.2.2.3 Decision-maker factors 
 
Based on the agency perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989) and the upper echelon 
theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), an organisation‟s top decision makers 
(i.e. the BoD and the EC) and their characteristics are likely to play a huge 
role in influencing the organisation‟s willingness to take risks (Belghitar and 
Clark, 2012; Kraiczy et al., 2015; Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 2012). This 
section discusses the frequently mentioned decision maker factors that may 




One stream of research has examined whether the composition of BoD 
affect the organisation‟s risk propensity, within which a number of scholars 
focused on the potential effect of BoD size on organisational risk propensity 
(Cheng, 2008; Nakano and Nguyen, 2012; Pathan, 2009; Wang, 2012). For 
example, Cheng (2008) found that UK firms with larger BoDs tend to take 
less risk. The reason is that larger BoDs have greater difficulty in reaching 
consensus in risky decisions, and thus the final decision is often a less 
extreme, compromised position among the individual positions of the BoD 
(Kogan and Wallach, 1964). Likewise, the empirical studies of Pathan (2009) 
and Wang (2012) also demonstrated that increasing BoD size tends to 
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reduce organisational risk taking. Nakano and Nguyen (2012) added that 
this negative effect of BoD size on organisational risk propensity might be 
moderated by the number of risk taking choices available to the organisation. 
Goodstein et al. (1994) argued that the negative effect might not always in 
place. Overall, the potential relationship between BoD size and risk appetite 




While Goodstein et al. (1994) found no significant correlation between BoD 
size and corporate risk taking, BoD diversity was found to negatively 
impact on risk taking. The authors explained that higher diversity among the 
BoD may lead to conflicting views about engaging risky activities, and 
therefore limit the BoD‟s ability to take timely decisions as a whole. These 
authors conclude that organisations with diverse BoDs are less likely to take 
risks than those with homogeneous boards. Supporting this argument, 
Lenard et al. (2014) and Gulamhussen and Santa (2015) found that a more 
diverse BoD (in terms of gender) shows less willingness to take risks than a 
more homogeneous BoD. However, such a relationship did not appear in the 
recent study of Sila et al. (2016). Nevertheless, whilst BoD diversity 
reduces risk propensity, it has been argued to improve the quality of the 
final decisions due to the consideration of different views (Kor, 2006; 
Rhode and Packel, 2010). 
 
While the above research highlights the crucial influence of BoD on firm 
risk propensity, the upper echelons scholars (e.g. Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1996) argue that an organisation‟s top management team, i.e. the EC, have a 
stronger influence on the organisation‟s behaviour than the BoD. In this 
regard, the diversity of the EC is likely to have a more influential role than 
the BoD on risk propensity. The study of Berger et al. (2014) into bank risk 
taking concluded that a bank with a diverse EC (a mix of age, gender and 
education background) tends to have a lower risk propensity. A similar 
negative relationship was also confirmed in the study of Baixauli-Soler et al. 
(2015), where gender diversity among the executive team was found to 
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discourage the organisation to take risk. Overall, the effect of decision 
maker diversity on an organisation‟s risk appetite is explored in this 
research. 
 
Performance-based executive remuneration 
 
Performance-based executive remuneration has been a popular topic for 
organisational risk taking researchers. While the remuneration package 
often includes a mix of cash bonus and stock options (Chien et al., 2013), 
most scholars seem to have focused on how stock options may influence an 
organisation‟s risk propensity (Coles et al., 2006; Sanders and Hambrick, 
2007; Wen and Chen, 2008; Wright et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2007). For 
example, Wen and Chen (2008) studied 337 CEOs in the insurance industry 
during 1992 to 2004 and found that CEO stock options are a significant 
driver of an organisation‟s propensity to take risk. From an agency 
perspective, this is because the stock options have effectively aligned the 
interest of the executives to the shareholders. Assuming that higher risk 
yields higher return, the stock options encourage the CEO to take more risks 
in order to maximise shareholder returns as well as his own profits 
(Eisenmann, 2002). Despite some exceptions (Honoré et al., 2015; Kim et 
al., 2008), most studies on executive remuneration support this finding 
(Sanders and Hambrick, 2007; Wright et al., 2007). Nevertheless, Wright et 
al. (1996) argued that such a positive influence may become negative when 
the CEO has accumulated a fair amount of stocks, in which case the CEO 
would want to protect the personal wealth vested in the organisation, thus 
triggering the organisation to become conservative and risk-averse (Devers 
et al., 2008; Seo and Sharma, 2013). As such, the inappropriate use of stock 
options has led to various firm-level project failures, such as unsuccessful 
M&As (Honore et al., 2015) and insufficient innovation projects (Graham et 
al., 2005). In other words, the stock options exhibit an inverted U-shaped 
influence on organisational risk propensity (Baixauli-Soler et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, Seo and Sharma (2013) warned that the performance-based 
remuneration overly focusing on achieving performance goals may not 
necessarily promote constructive risk-seeking behaviour. The potential 
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With the underlying belief is that CEO has the ultimate power and authority 
for an organisation‟s decision making (Barker and Mueller, 2002; Herrmann 
and Datta, 2005), some scholars have investigated the effect of CEO 
emotions on organisational risk taking. Drawing on extensive psychology 
research where an individual‟s emotional state have been found to affect 
how he/she would take risk (Chou et al., 2007; Forgas, 1995; Grable and 
Roszkowski, 2008; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Kliger and Levy, 2003), it is 
reasonable to assume that the emotions of the CEO may shape his/her 
decisions related to organisational risk taking. For example, Delgado-Garcia 
et al. (2010) analysed the influence of the stable, long-term emotional traits 
of CEOs on bank risk taking. Their results show that negative CEO 
emotions reduce the organisation‟s risk propensity. The potential impact of 
CEO emotions on risk appetite is further explored in this research. 
 
2.2.2.4 Environmental factors 
 
The influence of an organisation‟s external environment on its risk decision 
making cannot be overlooked (Palmer and Wiseman, 1999; Voss et al., 
2008). While research has identified several environmental factors that are 
likely to influence organisational risk propensity, such as regulation 
(Harwood et al., 2009), shareholder demands (Pablo and Javidan, 2002), 
economy (Baird and Thomas, 1985), and competition (Pablo and Javidan, 
2002), the question of how these factors may individually influence 




The regulation by which an organisation has to abide by has been argued to 
influence an organisation‟s risk propensity (Bargeron et al., 2010; Cohen et 
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al., 2013; Devers et al., 2008; Hoque et al., 2015). Since regulation is 
typically introduced to encourage desirable behaviour and prevent 
wrongdoings, scholars appear to agree that the regulation is likely to reduce 
the organisation‟s propensity to take risk. However, empirical evidence on 
the effect of regulation on organisational risk propensity is rather limited 
and only a few studies have investigated this issue. For instance, Konishi 
and Yasuda (2004) examined the determinants of risk taking in Japanese 
banks and found that the required compliance with a restrictive regulation 
decreased the bank‟s risk propensity. Bargeron et al. (2010), Cohen et al. 
(2013) and Devers et al. (2008) found that the introduction of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act has greatly undermined the organisations‟ willingness to take risk 
for public companies in the US. The potential impact of regulation on risk 
appetite is further explored in this research. 
 
Level of competition 
 
A number of scholars have argued that the level of competition among 
rivals may influence an organisation‟s willingness to take risks (Jimenez et 
al., 2013; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Tabak et al., 2012; Yeyati and 
Micco, 2007). Competition encourages organisational efficiency and 
information sharing, and creates a sense of urgency to continuously improve 
oneself (Liu et al., 2012). While the conventional view suggests that 
competition induces risk taking (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Martinez-
Miera and Repullo, 2010), an increasing number of studies, particularly in 
banking, have shown contradictory findings. For example, while Liu et al. 
(2012) found no relationship between competition and organisational risk 
taking in the South East Asia banking sector, the large-scale study of Yeyati 
and Micco (2007) showed that competition reduces banks‟ willingness to 
take risk. These results differ from Tabak et al. (2012), who found an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and bank risk. In other 
words, banks tend to show a higher risk propensity when facing average 
level of competition, and show a lower risk propensity when facing either 
low or high level of competition. Nevertheless, most of these studies could 
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not offer a possible reason underpinning the observed relationships between 
competition and firm risk taking, which this research seeks to explore. 
 
Overall, the above review into the organisational risk taking literature has 
identified a number of factors that influence an organisation‟s risk 
propensity (Table 2.5, p. 54). These factors have complemented the 
practitioner literature and considerably enriched the „picture‟ of the factors 
that may shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. However, for several reasons 
there is a need to go beyond the scope of the organisational risk taking 
literature to continue exploring the potential factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. Firstly, existing literature on organisational risk 
propensity, while larger than the practitioner literature, is still relatively 
limited (Harwood et al., 2009). Also, many of the studies reviewed herein 
have examined the construct of organisational risk taking, which is often 
interpreted as the actual risk behaviour. While risk propensity and risk 
behaviour are closely related but different concepts (Das and Teng, 2001; 
Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Sitkin and Weingart, 1995), it is unclear whether 
factors influencing organisational risk behaviour also influence risk 
propensity. Furthermore, there is a more extensive and advanced literature 
on individual risk taking, including considerable research into the factors 
that influence an individual‟s risk propensity. Several organisational risk 
taking researchers (Baird and Thomas, 1985; Harwood et al., 2009; Sitkin 
and Pablo, 1995) have argued that there are parallels between individuals 
and organisations and organisational risk taking researchers should draw 
upon the rich insights of the literature on individual risk taking. Therefore, 
the following section examines pertinent research on individual risk taking 










Table 2.5 Evidence from the organisational risk taking literature on factors 





Organisational factors   
Aggressiveness of 
objectives 
+ Bhatta, 2003 
Degree of access to 
information 
+ Baird and Thomas, 1985; Bhatta, 2003 
Organisation‟s age - Bhatta, 2003 
Risk reporting + Deumes, 2008; Harwood et al., 2009; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2005 
Transparency of actions - Harwood et al., 2009; Houston et al., 
2010; John et al., 2008; Nier and 
Bauman, 2006; Wang et al., 2015; 
Performance  M Bromiley, 1991; Chen and Miller, 2007; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Greve, 1998; 
Jung and Bansal, 2009; Shimizu, 2007  
Ownership structure M Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Carpenter, 
et al., 2003; Mishra, 2011; Saunders et 
al., 1990 
Firm size + Bhagat et al., 2015; Chang, 2010; 
Mattana et al., 2015; Wall, 2005a 
Need for innovation + Baysinger and Koskisson, 1989; Chen, 
2009 
Perceived level of risk in the 
environment 
- Kull et al., 2014; Panzano and Roth, 
2006 
Decision-maker factors   
BoD risk propensity + Bhatta, 2003; Pablo and Javidan, 2002 
BoD size M Cheng, 2008; Goodstein et al., 1994; 
Nakano and Nguyen, 2012; Pathan, 
2009; Wang, 2012; 
BoD diversity M Gulamhussen and Santa, 2015; Lenard et 
al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016 
EC risk propensity + Bhatta, 2003; Pablo and Javidan, 2002 
CEO emotions + Delgado-Garcia et al., 2010 
Performance-based 
remuneration 
M Baixauli-Soler et al., 2015; Coles et al., 
2006; Honoré et al., 2015; Seo and 
Sharma, 2013; Sanders and Hambrick, 
2007; Wen and Chen, 2008; Wright et 
al., 2007  
Environmental factors   
Degree of regulation - Bargeron et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 
2013; Hoque et al., 2015 
Shareholder demands M Pablo and Javidan, 2002 
Economy + Baird and Thomas, 1985 
Level of competition M Jimenez et al., 2013; Martinez-Miera 
and Repullo, 2010; Tabak et al., 2012; 
Yeyati and Micco, 2007 
Note: „+‟/„-‟ indicates the factor is positively/negatively related with risk propensity. 






2.2.3 Evidence from the individual risk taking literature 
 
Within the literature on individual risk taking, individual risk propensity 
(also termed as risk tolerance) has long been a popular research topic (Cho 
and Lee, 2006; Kull et al., 2014; Roszkowski and Davey, 2010). In an 
attempt to understand the risk propensity of an individual, scholars have 
highlighted the need to clarify a key conceptual issue, concerning whether 
individual risk propensity is a pre-dispositional personality feature that is 
stable over time, or a behavioural tendency that is not only determined by 
the individual‟s biological makeup and early childhood experiences but also 
varies according to changes in one‟s external environment (Blais and Weber, 
2006; Roszkowski and Davey, 2010). This assumption is critical in 
determining the scope of the potential factors that influence an individual‟s 
risk propensity. While some researchers argue that individual risk 
propensity is a fixed personality trait (Roszkowsk and Davey, 2010; 
Schoemaker, 1993), much more empirical evidence has suggested that it is a 
situational behavioural tendency that varies according to changes in both 
internal and external environments (Cho and Lee, 2006; Kull et al., 2014; 
Nicholson et al., 2005). 
 
Adopting the view of the behavioural tendency, Irwin (1993) developed a 
conceptual model to explain the factors that drive the risk taking of 
adolescents. The model identifies two broad groups of factors that 
contribute to individual risk taking, namely, „biopsychosocial‟ and 
„environmental‟ factors. Biopsychosocial factors refer to inherent 
characteristics relating to an individual‟s biological, psychological, and 
social-cultural aspects, which are endogenous to an individual. 
Environmental factors, on the other hand, are exogenous and include aspects 
of an individual‟s social environment (Irwin, 1993). This classification later 
became the foundation of many studies investigating the factors that 
influence individual risk propensity (Grable, 2000; Grable and Joo, 2004; 
Grable and Lyntton, 1999; Harlow and Brown, 1990). For this reason, this 
classification is adopted in this research to structure the discussion on 








The most widely studied factor affecting an individual‟s risk propensity 
appears to be gender (Gilliam et al., 2010; Hariharan et al., 2000; 
Neelakantan, 2010; Wang et al., 2009; Watson and McNaughton, 2007). It 
is generally assumed that women tend to be more conservative and risk-
averse than men. This might be explained by biological differences between 
men and women as well as by certain socio-cultural gender differences 
(Felton et al., 2003). As to such differences, women have been found to 
produce higher levels of the enzyme monoamine oxidase that constrains the 
tendency to seek sensations, thereby reducing the possibility of taking risks 
(Zuckerman, 1994). Secondly, as contended by Slovic (1966), women are 
pressured from childhood into behaviours determined by gendered cultural 
roles, which might lead to a lower willingness to take risk. Girls who 
experience restrictive parenting during childhood tend to be resistant to 
taking risks in later life (Byrnes, 1998). 
 
While Feng and Seasholes (2008) and Masters (1989) and could not find 
any significant difference between male and female risk propensity, most 
empirical evidence have confirmed the assertion that women are more risk 
averse than men (Hariharan et al., 2000; Neelakantan, 2010; Wang et al., 
2009; Watson and McNaughton, 2007). For instance, the results of the large 
scale study by Neelakantan (2010), comprising a population of 18,469 with 
equal number of men and women, suggested that women, on average, is 
more risk averse than men. The author, however, warned that this observed 
gender difference in risk propensity could be different if environmental 
factors are taken into account. Supporting this, Schubert et al. (1999) found 
that when frame (an environmental factor) is considered, women are more 
risk-averse in a gain frame than men but appear more risk-seeking in a loss 
frame. This finding, however, contradicts to Powell and Ansic (1997), who 
found that women have a consistently lower risk propensity than men, 
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irrespective of environmental factors, including frame. As such, Powell and 
Ansic (1997) argued that gender difference in risk propensity is a general 




Another factor that is frequently argued to influence an individual‟s risk 
propensity is age (Faff et al., 2009; Mata et al., 2016; Pavic and Vojinic, 
2012; Wang et al., 2009). Empirical results of the effect of age on individual 
risk propensity appear to be mixed. While the conventional view seems to 
suggest that age has a negative and nonlinear relationship with individual 
risk propensity (Faff et al., 2009; Mata et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2009), as 
older people have less time to recover from potential losses (Grable and 
Lytton, 1999; Purkayastha, 2008), many empirical studies found that an 
individual‟s risk propensity increases with age (Grable and Lytton, 1999; 
Pavic and Vojinic, 2012). Despite these two competing perspectives, several 
other studies reported a mixed relationship between age and risk propensity 
(Al-Ajmi, 2008; Ardehali et al., 2005; Faff et al., 2008; Riley and Chow, 
1992). For example, Faff et al. (2008) found that the mixed relationship 
displays a U-shape, i.e. the risk tolerance will decrease to a certain point and 
then start to increase. This „turning point‟, according to Riley and Chow 
(1992), might be around the time of retirement. But Ardehali et al. (2005) 
suggested that it could well last until one reaches around the age of 75-80. 
However, Al-Ajmi‟s (2008) study into the determinants of risk propensity of 
individual investors in Bahrain revealed an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between risk propensity and age, suggesting that risk propensity increases 
with age until the investor approaches the retirement age. 
 
Whilst most of the empirical studies reported a relationship between age and 
individual risk propensity, several studies could not find a significant 
relationship (Grable and Lytton, 1998; Williams and Narendran, 1999). 
Additionally, it is suggested that other factors, such as the level of wealth, 
might moderate the relationship between age and risk propensity. For 
example, Morin and Suarez (1983) analysed the 1970 Canadian Survey of 
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Consumer Finance data and found that the level of wealth could change the 
nature of the relationship between age and risk propensity. In particular, 
individual risk propensity decreases with age when the individual has a low 
level of wealth, whereas when the individual has a high level of wealth, the 




Informed by the PT (Kaheman and Tversky, 1979), an individual‟s risk 
propensity is also argued to be pertinent to the way in which a risk situation 
is framed (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). The term „framing‟, according to 
Kuhberger (1998: 24), refers to „the wording of formally identical problems, 
i.e. to a semantic manipulation of prospects whereby the exact same 
situation is simply re-described‟. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) posited 
that people exhibit contradictory risk propensities when a risk situation is 
framed in two different ways, i.e. positively (gain) and negatively (loss), 
Generally there is a risk-averse tendency in positively framed choices, and a 
risk-seeking tendency in negatively framed choices. This is known as the 
„framing effect‟, found in both hypothetical and real-life situations 
(Kuhberger et al., 2002). 
 
Empirical evidence of the effect of framing on individual risk propensity 
contains a mixed opinion. For example, Roszkowski and Snelbecker (1990) 
examined 212 financial services professionals and observed a general 
pattern consistent with the framing effect. Kuhberger et al. (1999) found 
that framing as a factor exhibits a stronger influence in individual risk 
propensity than other factors, such as the size of payoff. However, Fagley 
and Kruger (1986) discovered no framing effects when they asked a large 
group of psychologists to respond to a hypothetical scenario that involves 
school dropout prevention programme. The results suggested that people do 
not necessarily become risk-seeking in the negative frame.  
 
The impact of the framing effect on individual risk propensity might also be 
moderated by other factors. For example, Seo et al. (2010) examined the 
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role of affect and framing on investor risk decision making. While the 
framing effect was observed, they also found that the positive affect could 
not only reduce the tendency to become more risk-averse in the gain frame, 
but also reduce the tendency to become risk-seeking in the loss frame, 
therefore suggesting a moderating effect of positive affect on the 




Another strand of research has focused on whether marital status affects 
individual risk propensity, where two opposing schools of thoughts seem 
prevalent. One school postulates that individuals who are single are more 
willing to take risks than those who are married (Daly and Wilson, 2001; 
Grable and Lytton, 1998; Hallahan et al., 2004). An explanation is that 
marriage places extra responsibilities on both individuals and highlights the 
need to maintain the relationship, so that married individuals would be less 
willing to take risk that could endanger the relationship (Grable and Lytton, 
1998). Individuals who are single do not have these extra responsibilities, 
and they also have less to lose compared to their married counterparts (Daly 
and Wilson, 2001).  
 
In contrast, the other school of thoughts argues that individuals who are 
married are more willing to take risks than individuals who are single 
(Masters, 1989; Save-Soderbergh, 2003; Watson and McNaughton, 2007). 
According to Save-Soderbergh (2003), married couples are likely to have a 
second stream of income which would provide extra protection if their own 
risky choice turns out to be a loss, suggesting that marriage encourages 
individual risk propensity. 
 
Empirical studies of the effect of marital status on individual risk propensity 
seem inconclusive. Chaulk et al. (2003), Grable and Joo (2004) and 
Hallahan et al. (2004) provided empirical support for the notion that married 
individuals are less willing to take risks than single individuals. Even so, 
Ardehali et al. (2005) found that rather than being significantly more, single 
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individuals were only slightly more willing to take risks than those who 
married. On the other hand, there are ample empirical studies offering 
contradictory evidence (Grable, 2000; Masters, 1989; Watson and 
McNaughton, 2007). For example, Masters (1989), investigating the effect 
of a number of demographic variables on individual risk propensity, found 




Many studies have also highlighted the impact of education on an 
individual‟s risk propensity (Al-Ajmi, 2008; Gilliam et al., 2010; Grable 
and Joo, 2004; Pavic and Vojinic, 2012). It is commonly assumed that 
individuals with a higher level of education are more willing to take risks, 
because they are likely to have a stronger ability in terms of understanding 
and processing the risk information, as well as estimating the consequences 
of taking the risk (Grable and Lytton, 1998). This stronger cognitive ability 
would make a well-educated individual more willing to take certain risks. 
Grable and Lytton (1998) suggested that education is the most reliable 
indicator for individual risk propensity. Despite the studies of Masters (1989) 
and Williams and Narendran (1999) where no significant relationship 
between education and individual risk propensity was found, most empirical 
studies of education and individual risk propensity largely support the 
positive relationship. Many large-scale quantitative studies (Al-Ajmi, 2008; 
Grable and Joo, 2004; Pavic and Vojinic, 2012) found evidence that a 
higher level of education is strongly associated with higher willingness to 
take risks.  
 




Child presence has also been argued to affect an individual‟s risk propensity 
(Chaulk et al., 2003; Faff et al., 2008; Pavic and Vojinic, 2012; Wang et al., 
2009). The general belief is that individuals with children have lower risk 
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propensity than childless individuals (Wang et al., 2009), because those 
with children require more resources to ensure the meeting of survival needs, 
and therefore are more reluctant to take risky investments (Chaulk et al., 
2003). Another reason could be that individuals who have children are more 
likely to require certainty in return on investments, so that they would take 
less risk to ensure financial security for their dependents (Venter, 2006).  
 
Empirical evidence of the effect of child presence on individual risk 
propensity seems inconclusive. For example, while Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek (1998) and Pavic and Vojinic (2012) observed that risk propensity 
is negatively correlated with the number of children, Faff et al. (2008) found 
that risk propensity increases with the number of dependent children. Other 
studies such as Hallanhan et al. (2003) and Bellante and Gren (2004) did not 
notice any significant relationship between risk tolerance and the number of 
children. Furthermore, other biopsychosocial and environmental factors, 
such as age and wealth, appear to moderate the relationship between 
individual risk propensity and child presence. For example, Chaulk et al. 
(2003) noted that although individuals with children are generally risk-
averse, when they have a high level of wealth, their willingness to take risks 
appear to be higher than childless individuals. The authors also found that 
young individuals with children showed a lower willingness to take risk 




A number of scholars have investigated whether the level of knowledge, 
acquired through either experience or education, shapes an individual‟s risk 
propensity (Grable, 2000; Masters, 1989; Watson and McNaughton, 2007). 
Grable (2000) argued that similar to education, knowledge is also a key 
factor underpinning an individual‟s willingness to take risks. In some cases, 
knowledge has been proved as an even more reliable factor than education, 
for instance in the study of Masters (1989). Watson and McNaughton (2007) 
found that individuals who have deeper knowledge about investments are 
more likely to invest in risky assets. They, therefore, suggested that 
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knowledge is positively related to individual risk propensity. It is important 
to note that a critical aspect of knowledge is the individual‟s previous 
experience. As observed by Post et al. (2008) and Thaler and Johnson 
(1990), prior experience, regardless of the outcome (i.e. positive or 
negative), tends to increase an individual‟s knowledge about a particular 




Since risk taking is motivated by rewards, several scholars have studied 
whether the level of the expected rewards shapes an individual‟s risk 
propensity (Holt and Laury, 2002; Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Post et 
al., 2008). For example, Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) examined the 
effect of high monetary rewards on individual risk propensity in China. 
They found no difference in risk propensity when the rewards are non-
existent or at a low level. However, when the monetary rewards reached at a 
high level, i.e. the equivalence of two or three times of a person‟s monthly 
salary, they discovered a strong positive relationship between individual risk 
propensity and rewards. The finding confirmed that individual risk 
propensity is driven by rewards, although the amount of rewards needs to be 
at a relatively high level. While this finding is supported by Holt and Laury 
(2002), Post et al. (2008) found that even when the expected reward is very 
high, individuals still refer to their past experience in helping them decide 
whether or not to take the risk. This suggests that past experience would 
mediate the relationship between reward and individual risk propensity. 
 
Overall, section 2.3.3 has examined the well-researched literature on 
individual risk taking and identified the factors that influence individual risk 
propensity (Table 2.6, p. 63). While the understanding of these individual-
level factors could benefit the quest for factors that shape an organisation‟s 
risk appetite, without an appropriate theoretical basis these individual-level 
factors cannot be directly applied in the organisational context, since they 
are derived from research focused on human beings rather than 
organisations. The „living organisations‟ thinking (de Geus, 1997; Maula, 
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2006; Wolfe, 2011), which views organisations as the same as human 
beings, provides a solid conceptual basis that enables the application of the 
findings from individual risk taking research to the organisational context. 
Informed by this notion, the „living composition‟ model (Maula, 2006) 
offers a robust conceptual framework to integrate the literature review 
findings into a unified model to explain the factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. The following section therefore introduces the 
„living organisations‟ thinking and the „living composition‟ model, and 
explains how these two perspectives can serve as an appropriate theoretical 
framework for the study of risk appetite. 
 
Table 2.6 Evidence from the individual risk taking literature on factors that 





Biopsychosocial factors   
Gender  * Gilliam et al., 2010; Neelakantan, 
2010; Hariharan et al., 2000; Wang et 
al., 2009; Watson and McNaughton, 
2007 
Age M Faff et al., 2009; Mata et al., 2016; 
Pavic and Vojinic, 2012; Wang et al., 
2009 
Framing M Kuhberger et al., 1999; Roszkowski 
and Snelbecker, 1990; Seo et al., 2010 
Marital status M Ardehali et al., 2005; Daly and Wilson, 
2001; Grable and Lytton, 1998; 
Hallahan et al., 2004; Watson and 
McNaughton, 2007 
Education + Al-Ajmi, 2008; Gilliam et al., 2010; 
Grable and Joo, 2004; Pavic and 
Vojinic, 2012 
Environmental factors   
Child presence M Chaulk et al., 2003; Faff et al., 2008; 
Pavic and Vojinic, 2012; Wang et al., 
2009 
Knowledge + Grable, 2000; Masters, 1989; Watson 
and McNaughton, 2007 
Rewards + Holt and Laury, 2002; Kachelmeier and 
Shehata, 1992; Post et al., 2008 
Note: „*‟: Men have higher risk propensity than women. 
„+‟ indicates the factor is positively related with individual risk propensity. 







2.3 The „Living organisations‟ thinking and the „Living 
composition‟ model 
 
2.3.1 The „living organisations‟ thinking 
 
In the field of business management, organisations are traditionally viewed 
as „machines‟, which is strongly influenced by the Newtonian model of the 
world (Tesson, 2006). However, this conventional „machine‟ view has been 
ineffective in explaining the dynamic behaviour of modern organisations, 
observed in the contemporary business environment (Draman, 2004). In the 
last two decades, there has been a noticeable shift in the view of 
organisations from the „machine‟ model to a new form that reflects the 
characteristics of living entities (Harder et al., 2004; Petzinger, 1999). In 
particular, there is ample evidence that organisations are increasingly seen 
as the same as human beings, which interact, adapt, and co-evolve with the 
environment (de Geus, 1997; Maula, 2006). For example, Vancouver (1996) 
argued that organisations and human beings are similar in the sense that 
they both set goals and develop processes to accomplish those goals. 
Wheatley and Kellner-Rogers (1995) posited that organisations feature the 
essential properties of human beings: creative, adaptive, self-organising, and 
learning. de Geus (1997) and Tracy (1994) considered organisations as 
possessing their own identities and unique personalities. Maula (2000) 
discovered that organisations are capable of „sensing‟ the changes from the 
environment, „creating‟ and „memorising‟ new knowledge, and „recalling‟ 
the stored knowledge when needed (von Krogh and Vicari, 1993). Wolfe 
(2011) argued that a human being is a perfect analogy for the more complex 
organisational body.  
 
This abovementioned perspective of viewing organisations as living entities 
(e.g. human beings) is known as the „living organisations‟ thinking. 
Stemmed from the living systems theory (Harder et al., 2004; Miller, 1978; 
Swanson, 2006) and the autopoiesis theory (Maturana and Varela, 1980; 
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1987), where human beings and organisations are considered as self-
producing living systems with different levels of complexity (Ashmos and 
Huber, 1987; Miller and Miller, 1990), the „living organisations‟ thinking 
provides a solid conceptual basis for the study of organisational behaviour 
to benefit from studies on human behaviour (Hall, 2005). This is because in 
the context of living systems, the characteristics of human beings are also 
evident in other living systems, including organisations (Miller and Miller, 
1990). This cross-level inference suggests that organisational researchers 
can draw on the work of physiologists and psychologists who study other 
living systems (Suan, 1994; Tracy and Swanson, 1993). Therefore, the 
„living organisations‟ thinking enables the study of risk appetite to draw 
upon the literature on individual risk taking. 
 
2.3.2 The „living composition‟ model 
 
Informed by the „living organisations‟ thinking, Maula (2006) developed 
and tested a model to describe the key components and processes of a living 
organisation, namely the „living composition‟ model (Figure 2.3, p. 66). A 
key feature of the model is that an organisation has an enabling 
infrastructure of ten strategic components that are continually reproduced by 
the organisation itself. These ten components include „identity‟, „perception 
of the environment‟, „strategy‟, „knowledge‟, „internal standards, processes 
and communication‟, „information and communication systems‟, „boundary 
elements‟, „interactive processes and communications with the 
environment‟, „triggers‟ and „experimentation‟. Table 2.7 (p. 68) offers an 
explanation of each component. The „living composition‟ model also 
highlights several cognitive processes within an organisation that are vital 
for its survival and growth in the changing environment, including sensing, 
interpreting, responding, reflecting and learning. Maula (2006) believes that 
the continuous updating of the ten strategic components, combined with 
their interrelationships and the cognitive abilities of sensing and memory, 
determine how an organisation would behave in the changing environment, 
including taking risks. As risk appetite is conceptualised in this research as 
an intention of an organisation to take risk (p. 6), the „living composition‟ 
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model provides a robust conceptual framework that can be used to explore 
the factors that shape this behavioural intention.  
 
Figure 2.3 The „living composition‟ model 
 
(Source: Maula, 2006: 80) 
 
The key reasons that underlie the adoption of the „living composition‟ 
model as a conceptual framework for this research are:  
 
 The „living composition‟ model provides a solid conceptual basis 
that allows the study of organisations to benefit from studies on 
individuals. Therefore, the model enables this research to draw upon 
individual risk taking literature to study the organisational construct 
of risk appetite. 
  
 The „living composition‟ model is not solely focused on the internal 
context of an organisation; the external environment to which 
organisation is exposed is also considered, as demonstrated in the 
inclusion of three external components (interactive process and 
communication with the environment, triggers, and 
experimentation). This indicates that the model allows for an 
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inclusive understanding of how a particular organisational 
behavioural intention, e.g. risk appetite, is shaped by a complex 
interplay between inherent organisational characteristics and internal 
processes and the external environmental forces. 
 
 The ten strategic components of the „living composition‟ model 
provide a more sophisticated structure to further classify the factors 
identified from the practitioner and academic literature into an 
interconnected whole, thus leading to the development of a 
conceptual framework of factors that shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite (Figure 2.4, p. 74). The strategic components of the model 
correspond well to the classification of the literature, where 
identified factors are typically grouped under organisational, 
decision-maker and environmental categories. As shown in Figure 
2.3 (p. 66), components 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 10 are internal to an 
organisation and can be seen as the „organisational‟ category; 
component 5 can be considered as the „decision-maker‟ category as 
it refers to specific roles that can effectively link the organisation 
with the environment; components 6, 7 and 8 are external to the 























Table 2.7 Ten strategic components of a living organisation 
Component Explanation 
Identity Identity refers to the organisation‟s history, mission, the way 
the organisation defines itself, and other essential 
characterising features, such as organisational image and 
culture. Identity helps to maintain an organisation‟s integrity 
and distinguishes the organisation from others. 
Perception of the 
environment 
This refers to the organisation‟s subjective perception of its 
external environment, based upon its own internal rules. The 
perception can be reflected in the organisation‟s strategies. 
Strategy Strategy refers to a plan that integrates an organisation‟s 
goals, policies, and actions into a cohesive whole. Strategy is 
based on identity, perception of the environment, and other 
relevant aspects. 
Knowledge Knowledge facilitates and regulates the self-producing 
process of the organisation and enables adequate behaviour in 




This includes various elements that influence the 
organisation‟s motivation and capability to learn, such as 
production processes, career structure, task definitions, 




This includes a variety of more or less structured information 
systems. The systems have a central role in enabling the 
integrated sensing and memory of an organisation. 
Boundary elements Boundary elements include various embedded roles and 
functions that enable the interaction between an organisation 
and its environment. Boundary elements enable the 
organisation‟s sensing ability by identifying triggers, by 
interaction, and by experimentation. 
Interactive Processes 
and Communication 
Interactive processes include the methods used to 
communicate and co-evolve with the environment. They also 
include social coupling that refers to communication with 
individuals from outside the organisation. 
Triggers Triggers are perturbations that may lead to compensations in 
an organisation‟s structure. Triggers do not necessarily come 
from the external environment; there may be internal triggers. 
Experimentation Experimentation helps an organisation to create new 
knowledge and learn about its environment through trial and 
failure. 





2.4 Towards a conceptual framework of factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite 
 
2.4.1 Identifying the parallels between individual factors and 
organisational factors 
 
Prior to developing the conceptual framework, it is vital to „translate‟ the 
factors identified through the literature on individual risk taking into their 
organisational equivalents. This section identifies these organisational 
equivalents. 
 
„Gender‟ to „Level of masculinity‟  
 
While gender plays a key role in shaping individual risk propensity (Gilliam 
et al., 2010; Hariharan et al., 2000; Neelakantan, 2010; Wang et al., 2009; 
Watson and McNaughton, 2007), it seems inappropriate to gauge and 
describe an organisation as either „male‟ or „female‟. Nevertheless, it may 
be more sensible to describe an organisation as being more masculine or 
feminine, based on particular characteristics of its organisational culture. 
According to Alvesson (2002), a „masculine organisation‟ is more likely to 
emphasise upon certain values and principles such as self-assertion, 
separation, independence, control, competition, focused perception, 
rationality and analysis, whereas a „feminine organisation‟ tends to embrace 
interdependence, cooperation, receptivity, acceptance, emotional tone, 
intuition and synthesising. Since individual risk taking research suggests 
that women are more risk-averse than men, it could be conjectured that an 
organisation‟s level of masculinity is positively related to its risk appetite. 
This positive relationship is explored in this research. 
 
„Age‟ to „Organisation‟s age‟ 
 
Individual risk taking research suggests that the age of a person is likely to 
be associated with his/her risk propensity (Faff et al., 2009; Mata et al., 
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2016; Pavic and Vojinic, 2012; Wang et al., 2009). Applying this factor into 
the organisational context, the organisational equivalent would be the 
organisation‟s age. There is some evidence in the organisational risk taking 
literature that the age of an organisation is related to its risk appetite (Bhatta, 
2003). As the individual risk taking literature presents a mixed result with 
regard to the „direction‟ of the relationship between age and risk propensity, 
one can suspect that the organisation‟s age has a mixed relationship with the 
risk appetite, which is investigated in this research. 
 
„Framing‟ to „Perceived level of risk in the environment‟ 
 
Individual risk taking research has demonstrated that the way individuals 
frame the external situation influences risk propensity (Kuhberger et al., 
1999; Roszkowski and Snelbecker, 1990; Seo et al., 2010). In particular, a 
positive framing of the external situation, i.e. a low level of perceived risk, 
reduces individual risk propensity; whereas a negative framing of the 
external situation, i.e. a high level of perceived risk, increases risk 
propensity (Tversky and Khanemann, 1981). The component of „perception 
of environment‟ in the living composition model might be the organisational 
equivalent to framing. It could be argued that the way an organisation 
perceives the environment also influences its risk appetite. One can suspect 
that a positive perception, i.e. a low level of perceived risk in the 
environment, reduces the risk appetite, and a negative perception, i.e. a high 
level of perceived risk in the environment, increases the risk appetite. This 
proposed relationship is further explored in this research. 
 
„Marital status‟ to „Alliances or partnerships‟ 
 
Individual risk taking research has highlighted that an individual‟s marital 
status is associated with his/her risk propensity (Daly and Wilson, 2001; 
Grable and Lytton, 1998; Hallahan et al., 2004;Watson and McNaughton, 
2007). Placed in the organisational context, the marital status of an 
individual could refer to whether the organisation has formed alliances or 
partnerships with other organisations. While a „married‟ organisation can 
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benefit from additional sources of capital, knowledge and skills from its 
„partner‟, it also needs to contribute these resources to its partner. As such, 
in line with the proposition of the individual risk taking literature, it could 
be argued that the alliances or partnerships of an organisation have a mixed 
relationship with the risk appetite, which is explored in the research. 
 
„Education‟ to „Ability to sense‟ 
 
Individual risk taking research has showed that education is a highly 
important factor of individual risk propensity (Al-Ajmi, 2008; Gilliam et al., 
2010; Grable and Joo, 2004; Pavic and Vojinic, 2012). Different levels of 
education equip a person with varying abilities to seek and filter information 
from the external environment, which is then used to make risk decisions. 
While it appears difficult to identify an organisational equivalent for 
education, the living composition model (Maula, 2006) indicates that an 
organisation‟s „education‟ might be coincided with its „sensing‟ ability. In 
other words, education can be understood as an organisation‟s ability to 
sense relevant and useful information from the environment. In line with the 
argument from the individual risk taking literature, it can be argued that an 
organisation‟s ability to sense is positively related with the risk appetite. 
This positive relationship is examined in the research. 
 
„Child presence‟ to „Number of subsidiaries‟ 
 
Child presence, as an environmental factor, has been highlighted as a factor 
that influences individual risk propensity (Chaulk et al., 2003; Faff et al., 
2008; Pavic and Vojinic, 2012; Wang et al., 2009). In the organisational 
context, child presence might refer to the presence of subsidiaries. It could 
be argued that the establishment of subsidiaries might reduce the 
organisation‟s risk appetite, because the organisation would need to invest 
considerable resources into the operation of the subsidiaries, thus 
undermining the capacity and capability of the parent organisation to take 
risks. However, it is also possible to conjecture that organisations with 
subsidiaries need to take more risks because they need the potential rewards 
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to satisfy their „dependents‟. As such, it can be conjectured that the number 
of subsidiaries would have a mixed relationship with the risk appetite. 
However, it might be more appropriate to view the „number of subsidiaries‟ 
as an organisational factor, because it reflects the composition of an 
organisation. The effect of „number of subsidiaries‟ on risk appetite is 
further explored in this research.  
 
„Knowledge‟ to „Organisation‟s knowledge of self and environment‟ 
 
Knowledge has been found as a key factor that increases an individual‟s risk 
propensity (Grable, 2000; Masters, 1989; Watson and McNaughton, 2007). 
Not only does a knowledgeable individual have a good level of self-
awareness, he or she also has a good level of understanding of the 
environment. Equally, a knowledgeable organisation should have a good 
level of knowledge about itself and the environment to make intelligent risk 
taking decisions. Consistent with the argument of the individual risk taking 
literature, it could be argued that an organisation‟s knowledge of self and 
environment is positively related to the risk appetite. Nevertheless, rather 
than viewing knowledge as an environmental factor as suggested by 
individual risk taking research, this study considers the knowledge of self 
and environment as embedded within an organisation and therefore as an 
organisational factor to be further explored. 
 
„Rewards‟ to „Expected rewards‟ 
 
Last but not least, individual risk taking research has highlighted that the 
level of expected (monetary) rewards associated with taking a particular risk 
is positively related with individual risk propensity (Holt and Laury, 2002; 
Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Post et al., 2008). This positive 
relationship is envisaged to be consistent in the organisational context, 
where an organisation could be more willing to take risks if expected 





2.4.2 The conceptual framework 
 
The review of three distinctive types of literature, i.e. the practitioner risk 
appetite literature, the organisational risk taking literature, and the 
individual risk taking literature, has identified a wide range of factors that 
could shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. In particular, some factors 
exhibit a positive relationship with the risk appetite; some exhibit a negative 
relationship; others pose a mixed relationship. Whilst the literature classifies 
the factors into three different categories, i.e. organisational, decision-maker, 
and environmental, the ten strategic components and their interrelationships 
depicted in Maula‟s (2006) living composition model offers a more 
sophisticated yet structured framework into the factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. Integrating the literature review with the living 
composition model, a conceptual framework (Figure 2.4, p. 74) is developed 
to guide the primary research phase of this study. The thought-process for 
mapping individual factors onto specific components of the living 
composition model is based on the explanations of the ten strategic 
components (Table 2.7, p. 68).  
 
The conceptual framework suggests three areas for further exploration. 
Firstly, while the literature identifies a wide range of factors, the 
understanding of how and why a particular factor shapes the risk appetite 
remains largely insufficient. Secondly, the conceptual framework provides 
the opportunity to explore the relative importance of identified factors to 
risk appetite, so that an understanding of the most important factors that 
shape an organisation‟s risk appetite could be established. Finally, since the 
„living composition‟ model consists of ten interrelated components, the 
conceptual framework also offers an opportunity to explore the 
interrelationships among the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite. An understanding of the interrelationships between different 
factors could enhance the analysis with regard to how an organisation‟s risk 
appetite could change based on the changes in the organisation‟s internal 




         
„Identity‟ 
 
 Risk culture  
 Firm size 
 Degree of 
masculinity 
 Organisation‟s age 
 Ownership structure 
 Performance 
 Number of 
subsidiaries 
„Perception of the environment‟ 




 Transparency of actions 
 Degree of access to 
information 
„Knowledge‟ 
 History of risk taking 
 Knowledge of self and 
environment 
 Risk management capability  
„Strategy‟ 
 Ambitiousness of objectives 
 
„Internal standards, processes, and 
communication‟ 
 Risk capacity 
 Risk reporting 
Risk appetite 
Organisational factors 
„Interactive processes and 
communication with the 
environment‟ 
 
 Alliances/partnerships  
 Shareholder demands  
 Stakeholder demands  
„Experimentation‟ 






 BoD risk propensity 
 BoD diversity 
 BoD size 
 EC risk propensity 
 CEO risk propensity 
 CEO emotions  
 Performance-based 
remuneration  




 Expected rewards  
 Economy 
 Degree of regulation  
 Level of competition 
 
Note: Dashed arrows represent the proposed relationships between individual components, as suggested by Maula (2006). 









This chapter presents the research methodology of this study. The design of 
this research followed Saunders et al.‟s (2012) „research onion‟ framework, 
including research philosophy, research approach, research strategy, 
sampling, data collection and analysis. A reflective account of the research 
process is also provided. 
 
3.1 Purpose of the study 
 
The first step to designing a research study is to understand and clarify the 
purpose of that study (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). Typically, a research 
study serves three different purposes: 1) to explore a new area of research; 2) 
to describe the characteristics of a phenomenon; or 3) to examine and 
explain whether or not a conjectured relationship holds true in a given 
context (Lee and Lings, 2008). Because these three purposes reflect an 
incremental pattern of knowledge development within a field, i.e. from 
unknown to knowing substantially, it has been argued that the choice of a 
study‟s purpose is primarily dependent upon the level of existing knowledge 
in the topic area, as well as the nature of the research questions (Sekaran and 
Bougie, 2013). 
 
The aim of this study is to identify and evaluate the factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite in the context of international hotel industry. 
Since risk appetite is an under-researched topic in the management domain 
(Aven, 2013; Gontarek, 2016; Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012), an 
explanatory study was not plausible, because it requires a considerable 
amount of existing research on the topic (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). It 
seemed that an exploratory study that aims to explore, rather than to 
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describe or explain, the topic in more depth was the most appropriate. Also, 
given that the two main research questions of this study, i.e. „what factors 
influence an organisation‟s risk appetite?‟, and „how do these factors 
influence the risk appetite?‟, are largely exploratory in nature, it seemed 
logical to follow through with an exploratory research purpose. 
 
3.2 Research philosophy 
 
The world in its physical and social manifestations may appear very 
differently in the eyes of different observers, including researchers. The 
differences in perspective reflect a variety of underpinning beliefs held by 
different individuals about the world and the nature of knowledge. The 
perspective that a researcher takes is known as a philosophical position 
(Saunders et al., 2012) and it is important to clarify this because it underpins 
the researcher‟s choice of methodology and data collection methods 
(Bryman, 2008; Creswell et al., 2011). An explicit discussion of 
philosophical position enables a researcher to formulate appropriate 
research designs, to determine the types of evidence needed, and to select 
the best means of collecting and interpreting data (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002). It also helps the researcher to identify limitations to the research and 
develop innovative designs that are appropriate for the study but beyond the 
current experience or resources of the researcher (Sekaran and Bougie, 
2013). 
 
Within the field of business and management research, three research 
philosophies appear predominant: positivism, interpretivism and 
pragmatism. Generally, positivism asserts that reality exists objectively and 
independently from human consciousness, and that knowledge is derived by 
observation of the world as external to human beings (Creswell and Clark, 
2011). In order to be valid, positivistic research must be value-free and 
remain uninfluenced by the researcher‟s own beliefs (Saunders et al., 2012). 
This philosophy embraces the methods of natural world inquiry and favours 
a deductive, hypothesis-testing approach to research, with the aim of 
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demonstrating causal relationships between constructs under study (Altinay 
et al., 2015; Johnson and Duberley, 2000).  
 
Interpretivism represents a belief that reality and knowledge are constructed 
from people‟s subjective perceptions and interpretations of the world. With 
an emphasis on human experiences, interpretivist research tends to be seen 
as biased and thus unable to claim to be value-free (Creswell and Clark, 
2011; Lee and Lings, 2008). Compared with positivism, interpretivism 
advocates an inductive, theory-building approach to research, with the aim 
of understanding deep meanings rather than demonstrating causality 
(Saunders et al., 2012). 
 
Pragmatism appreciates the value and strengths of both positivism and 
interpretivism, and attempts to incorporate their principles in order to 
answer the research question in a way that is most appropriate to achieve the 
research aim (Saunders et al., 2012). Pragmatism focuses on practicality and 
tends to utilise all possible approaches that might work in the research 
process. As such, studies informed by pragmatism often utilise a mixed-
methods approach that employs both qualitative and quantitative methods 
(Creswell, 2009). 
 
The literature on methodology suggests that there are no right or wrong 
choices in research philosophy and each has its own merits and limitations 
(Sekaran and Bougie, 2013; Creswell and Clark, 2011). Nevertheless, it may 
be that one philosophy appears more appropriate than others for a particular 
study, based on several factors, including the extent of existing knowledge 
in the research area, the nature of the research question and the researcher‟s 
skills (Altinay et al., 2015). Taking these factors into consideration, this 
study adopted the interpretivism. The justification is presented below: 
 
 Concerning the extent of existing knowledge in the research area, 
risk appetite is an under-researched topic with little existing 
research. In order to achieve the research aim, the researcher needs 
to explore practitioners‟ experience of risk appetite. Compared with 
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positivism and pragmatism, interpretivism is more suitable for 
exploratory studies and building theory in under-researched areas. 
As such, it was deemed the most appropriate choice.  
 
 With regard to the nature of the research questions, the main 
research questions proposed for this study are „What factors 
influence an organisation‟s risk appetite?‟, „How do these factors 
influence an organisation‟s risk appetite?‟ and „What are the most 
important factors?‟. These three questions, essentially exploratory in 
nature, call for a qualitative approach inherent in interpretivism. 
However, it is worthwhile to note the argument of Creswell (2008), 
who believed that „what‟ and „how‟ questions could also be 
answered via a positivism-informed quantitative approach. This 
leads to the next point of consideration, the skills of the researcher. 
 
 Considering the skills of the researcher, the researcher was more 
competent and experienced in conducting qualitative research, based 
on previous experiences of designing and conducting interviews and 
observations, and analysing qualitative data. As such, it seemed 
more sensible to adopt the interpretivism and follow a qualitative 
approach rather than a positivist or pragmatic approach, either of 
which is likely to require a large-scale quantitative element in the 
research.  
 
3.3 Research approach 
 
The choice of a particular research philosophy usually leads the researcher 
to employ a certain research approach and strategy (Bryman, 2008; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Saunders et al., 2012): positivism is often 
associated with the deductive approach and quantitative research strategy; 
interpretivism is associated with the inductive approach and qualitative 
strategy; pragmatism normally corresponds with the abductive approach and 
mixed-methods strategy. However, such a link is not always the case, for 
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example the seminal study of Hofstede (1984) on cultural differences 
utilised a large-scale quantitative approach, but Hofstede described his 
philosophy as non-positivism.  
 
This study adopted an inductive research approach, which is in line with the 
conventions of interpretivism. There are several reasons to justify this 
choice. The inductive approach has been argued as the most suitable 
approach for studying a new phenomenon, around which little or no 
previous research has been undertaken (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). As 
discussed earlier, risk appetite was a new area of research with little existing 
knowledge. Also, because this study aims to identify and understand the 
factors that influence an organisation‟s risk appetite, an inductive approach 
would enable the researcher to qualitatively explore the effects of the factors 
on risk appetite. Findings would emerge through an exploration of the 
subjective meanings, interpretations and experiences of the correspondents, 
in this case corporate executives and risk managers, who collectively 
determine the risk appetite of their companies. A deductive approach would 
be inappropriate to achieve the intended research aim, due to the lack of 
prior theoretical developments on the topic.  
 
It is worthwhile to mention that the abductive approach (Saunders et al., 
2012) seemed at first sight a viable alternative to induction, because it 
integrates the advantages of both inductive and deductive approaches and 
seems more likely to generate a comprehensive answer to the research 
questions. However, as discussed in the considerations of research 
philosophy, such a combination did not appear advisable in the light of the 
constraints of the researcher‟s skills. Also, pursuing an abductive approach 
might fail to generate the depth of knowledge that might be attained either 
by a purely inductive or deductive approach. Therefore, the inductive 






3.4 Research strategy 
 
The importance of determining a suitable research strategy to the overall 
research quality has been well documented in the literature. As suggested by 
Saunders et al. (2012), a research strategy is a specific plan for answering 
the research questions, which links the study‟s philosophical position with 
its choice of data collection and analysis techniques. Informed by the 
exploratory purpose of this study, the philosophy of interpretivism and the 
inductive research approach, the Case Study research strategy was adopted 
for this study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). The key reasons for selecting 
the Case Study strategy were: 1) It is a widely adopted research strategy 
particularly in the field of management and organisation studies (Bryman, 
2008; Gummesson, 2014); 2) It fits well with exploratory studies on new 
and under-researched phenomenon and is appropriate to answer „what‟ and 
„how‟ questions (Phillips and Pugh, 1994; Yin, 2003). 3) As there is limited 
existing knowledge on risk appetite, a Case Study strategy would help to 
generate rich insights into the concept of risk appetite and the effects of 
various internal and external factors, and open opportunities for further 
exploration on this topic. 
 
It is useful to mention that the Grounded Theory strategy was initially 
identified as a potential research strategy for this study, as it is capable of 
developing new knowledge in areas with no or limited theory (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). However, this strategy was ruled out after further 
consideration, because a grounded theory researcher needs to enter and exit 
the field on a regular basis and constantly refine and revise the research 
questions (Altinay et al., 2015; Lee and Lings, 2008). It was envisaged that 
this repeated „entry to‟ and „exit from‟ the field would pose significant 
challenges for the researcher, considering the difficulty in ensuring 
prolonged access to participants. Also, it was understood that the Grounded 
Theory strategy advocates the method of observation during the data 
collection process (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). This would suggest the 
necessity of the researcher observing in corporate-level meetings where 
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discussions on risk appetite happen. However, access to such high level 
meetings was deemed unlikely due to the confidential nature of the 
information discussed. This thought was later confirmed during the 
fieldwork when the gatekeepers of the participating organisations rejected 
the possibility of observing corporate meetings. 
 
Following the choice of the Case Study strategy, an essential consideration 
was to determine whether the research needs to select a single case or 
multiple cases, as the decision could have a significant impact on the quality 
of research findings (Saunders et al., 2012). Yin (2003) argues that a single-
case design is normally employed when the case itself represents an extreme 
or unique example, or the case provides the researcher with an opportunity 
to observe and analyse a phenomenon that few have considered before. The 
rationale for selecting a multiple-case design, on the other hand, is largely 
dependent upon whether findings are replicable across different cases. Some 
argue that multiple-case research is more robust, because the findings are 
regarded as more reliable and generalisable (Pettigrew et al., 1992; Wisker, 
2001). However, Gummesson (2014) cautions that when it comes to an 
under-researched phenomenon, multiple cases may yield contradictory 
results, which would in turn undermine the generalisability of the findings. 
Eisenhardt (1991) suggests that the decision regarding single or multiple 
cases needs to be based on how much knowledge is already known and how 
much new information is likely to be generated from incremental cases.  
 
For this study, the topic of risk appetite has been studied inadequately in 
academia, with a number of calls for exploration of the phenomenon in 
more depth (Aven, 2013; Bromiley et al., 2015; Lam, 2014). Therefore, 
demonstrating a high level of reliability and generalisability in the findings 
was not an intention of this study. Also, since the concept of risk appetite 
was equally „fresh‟ to organisations in the international hotel industry, and 
due to the fact that most hotel companies exhibit similar corporate structures 
and business models, it seemed that not much new information could be 
learnt from incremental cases. In this sense, it was felt that a single case 
would be appropriate. However, it was difficult to select a single 
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organisation whose risk appetite could be considered as an extreme or 
unique example. This was because, 1) it was not clear what constitutes an 
„extreme‟ risk appetite from existing literature and; 2) in an organisation, 
the risk appetite is not static but always changing, possibly being „extreme‟ 
at one time but not at all at other times (Georgousopoulou et al., 2014; 
Gontarek, 2016). Further, it was thought that a single case might be too 
narrow to capture and illustrate in any depth the dynamic relationships 
between the risk appetite and various internal and external factors. For these 
reasons, a two-case design was chosen for the study. 
 
Two international hotel companies, with whom the researcher‟s supervisor 
has developed good professional relationships, were recruited as the case 
organisations. Initial access to these organisations was secured with the help 
of a „gatekeeper‟, who in each organisation was a corporate-level executive 
responsible for articulating the organisation‟s risk appetite. From this point 
in the thesis, these two case organisations are referred to as „organisation A‟ 
and „organisation B‟. A brief background to both organisations is provided 
as follows: 
 
 Organisation A is a publicly listed company that owns, manages and 
franchises hotels and resorts. The company is one of world‟s largest 
hotel brands owner and operator, comprising over several thousand 
hotels globally. It has a diverse portfolio of hotel brands designed to 
satisfy the dynamic needs of customers. Despite a decline in 2008-09 
due to the global economic crisis, the company‟s overall 
performance had been steadily improving between 2010-14, thanks 
to its commitment to an „asset-light‟ business model, which 
represents a means of business growth through franchising or 
management contract, rather than leasing or owning. 
 
 Organisation B is also a publicly listed company competing in the 
international hotel industry. Considered as one of the fastest growing 
company, its multi-branded portfolio comprises approximately one 
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thousand hotels and resorts worldwide. Similarly to organisation A, 
organisation B also commits to an „asset-light‟ business model, 
which helped drive growth through difficult times following the 
global financial crisis. 
 
3.4.1 Document analysis of case organisations‟ risk appetite 
 
As this study aims to explore the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite, it was deemed essential to gain an initial understanding of the case 
organisations‟ risk appetites. This was achieved through a content analysis 
of various documents (Bowen, 2009), which included company annual 
reports (2009-2014), independent market analyst reports (2014-2015) 
specifically focused on the case organisations, and several earnings call 
transcripts from the case organisations. These three types of documents 
were thought to complement each other and together would allow a 
preliminary assessment of the case organisations‟ risk appetite. All analysed 
reports were obtained online from the case organisations‟ official websites 
and from the Thomson One Banker database (for which the researcher‟s 
University pays an annual subscription fee).  
 
After reading and re-reading collected documents and highlighting texts that 
could evidence an organisation‟s willingness towards risk taking, two broad 
themes, namely „growth strategy‟ and „risk management‟, were identified as 
key aspects reflecting the risk appetite. „Growth strategy‟ outlines an 
organisation‟s plan for further growth, which can be analysed through 
embedded aspects such as „target market‟ and „brand development‟. „Risk 
management‟ concerns the approach with which the organisation defines, 
assesses and responds to its risks. 
 
Regarding the target markets, while organisation A concentrated on the 
most developed and emerging countries (e.g. US, UK, Germany and China), 
organisation B mainly focused on emerging countries in Europe (e.g. 
Russia), Middle East (e.g. Turkey and Saudi-Arabia) and Africa (e.g. 
Nigeria and South Africa). Compared with organisation A, organisation B‟s 
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target markets appeared relatively immature and present considerably more 
political, economic, social-cultural and environmental risks. Even the Board 
of organisation B had acknowledged on various occasions that their 
geographic target markets present greater risks. It was also notable that 
organisation A‟s target markets were subject to intense competition by 
many other international hotel companies, whereas organisation B‟s target 
markets were relatively unexploited. This implied that other major hotel 
companies might also consider the target markets of organisation B as risky 
and unfavourable. Therefore, the analysis suggested that organisation A 
possessed a relatively lower risk appetite than organisation B. 
 
With regard to brand development, whilst organisation A re-energised and 
enlarged its brand family with several brand additions, organisation B 
underwent a major brand portfolio restructuring over the observed six-year 
period, including several brand additions and removals. This difference of 
pace and approach in brand development also suggested that organisation A 
had a lower appetite for the risk associated with brand development than 
organisation B. 
 
In addition to the theme of „growth strategy‟, an organisation‟s risk appetite 
may also be reflected by examining its approach to risk management, i.e. 
how the organisation defines, assesses and responds to its risks. It was noted 
that both case organisations disclose information on „risk management‟ in 
their annual report, where the key risks affecting the organisation and how 
they are managed are explained.  
 
In organisation A, the term „risk‟ was defined as issues or events that may 
undermine the achievement of organisation‟s objectives. This definition 
seems to have a negative connotation, assuming that a risk is something 
inauspicious for an organisation. Moreover, organisation A‟s risk 
management effort was led by a structured framework that allows itself to 
proactively identify both short and long term risks emerging from the 
organisation‟s internal and external environment. Identified risks were 
evaluated and prioritised against the organisation‟s strategic objectives. 
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Specific risk treatment strategies and control measures were developed and 
implemented to mitigate the major risks, and other less significant risks 
were regularly monitored and reviewed. This vigilant approach to risk 
management and the „hostile‟ view of risk could imply a risk-averse 
tendency of the organisation. 
 
With regard to organisation B, whilst the term „risk‟ was not defined in its 
annual report, its meaning appeared very similar with organisation A. 
However, its reporting of „risk management‟ approach seems less 
comprehensive than organisation A. It reported the risks in two broad 
categories – financial and operational, and those risks appear to be focused 
on short-term (normally one year) issues only. Although the company 
acknowledged that a risk management procedure is in place, it reported in 
little detail as to how the key risks are identified, assessed and prioritised. 
The risk treatment strategies also seem generic. This more „relaxed‟ 
reporting of risk management approach might indicate that organisation B is 
more tolerant of the possible external speculation that the company is less 
adept at risk management. 
 
Overall, the analysis showed that the case organisations exhibited somewhat 
different behaviour towards risk taking over the observed period (2009-
2014). Organisation A seemed more risk-averse and conservative, while 
organisation B appeared relatively more aggressive and „hungry‟ for risk 
taking. It was considered that these two organisations would make an 
appropriate case for identifying similarities and differences in the factors 




While sampling as a key methodological issue seems to have been given 
more attention in quantitative research, many scholars (e.g. Altinay et al., 
2015; Lee and Lings, 2008; Sekaran and Bougie, 2013) have argued that 
sampling for qualitative studies is equally important, as the appropriateness 
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of the selected sample will have a significant impact on the quality of the 
data and the entire research.  
 
Because of the qualitative and exploratory nature of this study, probability 
sampling, a technique mostly utilised in quantitative research (Altinay et al., 
2015), was deemed inappropriate to employ. Instead, the samples of this 
study were selected through the technique of purposive sampling (Saunders 
et al., 2012), where the participants were handpicked on the basis that their 
expertise and experience fit to the topic under study (Lee and Lings, 2008). 
 
In order to provide a rich and in-depth answer to the research questions, 
three different sample groups were selected for this study:  
 
 The first group consisted of respondents who were globally 
recognised experts on risk appetite. They were highly experienced 
risk management consultants with particular expertise in risk 
appetite. The decision for recruiting these experts as one sample 
group was primarily due to the exploratory nature of the study. As 
academic research on risk appetite appeared scarce, the experts could 
provide valuable insights on factors that could shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite, thus enabling the researcher to validate 
and refine the preliminary conceptual framework developed from the 
literature review. The particular selection criteria of these subjects 
were that one must have published materials on the topic of risk 
appetite, e.g. thought papers, working papers and/or consultancy 
reports which are accessible either online or in print form, and that 
one must have been globally regarded as leading experts in risk 
appetite and have been frequent speakers in risk management related 
conferences, seminars or workshops. 
 
 The second group included respondents who were financial analysts 
with intimate knowledge of the case organisations. These 
independent analysts have a deep and thorough understanding of the 
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case organisations, as they monitor and investigate the case 
organisations on a daily basis and also advise existing and potential 
investors interested in those organisations. The companies for which 
these analysts worked are well-known global consulting companies 
and investment banks. The main reason for recruiting the analysts 
was that they could provide an independent viewpoint on the general 
risk appetite of the two case organisations, therefore offering solid 
evidence for (or to perhaps disprove) the different risk behaviours, 
i.e. one being risk-averse and conservative, and the other being risk-
seeking and aggressive, as observed in the document analysis of the 
case organisations.  
 
 Subjects in the third group included corporate-level executives and 
risk managers of the two case organisations. The main purpose of 
recruiting this group of respondents was to test and further explore 
the revised framework in real world settings. Corporate-level 
executives and risk managers were the only people within an 
organisation who would have the required level of knowledge and 
experience to discuss their organisation‟s risk appetite. The particular 
selection criteria were that potential participants must have 
responsibility in managing risk at operational or corporate level, 
and/or they must have been involved in discussions on their 
company‟s risk appetite. Since risk appetite is a high level concept 
within an organisation, and is mostly discussed in the boardroom 
among Board members, corporate executives and risk managers, 
management from other departments and operational level 
employees were thought to be unlikely to possess sufficient 
knowledge to be able to engage in discussions on risk appetite. 
Therefore, the population of this sample group was regarded as 
relatively small, but from whom it was possible to extract rich 






3.6 Data collection  
 
The data collection process encompassed two consecutive stages. The first 
stage included undertaking in-depth interviews with the first sample group, 
i.e. risk management consultants who are considered as risk appetite experts. 
The second stage included the case study, which involved collecting data 
from the second (i.e. financial analysts of case organisations) and third 
sample groups (i.e. corporate executives and risk managers). Details of data 
collection at each stage are presented below. 
 
3.6.1 Stage one 
 
3.6.1.1 Data collection method 
 
Informed by the interpretivism philosophy and the exploratory nature of the 
study, unstructured in-depth interviewing was chosen to collect data from 
the risk appetite experts. It was believed that such a data collection method 
would extract richer and deeper information about risk appetite than semi-
structured and structured interviews, meanwhile maintaining sufficient 
flexibility in terms of content and time of the interview (Lee and Lings, 
2008). In order to understand, from the participants‟ perspective, the 
meaning of risk appetite and identify the most important factors that shape 
an organisation‟s risk appetite, only two main questions were prepared, 
which were „how do you explain the concept of risk appetite?‟ and „what 
factors do you think influence an organisation‟s risk appetite?‟. All other 
questions were formulated in accordance with the response of the 
informants on these two questions (Hackley, 2003). While the researcher 
was furnished with a number of expected answers (e.g. risk appetite factors 
such as risk culture and risk capacity) as a result of the literature review, 
they did not in any way lead the interview; instead, the expected answers 
served as a „mental checklist‟ for the researcher and were only probed 




3.6.1.2 Gaining access to risk consultants 
 
In order to identify suitable participants, a comprehensive research over the 
Internet was undertaken. The particular selection criteria (discussed in 
section 3.5 sampling) were applied to identify participants suitable for the 
study. As a result, seventeen eligible risk consultants, geographically 
dispersed across the UK, US, and Australia, were identified. Their contact 
details were collected from their company or personal websites and each 
one of them was sent a personalised invitation email (Appendix 3.1). 
Invitation email was deemed the most appropriate tool to approach those 
experts, because it was efficient and economical for the researcher, and 
offers a medium for gentle requests to be conveyed to potential participants 
(Gillham, 2005). Subsequently, ten experts (eight UK-based and two US-
based) expressed an interest in participating in the research, five others 
declined the invitation for various reasons, and the remaining two seemed 
beyond contact, despite further follow-up emails and phone calls to their 
places of work.  
 
Within twenty-four hours of receiving email confirmation from these ten 
people who were interested in participating, an official participant 
information sheet was sent to each one of them via email. The participant 
information (Appendix 3.2) sheet contained essential information about this 
research, including what they would be required to do, how they might 
benefit from participation and ethical considerations relating to the 
university‟s anonymity and data protection policies. The purpose of 
providing such a detailed information sheet was to ensure that potential 
participants were fully aware of the research study and what was expected 
from them, so that they would be in a good position to make an informed 
decision as to whether or not to take part. As highlighted by Gillham (2005), 
the quality of participant information sheets can have a significant impact on 
setting the tone for the future interview as well as establishing a degree of 




Following the dispatch of participant information sheets, further emails and 
phone calls were exchanged to arrange a mutually convenient time and 
venue for the interview with each participant. Once the details were agreed, 
the researcher sent an email a few days prior to the interview to confirm 
arrangements with the participant. This move was particularly praised by 
one participant, who thought it was very professional and considerate to re-
confirm the interview. 
 
3.6.1.3 Collecting data from risk consultants 
 
Ten interviews were conducted during January 2013 to April 2013. A 
summary of the participants‟ background, the location and length of the 
interview is provided in Table 3.1 (p. 90). The eight UK-based participants 
were interviewed face to face in places at their convenience. Overall six 
interviews took place in public cafés, while two interviews were conducted 
in the participants‟ place of work. 
 
Table 3.1 List of risk consultant participants 
Code Gender Location of interview Length of interview 
P01 Male Petersfield, UK 61 minutes 
P02 Male US (via telephone) 65 minutes 
P03 Female London, UK 87 minutes 
P04 Male Portsmouth, UK 49 minutes 
P05 Female Birmingham, UK 77 minutes 
P06 Male London, UK 64 minutes 
P07 Female London, UK 64 minutes 
P08 Male London, UK 45 minutes 
P09 Female US (via telephone) 48 minutes 
P10 Male London, UK 50 minutes 
 
 
The length of all UK-based interviews varied from forty-five minutes to 
nearly one hour and a half. Seven interviews were fully recorded with the 
consent of the participants. One interview could not be recorded as the 
participant was uncomfortable with the presence of a voice recorder. In that 
case, detailed notes were taken and a reflection of key issues was written 




With regard to the two US-based participants, telephone interviewing was 
conducted. While it was similar to face to face interviewing in most aspects, 
the researcher could not see the facial expressions of the participants, which 
added some ambiguity when it comes to the interpretation of the data. 
Moreover, Gillham (2005) pointed out that telephone interviews are more 
vulnerable to technology problems than face to face interviews. This was 
proven in this study, as one interview, which was initially conducted via 
Skype video, was disrupted in the middle of the conversation by a sudden 
Internet disconnection. After it was resumed five minutes later, the 
momentum was lost, and the informant‟s train of thoughts was also 
disrupted, which might have impaired the quality of the answers. Despite 
this setback, the researcher tried the best to encourage the informant to talk 
as much as possible, and eventually both telephone interviews were 
completed to the researcher‟s satisfaction within the agreed timeframe. 
 
Each interview started with a brief introduction of the research study to 
remind the participants of the topic and to clear any confusion they might 
have. This was deemed important and necessary, because if the participants 
did not fully understand the purpose of the research and what they were 
expected to do, the quality of their answers might be undermined. Also, the 
brief introduction was effective in terms of „breaking the ice‟ between the 
researcher and the participant and helping establish a rapport (Altinay et al., 
2015).  
 
Following the introduction two key questions of the interview were 
addressed. These were: „How do you explain the concept of risk appetite?‟ 
and „According to your knowledge and experience, what factors influence a 
company‟s risk appetite?‟ With an open mind and an understanding of the 
literature, the researcher identified interesting issues from the responses and 
further questioned them in more depth. Questions such as, „Can you please 
elaborate a bit more on this point?‟, „Why do you think this factor affects 
the company‟s risk appetite?‟, and „In what way does this factor influence 
the risk appetite?‟ were regularly used as probes. All interviews were ended 
with a „thank you‟ to the participant for their contribution, but the researcher 
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took every opportunity to extract as much information as possible before the 
participant left. For instance, questions such as, „Is there anything you want 
to add?‟, and „Do you have any question, comment, or suggestion about my 
research?‟ were asked in all interviews. This was deemed important because 
the methodology literature has often stressed the point that even during an 
interview-ending phase, more valuable information is often obtained 
(Gillham, 2005; Hennink et al., 2011; Lee and Lings, 2008).  
 
Immediately after the interview, the researcher spent a further thirty minutes 
to write an interview memo. The purpose was to note down any thoughts 
and observations regarding the interview while they are still fresh in the 
mind. Not only did this memo help the researcher evaluate and further 
improve the conduct of future interview, it also played a critical role in the 
subsequent interpretation of the data and helped identify any hidden 
meanings (Gillham, 2005). 
 
3.6.2 Stage two 
 
3.6.2.1 Data collection methods 
 
Stage two of the fieldwork encompassed the case study, where primary data 
was collected from sample groups two and three. In order to find out more 
about the case organisations‟ risk appetite and to validate the document 
analysis finding that the case organisations had rather contradictory risk 
appetites, it was decided to conduct a questionnaire survey with the 
financial analysts of the two case organisations (i.e. second sample group). 
This choice of data collection method was based on the consideration that 
questionnaires would be more time-efficient to achieve the intended purpose. 
 
With regard to sample group three (i.e. corporate-level executives and risk 
managers), a combination of questionnaires and semi-structured in-depth 
interviews were employed to gather data. Due to the limited time 
participants could contribute to the study, it was decided to use 
questionnaires at first to validate the „stage one‟ framework (Figure 4.2, p. 
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132) in terms of the nature and the relative importance of the risk appetite 
factors, and then use follow-up interviews to explore in more depth the 
concept of risk appetite and the most important/influential factors (as 
highlighted from the questionnaire). The plan was that the participants 
would answer the questionnaire first, which would be collected prior to the 
interview. It was believed that this combination of questionnaires and semi-
structured in-depth interviews could best answer the research questions by 
providing a comprehensive coverage of all factors considered to shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite, whilst allowing rich and deep insights to be 
extracted with regard to the most important factors.  
 
3.6.2.2 Gaining access to case organisations and recruiting 
corporate-level participants and analysts 
 
Access to both case organisations was mainly facilitated through the help of 
the researcher‟s supervisor. The supervisor initially approached his contacts 
in the case organisations through an introduction of the research project and 
a discussion of the possibility of allowing the researcher to gain access to 
the senior management. The contacts, who later served as the gatekeepers, 
brought the request to the executive managements of both organisations. 
The management later granted the researcher access to their organisations, 
in return for a detailed summary of research findings and recommendations 
for future risk appetite projects.  
 
Despite having secured initial access to both organisations, the researcher 
still had to rely on the help of the gatekeepers for identification of relevant 
personnel suitable for this study. Upon receiving the names and contact 
details of suitable personnel from the gatekeepers, the researcher contacted 
each one of them via emails (Appendix 3.3) and follow-up phone calls to 
invite them to participate in the study.  
 
In a process similar to that used to recruit risk consultants in stage one, 
potential corporate participants were also sent an information sheet 
(Appendix 3.4) that explained the research topic and addressed potential 
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ethics and confidentiality concerns. A list of interview questions was also 
provided as requested by several potential participants. Those who had 
agreed to participate in the study were then contacted via further emails and 
telephone calls to arrange a mutually convenient time and venue for the 
interview. Overall sixteen participants (eight in each case organisation) were 
recruited for the study. A summary of their background (code, gender, job 
title) and length of interview is provided in Table 3.2 (p. 95). 
 
It was a major challenge to recruit these corporate level participants. Due to 
the hectic nature of their job, the participants found it difficult to commit 
time for the research. Also, they did not see immediate benefits that 
participating in the study could bring to their job. As such, several 
participants, after expressing an interest initially, later withdrew from the 
study. The negotiation with most participants took several months in order 
to settle a convenient date and time for the interview. Still, a number of 
participants had to rearrange the interview at the last minute in order to 
accommodate emerging demands from their daily work. 
 
In terms of recruiting independent financial analysts for both organisations, 
the researcher obtained the names and email addresses from the „investor 
relations‟ tab of the case organisations‟ websites. There were a total of 
twenty-six analysts for organisation A and nine analysts for organisation B 
listed on their websites. An email (Appendix 3.5) was sent to all analysts to 
explain the research study and invite them to participate. Many refused to 
participate due to particular company policy inhibiting them from taking 
part in external surveys. Eventually, nine out of twenty-six and six out of 
nine analysts took part in the study, giving a response rate of 36% 











Table 3.2 List of case organisation participants 
Code Gender Job Title Length of interview 
P01A Male Director of Corporate Risk 87 minutes 
P02A Male 
Senior Vice President Global Risk 
Management 
66 minutes 
P03A Male Corporate Risk Manager 30 minutes 
P04A Male 












Director of Regional Risk and 
Reputation, Europe 
88 minutes 
P08A Male Director of Risk Insurance 36 minutes 
P01B Male 
Vice President Corporate Safety 
and Security 
56 minutes 
P02B Male Area Security Manager 57 minutes 
P03B Male Senior Vice President Procurement 61 minutes 
P04B Male 








Vice President Corporate 
Communications, PR & Reputation 
Management 
50 minutes 
P07B Female Vice President Legal 47 minutes 
P08B Male Vice President Group Tax 30 minutes 
 
 
3.6.2.3 Collecting data from independent financial analysts 
 
A short one-page questionnaire was designed to evaluate the risk appetite of 
case organisations based on Harwood et al.‟s (2009) framework of 
organisational risk propensity. This framework is particularly useful in 
qualitatively assessing an organisation‟s risk appetite from ten observable 
risk behaviour attributes, each of which has a dimensional range with „risk-
averse‟ and „risk-seeking‟ on each end of the continuum. The participating 
analysts were asked to rate on a 7-point scale where they thought their 
respective organisation would be for each risk behaviour attribute. The 
average of the ten attributes provided an overall indication of how risk-
averse or risk-seeking the organisation was. 
 
The questionnaire was reviewed by the supervisory team before being tested 
with an analyst who kindly offered to help. Valid advice was received 
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towards the design and overall appeal of the questionnaire, where the 
analyst particularly mentioned a lack of clarity in the meanings of two ends 
of the rating scale. Following the revision, the final questionnaire (see 
Figure 3.1, p. 96 for a snapshot and Appendix 3.6 for the full version) was 
administered online to all participating analysts via SurveyMonkey, which 
was believed to be the most convenient means for the financial analysts in 
terms of time and resource requirements. 
 
Figure 3.1 Questionnaire for financial analysts 
 







3.6.2.4 Collecting data from corporate participants of case 
organisations 
 
As explained in section 3.6.2.1, each participant of the case organisations 
was asked to complete a questionnaire followed by a semi-structured in-
depth interview. The questionnaire (see Figure 3.2, p. 98 for a snapshot and 
Appendix 3.7 for the full version) was developed in accordance with the 
„stage one‟ framework (Figure 4.2, p. 132), with the main purpose of 
evaluating the „weight‟ and „direction‟ of all identified factors on risk 
appetite. There were three questions that were asked for each factor. 
Question one, „Does this factor influence your company‟s risk appetite?‟, 
aimed to find out whether a particular factor is relevant to risk appetite in 
practice. Question two, „Does an increase in the factor increase or decrease 
your company‟s risk appetite?‟, aimed to uncover the specific nature or 
direction of a particular factor‟s influence on risk appetite. Finally, question 
three, „How much would you rate the level of the factor‟s influence on a 
scale, ranging from 1 „very low influence‟ to 5 „very high influence‟?‟, 
aimed to find out the relative importance (or the „weight‟) of each factor to 
risk appetite, so that the most important factors could be identified and 
further explored in the follow-up interview. 
 
Regarding the follow-up semi-structured interviewing, an interview guide 
(see Figure 3.3, p. 99 for a snapshot and Appendix 3.8 for the full version) 
was designed to explore in more depth the key issues emerged from the 
questionnaire. The interview guide consisted of six main questions, each of 
which had a few probing questions designed to extract more information 
when necessary. The first two main questions could be seen as „ice 
breakers‟, asking about the participant‟s background and his/her particular 
understanding of the „risk appetite‟ concept. The background information 
about the participants is useful to determine if there is any pattern between 
answers and participant backgrounds. Based on the interpretivism 
philosophy of this study, it was deemed necessary to check how each 
participant understood the risk appetite concept. Questions three and four 
focused on the questionnaire the participant completed in advance. The aim 
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was to identify any missing factors and further explore the influence of most 
important factors on risk appetite. The last two main questions were aimed 
at understanding in more depth the conceptual analogy of this study - the 
„living organisations‟ thinking. 
 
Figure 3.2 Questionnaire for corporate executives and risk managers 
 






Figure 3.3 Interview guide for corporate executives and risk managers 
 
(Note: „[]‟ was used to anonymise the case organisation) 
 
The questionnaire and interview guide were reviewed by the supervisory 
team and then piloted with both case organisations. Regarding the 
questionnaire, more information was added to the introductory page to 
improve the clarity of the risk appetite explanation. The wordings of some 
factors were also modified. For example, a factor originally named „Degree 
of access to information‟ was re-named to „information flow to the Board‟ 
in the final questionnaire. In the interview guide, the order of some 
questions was changed to create a more logical flow and a particular 




During the first pilot interview, the researcher learnt that the way a question 
is phrased can significantly influence its answer. The question aimed to find 
out whether the risk taking behaviour of the case organisation was similar to 
that of a human being, which is mostly rational but can appear irrationality 
at times. The original question was „In your view, when it comes to risk 
taking, does your company normally behave like a human, i.e. exhibits some 
degree of spontaneity, unpredictability and perhaps some irrationality, or 
does the company usually operate in an ordered, well-informed and rational 
manner?‟ When asked this question, the participant (P01A) immediately 
replied without giving time to think, „Oh, we are always rational, we take 
well-informed decisions‟. However, later conversation with the same 
participant revealed some examples showing that the organisation was not 
always taking rational and informed risk decisions. This inconsistency made 
the researcher realise the way the question was phrased might not be 
appropriate. The characteristics of human risk taking behaviour as shown in 
the question were all rather negative, particularly with the word 
„irrationality‟. In fact, human beings are at most times rationale decision 
makers in face of risk and only occasionally exhibit some irrationality. This 
was however not captured in the question. The „negative nature‟ of the 
question might have held the participant back from giving the „honest‟ 
answer. 
 
Given the above thoughts, in the second pilot interview, the same question 
was modified into, „In your view, when it comes to risk taking, does your 
company normally behave like a human, i.e. mostly rational, but sometimes 
unpredictable and irrational, or does the organisation always operate in an 
ordered, well-informed and rational manner?‟ The participant (P01B) took 
some time to think and then answered, „Oh, I think we are pretty human‟. 
 
Sixteen interviews were conducted during March 2015 to November 2015. 
While the interviews with organisation A were mostly undertaken face to 
face in the UK (except for one which was conducted via telephone as the 
participant was travelling), those with organisation B were conducted via 
Skype, because the participants were geographically dispersed around 
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different countries. The interviews lasted between 30-88 minutes and were 
recorded with prior permission. 
 
3.6.3 Ethical considerations during the research process 
 
During the course of this study, great care had been taken to ensure the 
research was carried out in an ethically appropriate manner and in line with 
Oxford Brookes University‟s Code of Practice for research ethics. Measures 
which aimed to promote ethical conduct were applied in both the design and 
the conduct phases. For example, when recruiting the case study participants 
(who were busy professionals), two primary concerns were of paramount 
importance: 1) ensuring the participation was entirely voluntary and free 
from any pressure, particularly from their peers or superiors; and 2) 
ensuring the time taken away from their work is as minimum as possible. In 
order to encourage voluntary participation, the researcher contacted each 
participant individually to clarify that the study was an academic research 
and their decision to participate would not influence their job in any way. In 
order to minimise the participant‟s time spent on understanding the study 
and reduce the hassle of emailing back and forth, the participant information 
sheets (see Appendix 3.2 and Appendix 3.4) and the research instruments, 
i.e. questionnaire (Appendix 3.7) and interview guide (Appendix 3.8), were 
always enclosed with the invitation emails. In this way, while the contacts 
with the participants were minimised, with sufficient information about the 
study provided, the participants were still able to make their decision in an 
informed and efficient manner. Further, the research instruments, 
particularly the questionnaires, were designed, reviewed and piloted in order 
to ensure that completing the questionnaire is time-efficient. 
 
Considerations for research ethics were also demonstrated in the actual data 
collection process. For instance, the promises that the researcher made to the 
participants were always kept. This included being punctual in showing up 
for the interview as well as in strictly keeping the interview within the 
agreed timeframe. It also included returning the interview transcripts to the 
participants for accuracy checking within the promised timeframe. 
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Moreover, during the course of the fieldwork the researcher had always put 
the participants‟ needs and convenience at first. For example, all venues 
where the interviews took place were either at the participants‟ place of 
work or at a public place recommended by the participants. When meeting 
with the participants, the researcher always dressed in appropriate business 
attire in order to show respect and professionalism. 
 
3.7 Data analysis 
 
3.7.1 Data analysis approach 
 
The particular approach to data analysis is the key to ensure the overall 
quality of a qualitative study (Altinay et al., 2015; Saunders et al., 2012). 
Although the literature on research methodology has put forward a variety 
of approaches that can be employed to analyse qualitative data (Hennink et 
al., 2011; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Saunders et al., 2012), there has been 
limited guidance on selecting the most appropriate data analysis approach, 
and each available approach appears to have its strengths and weaknesses 
(Sekaran and Bougie, 2013).  
 
One of the most prominent approaches for data analysis is that of Miles and 
Huberman (1994), who suggested a broad cyclical and iterative process that 
encompasses three key phases: data reduction, data display, and drawing 
conclusions. In this model, collected data needs to be firstly reduced through 
coding and categorisation, after which the reduced data needs to be 
displayed in an organised and condensed form to uncover patterns and 
relationships, which subsequently facilitates the drawing of conclusions. 
Whilst Miles and Huberman‟s (1994) approach has been widely 
acknowledged and used by many qualitative researchers (Lee and Lings, 
2008; Sekaran and Bougie, 2013), the model fails to offer much detailed 
guidance as to the specific tasks within each analytical phase, i.e. data 
reduction, display, and drawing conclusions (Hennink et al., 2011). Instead, 
this study followed a more structured model, the „analytic spiral‟ approach 
of Hennink et al. (2011: 238), which addresses the limitation of Miles and 
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Huberman (1994) by outlining specific tasks that need to be carried out 
during data analysis, including thick description, comparison, categorisation, 
conceptualisation, and explanation (Figure 3.4, p. 103). 
 
Figure 3.4 The „analytic spiral‟  
 
              (Source: Hennink et al., 2011: 238) 
 
 
3.7.2 Manual versus Computer-assisted analysis 
 
Another important consideration for data analysis is whether to carry out the 
analysis solely by hand or with the help of contemporary qualitative data 
analysis software. With the advanced technology and incorporation of IT in 
research, there are an increasing number of computer-based programmes 
which serve as effective tools for assisting qualitative data analysis, for 
instance ATLAS.ti, NVivo, etc. Compared with traditional manual analysis, 
computer software offers a more structured approach to analysis and is more 
efficient in organising and searching within a large volume of qualitative 
data (Faherty, 2010; Gibbs, 2002; Saldana, 2009), therefore allowing the 
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researcher to conduct analysis more quickly (Hennink et al., 2011). For 
these reasons, NVivo 10 was selected to assist the data analysis in this study. 
 
However, there are potential issues of adopting technology to assist with 
data analysis. For example, Faherty (2010) points out that there is a learning 
curve for all researchers to be able to use the software effectively and 
efficiently, which often takes a considerable amount of time. Researchers 
who do not have the required experience to use the software may find it 
difficult perform the analysis. Warren and Karner (2010) warn that 
contemporary computer-based qualitative data analysis software can only 
support, but not conduct the actual analysis for the researcher, thus it is 
recommended that researchers should be familiar with manual analysis 
before moving onto technological advances. Lewins and Silver (2007) also 
suggest that researchers who use software for data analysis should remain in 
control of the interpretive process. Bearing these in mind, the researcher 
engaged in comprehensive training of both manual and computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis in the early stages of this study to become better 
prepared for the task of actual data analysis. 
 
3.7.3 Analysing the questionnaire data 
 
As explained in section 3.6 data collection, this study used two forms of 
questionnaire: an online questionnaire (via SurveyMonkey) for independent 
financial analysts and a paper-form questionnaire for case organisation 
participants. The online questionnaire was designed to gain an independent 
evaluation of the case organisations‟ risk appetite and sought to triangulate 
the finding of document analysis. The „mean‟ of each of the ten questions 
was obtained from the SurveyMonkey (see Figure 3.5, p. 105 for a 
screenshot), which automatically calculated the „means‟. An overall average 
of the „means‟ of the ten questions was manually calculated to represent the 
overall risk appetite level of the particular organisation. The details of this 






Figure 3.5 SurveyMonkey questionnaire analysis 
 
 
Regarding the paper-form questionnaire for case organisation participants, 
the analysis began as soon as it was collected by the researcher as the results 
informed the follow-up interview. On most occasions, the participants 
returned the questionnaire one day prior to the interview, so that the 
researcher had some time to thoroughly examine the questionnaire and 
identify issues to be further explored. The initial examination of the 
questionnaire focused on identifying the most important factors affecting the 
risk appetite (i.e. those factors with a „5‟ or „4‟ rating) as well as any 
unexpected answers. However, there were few occasions when the 
questionnaire was only returned to the researcher moments before the 
interview, in which case the researcher had to quickly scan the questionnaire 




The questionnaire responses were transferred onto a summary sheet (see 
Figure 3.6, p. 107 for a snapshot and Appendix 3.9 for full version) as the 
research progresses, recording the number of times that a particular answer 
has been selected. In order to determine if and how a factor influences the 
risk appetite (i.e. questions one and two in the questionnaire), the choice that 
represents the majority responses was treated as the main view. In order to 
evaluate the importance of a particular factor to risk appetite (question three 
in the questionnaire), the „mean‟ and the „mode‟ of the answers were 
manually calculated. It was decided that the higher the „mean‟ and the 
„mode‟, the more important the particular factor is to risk appetite. As the 
importance was rated on a 5-point scale from „very little‟ to „very high‟ 
(Adelson and Mccoach, 2010; Sekaran and Bougie, 2013), factors with 
„mean‟ and „mode‟ that are more than „3‟ were considered as „important‟, 
and those that are equal or less than „3‟ were considered as „less important‟. 
 
Regarding the factors with which the case organisation participants 
unanimously agree on a particular answer, they were labelled as 
„undisputed‟; with regard to those where the answers have no clear 
consensus between participants, the particular factor was noted as „disputed‟ 
in order to show that different opinions exist in the organisation. 
Consequently, all factors in the questionnaire were organised into four 
categories: important disputed factors (represented in purple), important 
undisputed factors (represented in blue), less important disputed factors 
(represented in brown), and less important undisputed factors (represented 
in green). These categories, which are shown in Figure 4.4 (p. 141) and 
Figure 4.5 (p. 142), informed the presentation of findings in Chapter Four.  
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Figure 3.6 Questionnaire response overview for corporate executives and 
risk managers (Organisation A) 
 
 
3.7.4 Analysing the interview data 
 
All recorded interviews were first transcribed verbatim and were 
subsequently double-checked by the researcher for accuracy and 
completeness (Appendix 3.10 provides an example transcript). The verbatim 
transcripts in stage one fieldwork were sent back to the participants via 
email for their review and approval of the content and accuracy. This 
activity, which was termed as „member-checking‟ by Lincoln and Guba 
(1985), increases the credibility for the study and adds internal validity to 
the overall research process. Any amendments made to the transcripts by the 
participants were treated as primary data. 
 
All transcripts were imported to NVivo 10 for analysis. A combination of 
deductive and inductive coding approach was utilised to perform „data 
reduction‟ (Hennink et al., 2011). In other words, transcripts were initially 
coded with pre-developed codes established in the literature (i.e. particular 
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factors that influence the risk appetite). Following this, all transcripts were 
coded again inductively to identify codes emerged solely from the data. 
Inductively extracted codes were then compared with the deductively 
extracted codes to compile a complete set of codes. The purpose of 
including inductive coding in addition to deductive coding was to avoid the 
formulation of a pre-imposed „powerful conceptual grid‟ (Atkinson, 1992: 
459), which might overlook uncategorised issues embedded in the data 
(Silverman, 2011). 
 
The coding process focused on highlighting the key words, sentences and 
paragraphs in the transcripts that were related to the research questions, and 
placing them into pre-defined codes or labelling them as new codes (See 
Figure 3.7, p. 109 for a screenshot of a coded transcript). This process was 
repeated through all transcripts. Memos were also written on most codes 
and the purpose was to record any specific thoughts that could either 
connect different codes or provoke an initial understanding of the 
phenomenon under study (Faherty, 2010). The memos appeared immensely 
helpful during subsequent analysis. 
 
Following the completion of coding all transcripts, the codes were 
rearranged hierarchically to form broad and sub categories. This led to a 
hierarchical presentation of the data in relation to the research questions. 
(See Figure 3.8, p. 109 for a screenshot of the „node tree‟). 
 
Alongside the coding, the researcher read and re-read the coded excerpts 
several times to generate an understanding of the informants‟ accounts, 
which helped to formulate initial ideas in answering the research questions. 
This interpretation of codes started as soon as the first verified interview 
transcript was coded, so that the researcher could check for theoretical 
saturation (Hennink et al., 2011; Lee and Lings, 2008). During the analysis, 
the researcher also paid attention to the number of times that a particular 
word, phrase or code appeared across all informants to determine if there 














3.8 Ensuring research quality 
 
Unlike quantitative research where the criteria (such as reliability and 
validity) for assessing research quality have long been established, the 
criteria for assessing qualitative research have not been widely agreed 
(Cassell and Symon, 2011). While many qualitative researchers have 
proposed their own criteria (Spencer et al., 2003; Yardley, 2000), one of the 
most used quality criteria seems to be Lincoln and Guba‟s (1985) 
„trustworthiness‟ criteria, which includes the concepts of credibility, 
transferability, and dependability. Credibility refers to the use of multiple 
forms of evidence, which improves researcher confidence about data 
analysis as well as the findings. Transferability concerns to what extent the 
findings of the study can be applied to other settings. Dependability is 
similar to the concept of reliability in quantitative research, which concerns 
the degree to which the study can be repeated. 
 
In addition to Lincoln and Guba‟s (1985) criteria, Gummesson (2000) 
proposed 8-item criteria (Appendix 3.11) that are specifically designed to 
help readers assess the quality of qualitative case study research. These 
criteria were constantly used by the researcher during the course of this 
study to maximise the research rigour and overall quality. 
 
3.9 A reflective account of the research process 
 
There were several challenges during the research process and I wish to 
discuss and reflect on two particular ones: the choice of research philosophy 
and the actual conduct of the interviews. 
 
At the early stage of research design, I pondered for a long time over the 
specific philosophical position I should take. After reading much literature 
on different research philosophies, I felt that pragmatism or realism could 
best describe my natural belief. This was because my understandings of 
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what the reality means and whether knowledge is socially constructed lay 
somewhere in the middle between positivism and interpretivism, and that I 
wanted to adopt the most appropriate approach to best answer the research 
questions. Initially, these two philosophies seemed to suggest a mixed-
method approach, but the scarcity of existing knowledge in the topic area 
and the practicalities of access required for conducting a large-scale 
quantitative study had rejected a mixed-methods design. It was more 
sensible to conduct a small scale, in-depth exploration into the topic, before 
any large-scale study could be considered. But for a qualitative exploratory 
study, neither realism nor pragmatism seemed a very good fit; rather, 
interpretivism was more appropriate for studies of this nature. This led to 
the question: can I adopt a different philosophy other than the one that 
mostly matches my belief? The answer was yes, but adopting a view that 
was different to my original belief to conduct research was challenging. I 
had to train my brain to think more like an interpretivist and limit the impact 
of the positivistic side of the brain. Having been brought up and educated in 
a dominantly positivistic worldview for most of my education, it was very 
challenging to focus on the „messy‟ interpretation of qualitative data that 
was much less structured. In order to train myself to think like an 
interpretivist, I spent long periods of time learning and practising techniques 
often used by interpretivists, particularly on data analysis. This training 
played a positive role in helping me better interpret my data and link the 
findings back to the literature. 
 
Another challenge relates to the actual conduct of the interview. Although I 
had previous experience in conducting qualitative interviews and I made 
sufficient preparation before each interview, the actual conduct was still 
challenging, where the active listening, making sense of what had just been 
said and picking out issues of importance and asking the right follow-up 
questions were very difficult. Perhaps due to the difficulty in accessing 
those participants, I conducted each interview with the highest intensity of 
my attention, and after each interview I was mentally exhausted. I tried my 
best to explore the topic in detail but inevitably there could be interesting 
issues that could not be explored. During the reading of the interview 
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transcripts I realised I could be asking further questions in various places to 
elicit potentially more important insights. That was a shame and a limitation. 
Also I have discussed the idea of follow-up interviews with those 
participants and this was impossible, as participating in this study for those 
people was almost a one-off exercise: „they‟ve done their bit and that‟s it‟. 
If there were an opportunity to conduct this research again, more efforts 
would be spent on nurturing relationships with the participants, so that they 









This chapter presents the findings from the two primary research stages and 
comprises two main sections. Section 4.1 presents the „stage one‟ findings 
based on unstructured interviews with risk consultants. It identifies and 
explains the key factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite, and 
presents a refined framework of risk appetite factors (Figure 4.2, p. 132). 
Section 4.2 presents the „stage two‟ findings. It starts by reporting the 
findings of an online survey with financial analysts, in which the case 
organisations‟ risk appetite is evaluated and compared. Then, the section 
presents findings obtained from the case study. The factors that shape each 
case organisation‟s risk appetite are identified and evaluated, and two case-
specific frameworks of risk appetite factors are developed (Figure 4.4, p. 
141 and Figure 4.5, p. 142). This section also reports the interrelationships 
between different risk appetite factors.   
 
4.1 „Stage one‟ findings – Unstructured interviews with risk 
consultants 
 
The purpose of this stage is to identify and explain factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite from a generic-business and non-industry-
specific perspective, and to enrich the conceptual framework derived from 
the literature. Ten highly respected risk consultants with an average of 
twenty to twenty-five years of experience participated in the unstructured 
in-depth interviews. These consultants are also globally recognised risk 
appetite experts, and two of whom are even regarded as the gurus of risk 
appetite. Such a group of high quality informants helps to ensure the quality 




Each interview begins with a question regarding risk appetite definition, 
which helps to align the researcher‟s understanding of the topic with that of 
the informant and serves as an „ice-breaker‟. There is a notable disparity 
between the two gurus in conceptualising the risk appetite. One (P01) 
defines risk appetite as „a deeply-seated internal tendency of an individual 
or organisation to take risks‟. He uses the physical appetite for food and 
drink as an analogy for risk appetite, and describes it as an organisation‟s 
physical appetite for risk. He argues that the appetite for risk is an internal 
drive of an organisation that naturally exists, and it is dispositional rather 
than situational, meaning that it is only determined by an organisation‟s 
internal characteristics, and external forces have no influence whatsoever. 
 
However, this conceptualisation of risk appetite contrasts strongly with that 
of the other guru (P08), who contends that viewing risk appetite as a natural 
drive is „entirely erroneous‟. Instead, he describes risk appetite as an 
organisation‟s „fight-or-flight‟ response to risks, which could change 
according to any internal and external influences. This reflects a combined 
(dispositional and situational) view of risk appetite.  
 
While other informants seem consistent with the combined view of risk 
appetite, different definitions of the concept exist. For example, informants 
P05 and P06 argue that risk appetite is all about the „acceptability of risks‟; 
others (e.g. P02; P03; P09) define it as an organisation‟s „willingness to take 
risks‟. These two types of definitions, however, are criticised by informant 
P04 on the grounds that the term risk is seen as an organisational threat or 
danger that needs to be tolerated, whereas the potential rewarding and 
opportunistic aspect of risk is ignored. He (P04) maintains that risk should 
be viewed more positively in organisations, because no organisational goals 
could be achieved without taking any risks. Therefore, he suggests that one 
should avoid using unfavourable words when defining risk appetite, such as 
accept, tolerate and willingness. 
 
This lack of consensus in risk appetite definition indicates that the subject 
area is still at an early development stage. With many varying viewpoints 
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and no sign of a convergence, the area of risk appetite faces a challenge to 
move forward. Informant P01 proposes a possible solution to this issue: one, 
to have an open mind and accept all the debates; two, to elect a „referee‟, i.e. 
a central authority for the topic area, to synthesise the debates. He 
recommends that the International Standards Organisation (ISO), who 
published much credible guidance on risk management, should become the 
referee and take the area forward. He noted: 
 
„…the problem here is who is going to bring together these different 
voices, and who is going to act as a kind of „referee‟. It should be 
someone like the Institute of Risk Management as a professional 
body, but they are also a player, so they can‟t be the referee because 
they are playing in the game. They have a view of risk appetite 
themselves. So it‟s difficult to see who is going to… it maybe the 
Corporate Governance, it might be the ISO. Maybe the ISO should 
do it.‟ (P01) 
 
In this thesis, risk appetite is considered as having a combined (dispositional 
and situational) nature and the „working‟ definition on p.1 concurs with the 
view of six informants (P02; P03; P05; P06; P07; P09), who defined the risk 
appetite as the amount of risk an organisation is willing to take to achieve its 
objectives. In addition to the perspective of risk consultants, the definition 
of risk appetite is further explored from the perspective of case study 
participants in section 4.2.2.1. A unified definition of risk appetite, which 
synthesises the findings with the literature, is provided on p. 181. 
 
4.1.1 Factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite 
 
Data analysis indicates that the factors which shape the risk appetite of an 
organisation can be categorised into three groups, which may be labelled as 
„organisational‟, „decision-maker‟ and „environmental‟ factors. 
Organisational factors are internal elements relating to an organisation‟s 
characteristics, features or functions. Decision-maker factors are those 
directly relating to an organisation‟s key decision-makers. Environmental 
factors are external elements that reside in the generic PESTE environment. 
Figure 4.1 (p. 116) presents a summary of these factors. The underlined 
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factors, including risk culture, ambitiousness of objectives, performance, 
BoD risk propensity and stakeholder demands, are key elements which exert 
a more significant influence on risk appetite than other factors. The details 
of why and how each factor influences the risk appetite are reported in the 
following sub-sections. In addition, a number of factors seem to be 
interrelated to each other and these relationships are presented in section 
4.1.1.4.  
 
Figure 4.1 „Risk consultant‟ framework of factors that influence an 
organisation‟s risk appetite 
 
 




An organisation‟s risk culture is identified as a key factor that might affect 
risk appetite. Risk culture is an organisation‟s shared values and beliefs 
about risk in two aspects: First, the nature of risk, i.e. is risk a good or bad 




 Risk culture (U) 
 Ambitiousness of 
objectives (+) 
 Performance (M) 
 Risk capacity  (M) 
 Risk management 
capability (M) 
 History of risk taking (M) 
 Perceived level of risk in 
the external environment 
(-)  
 Leverage (-) 
Decision-maker factors 
 
 BoD risk propensity (+) 
 CEO risk propensity (+)  









 Regulation (-) 
Underlined factors: key factors that shape the risk appetite. 
+/-: this factor is positively/negatively associated with the risk appetite. 
M: Both positive and negative associations are likely for this factor. 




protected against, or is risk something exciting which offers opportunities 
thus an organisation should actively engage and exploit? Second, the extent 
to which risk is taken into account in key decision making. Every 
organisation has a distinctive risk culture based on its unique organisational 
„make-up‟, which may include vision and mission, history, structure and 
employees. It is this risk culture that plays a key role in determining the 
types and amount of risk the organisation is willing to pursue. Organisations 
with different make-ups will have different risk cultures and thus different 
risk appetites. For example, informant P01 explained how sports clubs with 
different vision and mission might have different risk appetites:  
 
„Our risk culture will shape the amount of risk that we take in our 
sports club. So how many supervisors do we have, how often do we 
renew or maintain our service equipment, how well do we train our 
staff. Now if your culture is „what‟s more important is we have a 
great time, everybody has a fantastic experience, and we are not so 
worried about reputation and safety‟, then your behaviour will be 
different. You will be checking your equipment less, having less 
training, all of these things will be downplayed, because what‟s 
more important is the experience. If your risk culture is „what‟s 
more important is that everybody is safe and our reputation is 
protected‟, then that will affect your behaviour in terms of what you 
allow your people to do in the execution of the sports. And exactly 
the same is true for businesses.‟ (P01) 
 
Despite this example, the other nine informants could not explain how risk 
culture may influence the risk appetite, and whether the influence could be 
positive or negative. Informant P01 and P08 argue that there is limited 
existing knowledge on the area of risk culture and further research is needed. 
 
Ambitiousness of objectives 
 
An organisation‟s objectives, commonly considered as „what we as a 
company are trying to achieve‟ (P01; P05) and „where we want to go‟ (P07; 
P08), seem to be another key factor playing a determinant role in an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. However, it appears that it is the ambitiousness 
of an organisation‟s objectives, rather than the objectives themselves, that 
shape the risk appetite. It is noted that highly ambitious objectives require 
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an organisation to have an equally aggressive risk appetite to accommodate 
business activities that go out of the „comfort zone‟, whereas an 
organisation with conservative objectives could just follow the most basics 
and operate with a low risk appetite. Informant P01 supported this view with 
an example: 
 
„…In the situation of global financial crisis, for some organisations 
the objectives might be simply to survive. And for others the 
objectives might be to reshape the organisation in order to thrive. If 
your objectives are simply to survive, then you have a much more 
conservative, protective, low risk appetite; if your objectives are, to 
reshape your company in the light of the external shock in order to 
do something different, then you have a much higher risk appetite.‟ 
(P01) 
 
In the above example, „thriving‟ in the context of financial crisis is a more 
ambitious objective than „surviving‟, which demands an organisation to 
increase its willingness for risk-seeking activities. Therefore, the 
ambitiousness of an organisation‟s objectives seems to be positively related 




Another key factor likely to shape the risk appetite is the performance of an 
organisation. Performance refers to an organisation‟s performance level 
relative to its aspirations or targets. An organisation meeting or exceeding 
its aspirations is regarded as well-performing, whereas one who falls behind 
its aspirations would be seen as under-performing. It appears that the way an 
organisation‟s performance influences its risk appetite is not definitive. 
 
With regard to a well-performing organisation, a common view among most 
informants is that the organisation would increase its risk appetite and take 
more risk, because the organisation knows that it has the ability to deliver its 
promises, and the „positive feedback‟ and the „increased confidence‟ 
resulted from performing well could further boost the organisation‟s 




„So if it‟s a very „well-oiled machine‟, and everything is going well, 
it can afford to take a bigger level of risk because it has better 
people, better systems, better processes, better customers, better 
cash flow, and can afford to take the risk.‟ (P02) 
 
However, two informants (P02; P10) adds that a well-performing 
organisation could also choose to take less risk, because it might not see the 
benefit or the need to take on extra risk and therefore may not want to take 
any chance that could jeopardise what the organisation has already achieved. 
 
For an under-performing organisation, the view is that the organisation 
could become more cautious and thus reduce its risk appetite, because it 
might not want to „risk the company for any further decline‟ (P04). 
However, some informants (P05; P06; P10) acknowledge the opposite 
possibility that an under-performing organisation that suffers deeply could 
become more risk-seeking, because it has „nothing more to lose‟ (P06). For 
such an organisation, taking on an increased level of risk is often considered 
as the only means to improve organisational performance, hence the risk-




An organisation‟s risk capacity appears to play a key role in affecting its 
appetite for risk. Risk capacity is defined as the absolute maximum amount 
of risk an organisation is able to take in financial/monetary means, which 
creates a legitimate upper limit for the risk appetite. It is noted that risk 
appetite should always be kept well within the risk capacity, as otherwise 
the organisation could be taking risks at a level that is more than it could 
afford, hence placing itself on the verge of collapse. As informant P07 
explained: 
 
„If your risk appetite is too close to your risk capacity, and you make 
one small mistake, it could totally wipe out your entire company. 
This was exactly the case with lots of large firms back in 2008 




Regarding how risk capacity could influence the risk appetite, there seems 
to be two schools of thought. One school argues that changes in an 
organisation‟s risk capacity do not change its risk appetite. According to 
informant P01, this is because in some organisations risk capacity only 
serves as a benchmark, which is used to gauge whether the risk appetite has 
been set at an appropriate level. As long as the risk appetite is within its risk 
capacity, risk capacity changes do not trigger a change in risk appetite. 
 
In contrast, another school postulates that if an organisation‟s risk capacity 
has increased, it ought to increase its risk appetite accordingly, otherwise the 
organisation‟s shareholders and potential investors might consider the 
organisation as overly conservative and therefore criticise the organisation 
for not utilising its available risk capacity to maximise returns. One 
informant (P08) recalled an example: 
 
„Look at the General Electric (GE) in the 1980s, they had an 
enormous risk capacity: the electrical fire power, the know-how, the 
cash resources. But you had the CEO who was just building an 
enormous cash mounting, and he didn‟t have a great risk appetite. In 
fact, he was criticised for that and the new board which then turned 
GE into Marconi had an appetite for doing all sorts of strange 
things.‟ (P08) 
 
Additionally, one informant (P06) highlights that the relationship between 
risk capacity and risk appetite may also be related to the nature of the 
industry in which the organisation operates. It seems that within a particular 
industry, there is a common view on what is generally acceptable and what 
is not with regard to risk taking. In an industry (such as construction or 
energy) where risk taking is generally discouraged, changes in risk capacity 
would only have a minimal, if any, impact on the risk appetite. 
 
Risk management capability 
 
Seven informants (P01; P02; P03; P04; P05; P06; P08) points out that an 
organisation‟s risk management capability may be a crucial factor that 
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affects the risk appetite. Risk management capability, among those 
informants, is perceived as a broad and multi-dimensional construct, 
encompassing the awareness and understanding of risk at various 
organisational levels, as well as risk management skills and know-hows. 
 
According to informants P04 and P06, an organisation‟s risk management 
capability determines the types of risk it is willing to take, because an 
organisation with good risk management capability would probably have a 
clear idea about „the core competences it has got‟ and „which risk it has the 
specialty to manage well‟ (P04; P06).  
 
However, informants P01 and P08 argue that such knowledge about risk 
specialty could, but not necessarily would, lead to the organisation taking 
the risks, because it might not have adequate capacity to support the risk 
taking. Equally, an organisation with a large risk capacity could have a 
relatively poor capability to identify risks and devise meaningful risk 
controls. In such a case, the company may choose not to engage in any risk 
taking. Therefore, risk capacity and risk management capability are two 
factors that work in tandem in supporting organisational risk taking. As one 
informant (P08) noted:  
 
„…you will need to have both risk capacity and capability if you are 
going to run a high risk strategy and expect it to be having a 
sustainable long-term future.‟ (P08) 
 
Additionally, the relationship between risk appetite and risk management 
capability seems to be a „U‟ shape. That is, according to informant P07, if 
an organisation has no or little risk management capability, it will be less 
likely to conduct any risk identification activities, and thus may 
unknowingly take on a high level of risks. If such an organisation were to 
develop its risk management capability, it would then recognise the various 
risks it is exposed to, and may probably reduce its appetite for risk. As the 
organisation‟s risk management capability continues to grow, provided that 
it has sufficient risk capacity, it might start to take more risk again, hence 
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depicting a U-shaped relationship between risk management capability and 
risk appetite. 
 
History of risk taking  
 
The history of an organisation‟s risk taking seems to be another influential 
factor for risk appetite. History of risk taking entails an organisation‟s 
previous risk taking experiences and the nature (successful or unsuccessful) 
of those experiences. Several informants (P01; P04; P05; P07; P09) argue 
that an organisation that has often been successful in previous risk-taking 
experiences would probably be more willing to take risk, because it has 
more confidence in itself and its ability to deliver. However, informant P06 
notes that this may not always be the case because the organisation might 
not see the benefit or need for an increased risk appetite.  
 
Informants P04 and P09 claim that an organisation with much unsuccessful 
experiences in risk taking is likely to be more conservative in future risk 
taking. However, it is also possible that the organisation could choose to 
maintain or even increase its risk appetite, because it might have learnt from 
its past mistakes and thus become more capable of managing the situation, 
or the organisation could just be reckless, hoping that potential rewards 
from increased risk-seeking activities could compensate for previous 
failures. 
 
Perceived level of risk in the external environment 
 
The organisation‟s perceived level of risk in its external environment could 
affect its willingness to take risk. According to informants P02 and P07, a 
favourable external environment with a low level of perceived risk might 
increase an organisation‟s risk appetite, whereas an unfavourable 
environment with a high level of perceived risk is likely to undermine the 




„If you take the situation right now, corporations in the US are 
worried about this continuation of the „funding cuts‟. I was reading 
this morning that many corporations are starting to hold cash, so 
their risk appetite on the cash flow side has gone down.‟ (P02) 
 
In the above example, US organisations had perceived the business 
environment (February 2013) as unfavourable due to a continued threat of 
financial cuts. This in turn led such organisations to display a conservative 




The leverage of an organisation emerged as a factor that might influence the 
risk appetite. According to informant P04, leverage refers to the amount of 
debt used to finance an organisation‟s operation, which tends to reduce its 
risk appetite. The reason is that a leveraged organisation has a regular 
financial commitment to repay its debt. Failure to keep this commitment 
would usually result in serious consequences such as disruption to the 
organisation‟s operation, asset repossession or bankruptcy. As such, a 
highly leveraged organisation tends to be very prudent in taking risks, as 
any unnecessary risk-taking decisions could impair the organisation‟s ability 
to repay its debt. On the contrary, an organisation with little debt (i.e. low 
leverage) might be more comfortable to exploit emerging opportunities and 
take on an increased level of risk. 
 
4.1.1.2 Decision-maker factors 
 
BoD risk propensity  
 
The collective risk propensity of an organisation‟s BoD has been identified 
by all informants as a key factor that positively shapes the organisation‟s 
risk appetite. According to informant P03 and P06, because the BoD has the 
ultimate responsibility in leading an organisation and determining the risk 
appetite, its collective propensity for risk taking is likely to shape the types 




However, as the BoD generally comprises a team of executive and non-
executive directors with a dynamic combination of different individual risk 
propensities, how to properly determine the collective risk propensity of the 
BoD remains a challenge. Three informants (P05; P07; P09) suggest that 
BoD‟s risk propensity may not simply be the sum of the risk propensities of 
all individual directors, instead it is likely to be the collective risk propensity 
of the most powerful members, such as the Chairman and the CEO. This is 
because the Chairman and the CEO are usually at the top of the decision-
making hierarchy and provide the overall leadership for other directors, but 
as informant P05 notes, such a strong personal influence of the Chairman 
and the CEO is unlikely in an organisation that strives for consensus in 
decision-making. 
 
CEO risk propensity & CEO emotions 
 
The risk propensity of the CEO is likely to have a positive relationship with 
an organisation‟s risk appetite. According to informants P09 and P10, being 
the most powerful member on the BoD, the CEO has the authority to align 
the organisation‟s risk appetite with his/her own risk propensity, even if 
sometimes that is counter-intuitive to other directors. 
 
However, the positive relationship between CEO risk propensity and risk 
appetite is based on a premise that the CEO has a dominant decision-making 
power on the BoD. If the CEO has limited power in taking Board decisions, 
then the influence of his/her own risk propensity on the organisation‟s risk 
appetite could be very much constrained. 
 
Three informants (P04; P05; P06) suggest that in the case of a powerful 
CEO, the CEO‟s emotional states at the time of decision making, including 
positive or negative mood, could override his/her own risk propensity and 




„I certainly see it [the influence of CEO emotions on risk appetite] in 
financial services. Fred Goodwin, the man was at the top of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland. He was a very emotional man, very 
unpleasant, aggressive man. And I believe that had a definite impact 
on the way they took risk. And also Dick Fuld, he was the CEO of 
Lehman Brothers, talked about “crushing” his rivals…so again a 




Five informants (P04; P05; P06; P07; P09) argue that the way in which the 
remuneration to the BoD is designed can shape the organisation‟s risk 
appetite. Remuneration may include cash bonuses and/or stock options and 
can be designed to reward desired behaviour and/or performance. However, 
inappropriately designed remuneration could drive undesirable 
organisational risk behaviour that is inconsistent with the risk appetite. For 
example, informants P06 and P07 claim that short-sighted remuneration that 
focuses only on boosting short-term performance tends to induce 
unnecessary risk-seeking behaviour. The consequence can be catastrophic to 
an organisation‟s long-term viability. As informant P04 explained:  
 
„In financial services, people get paid for bonuses, particularly 
bonuses based on short-term performance. That tends to encourage 
them to take more risk, because they can generate a bonus from a 
short-term performance, get lots of money, and if the company does 
badly in the long term, it doesn‟t matter. Dick Fuld from Lehman 
Brothers, before it failed, earned half a billion dollars, and most of 
that was bonuses. So you could say what incentive did he have to be 
conservative? None at all.‟ (P04)  
 
As such, a more sensible approach to incentivising senior decision makers is 
perhaps to design a remuneration policy that is focused on rewarding long-
term performance, as this could encourage the decision makers to be more 
vigilant in making risk-taking decisions. However, informant P06 warns that 
determining the appropriate timescale is crucial as overly stretched 
remuneration can be demotivating. 
 
Informant P05 states that in construction or energy organisations where 
health and safety is more important than financial performance, 
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remuneration policies tend to be rewarded for reduced risk-taking. In this 
case, remuneration decreases the risk appetite. She (P05), therefore, argues 
that the influence of remuneration on risk appetite is dependent upon the 
nature of the organisation‟s strategic objectives. 
 




The demands of an organisation‟s stakeholders emerged as an important 
factor that could influence the risk appetite. Stakeholders typically include a 
variety of groups such as shareholders, employees, customers, regulators, 
governments, communities, etc. Four informants (P04; P05; P06; P07) argue 
that due to competing demands of different stakeholder groups, an 
organisation might need to behave differently to satisfy different demands. 
Some demands might require the organisation to take more risk, some might 
require the organisation to be more risk-averse, and some might have little 
or no influence on the organisation‟s risk appetite. 
 
Two informants (P05; P09) state that a common challenge in most 
organisations is how competing stakeholder demands can be balanced, 
especially in situations where one stakeholder group wants to increase 
return on investment and the other group doesn‟t. In such circumstances, it 
is suggested that an organisation should prioritise its stakeholders and then 
abide by the particular group with which the organisation perceives as being 
more important. As informant P09 noted: 
 
„You need to filter down to how much influence a stakeholder has, 
and how much the company is going to listen to it and comply. For 
example, your bank has a lot of influence. If you have a big loan, 
then the bank owns part of your company. You‟ve got to have a lot of 
meetings with the bank, telling them what direction you are taking. 
And they may not agree with your risk appetite and tell you to 







Regulation seems an important factor that could shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite. In most cases, regulation is seen to be a constraint that prevents 
organisations from improper risk behaviour, thus imposing regulations may 
be seen as a means to moderate an organisation‟s risk appetite. In some 
cases, however, regulations may provide opportunities for an organisation to 
increase its risk appetite. As informant P06 explained: 
 
„Regulation is usually a constraint, because they are there to 
philosophically protect the social good in a sense, to stop you doing 
things which are unethical. But regulation is also an opportunity. If 
there is something which is mandated by regulation, and you have a 
really excellent competence delivering that thing, you should be 
more successful than someone who doesn‟t.‟ (P06) 
 
Nevertheless, it is noted that regulation can only influence the risk appetite 
if the organisation takes it seriously and complies with it, and there are no 
ways to bypass the regulation. Informant (P07) warn that in reality 
regulation is not always taken seriously by organisations, so the effects of 
regulation on risk appetite is minimal. As she noted: 
 
„Regulations will only influence your willingness to take risks if the 
regulations are taken seriously, and if there are no mechanisms to 
work around the regulation. I‟ve seen companies… who create off 
balance sheet structures which disguise the company‟s risk taking, 
then regulations may not have any effect.‟ (P07) 
 
 
4.1.1.4 Interrelationships among identified factors 
 
Data analysis suggests that a number of factors identified in the previous 
section also influence each other. The existence of these interrelationships 
could therefore affect the relationship between a particular factor and the 




One of the most interrelated factors appears to be risk culture. Risk culture 
seems to shape the BoD‟s and CEO‟s risk propensity, two key „decision-
maker‟ factors deemed to have a positive relationship with the risk appetite. 
Informant P01 argues that since risk culture is a shared belief about risk that 
is formed over a long period of time among organisational members, it is 
likely to moderate the „risk views‟ of its members, especially the BoD and 
the CEO when making risk-taking decisions. However, informant P01 also 
noted that risk culture might in turn be influenced by the risk propensity of 
the BoD or the CEO, but this would require them to firmly uphold their 
views for a prolonged period of time through sending constant messages 
that challenges the conventional risk culture. Moreover, risk culture may be 
affected by an organisation‟s past risk-taking experience. Three informants 
(P01; P04; P05) posit that repeated behaviour shapes culture, thus repeated 
successes or failures in the past may therefore change how organisational 
members view risk and how risk is considered in decision making. 
 
Board‟s risk propensity and CEO‟s risk propensity, despite being influenced 
by risk culture, could also be affected by the specific design of the 
remuneration. Three informants (P04; P07; P09) note that remuneration 
designed to reward short-term performance may provide the BoD and the 
CEO a temporary „boost‟ to their risk propensities, propelling unnecessary 
risk-taking decisions that could endanger the organisation. Moreover, the 
„inappropriately‟ designed remuneration, according to informant P06, may 
send misleading messages to the wider organisation that promote 
improvident risk behaviour, thus negatively impacting on the organisation‟s 
risk culture over time. Furthermore, the risk propensities of the BoD and 
CEO may also be shaped by the organisation‟s history of risk taking. It is 
noted (P07; P09) that previous risk-taking experiences, depending on 
whether they were a success or failure, may positively or negatively impact 
on the risk propensities of the BoD and CEO to make future decisions in 
similar situations. 
 
It has been found that the ambitiousness of an organisation‟s objectives is 
positively related with the risk appetite. However, the level of the 
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ambitiousness may be influenced by two other factors, the BoD‟s risk 
propensity and the perceived level of risk in the external environment. For 
example, since the BoD is often responsible for setting an organisation‟s 
overall objectives, its risk propensity is likely to have a positive impact on 
the level of ambitiousness of the final objectives (P03; P05). Particularly, a 
BoD that is more risk-seeking is likely to establish more ambitious 
objectives compared with a rather conservative BoD. With regard to the 
organisation‟s perceived level of risk in the external environment, it is noted 
(P01; P02) that environmental scanning is an essential step in the objective-
setting process, and depending on how risky the external environment is 
perceived, the organisation may establish more or less ambitious objectives. 
Nevertheless, different organisations may have differing perceptions of the 
level of risk in the external environment. While some may perceive a 
favourable external environment with a low level of perceived risk, others 
might perceive the opposite. According to informant P07, this perception 
may be dependent upon the particular strengths of the organisation in 
managing risk, which is related to the organisation‟s risk management 
capability. 
 
The amount of leverage an organisation possesses may moderate the 
relationship between its risk capacity and risk appetite. According to 
informant P04, if an organisation‟s capacity for risk is mostly comprised of 
debts (i.e. the organisation is highly leveraged), increasing risk capacity is 
more likely to reduce the risk appetite, as any risk-taking activity could 
threaten the organisation‟s ability to meet its repayment obligations. 
However, for an organisation with little or no debts, the influence of 
leverage on the relationship between risk capacity and risk appetite might be 
negligible. 
 
Although the above interrelationships add an extra layer of complexity in 






4.1.2 Enriching the conceptual framework 
 
Overall, stage one identifies a variety of factors and their impacts on an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. When comparing the „risk consultant‟ 
framework (Figure 4.1, p. 116) with the conceptual framework (Figure 2.4, 
p. 74), several similarities are notable. First, the three broad categories of 
factors (i.e. organisational, decision-maker and environmental) as illustrated 
in the conceptual framework remain unchanged in the risk consultant 
framework, as all informants agreed and embraced this categorisation. 
Second, almost all factors and their impacts on risk appetite in the „risk 
consultant‟ framework are echoed in the conceptual framework, except for 
one emerging factor: „leverage‟. 
 
There are a few differences between the „risk consultant‟ framework and the 
conceptual framework. One key difference is that the total number of factors 
in the risk consultant framework is considerably smaller than those in the 
conceptual framework. Many factors in the conceptual framework, such as 
„organisation‟s age‟, „ownership structure‟ and „level of competition‟, are 
not identified by the risk consultants. In addition, the relationships between 
certain factors and the risk appetite appear different. For example, instead of 
a „one-directional‟ positive relationship as suggested in the literature, an 
organisation‟s risk management capability appears to have a „mixed‟ 
relationship with risk appetite. Furthermore, while the conceptual 
framework could not distinguish the relative importance of the factors, the 
risk consultant framework was able to highlight a number of factors that are 
considered as key in shaping the risk appetite (i.e. underlined factors in 
Figure 4.1, p. 116). 
 
In addition to the above similarities and differences, this stage of the 
research has discovered new interrelationships between different factors. 
For example, an organisation‟s „risk culture‟ and „history of risk taking‟ 
may shape and be shaped by the BoD‟s and CEO‟s „risk propensities‟; the 
„risk propensities‟ of the BoD and the CEO and the „perceived level of risk 
in the external environment‟ may influence the „ambitiousness of an 
131 
 
organisation‟s objectives‟; and the „leverage‟ of an organisation could affect 
the relationship between risk capacity and risk appetite. 
 
Incorporating the above findings into the original conceptual framework 
(Figure 2.4, p. 74), a „stage one‟ framework of factors that influence an 
organisation‟s risk appetite is developed (Figure 4.2, p. 132). The emerging 
factor, „leverage‟, is grouped under the „identity‟ component. Newly 
identified interrelationships between different factors are also presented by 
adding solid arrows between relevant components. This „stage one‟ 
framework was then used to inform the design of the second stage of the 




   
Italic factors: Emerging factors  
Underlined factors: Key factors that shape the risk appetite 
(Dashed) arrows: (proposed) emerging relationships between living composition components that shape the risk appetite
„Identity‟ 
 
 Risk culture 
 Performance 
 Firm size 
 Degree of 
Masculinity  
 Organisation‟s age  
 Ownership structure  
 Number of 
subsidiaries  
 Leverage 
„Perception of the environment‟ 




 Transparency of actions  
 Degree of access to 
information  
„Knowledge‟ 
 History of risk taking  
 Knowledge of self and 
environment  
 Risk management capability  
„Strategy‟ 
 Ambitiousness of objectives 
 
 
„Internal standards, processes, 
and communication‟ 
 Risk capacity  
 Risk reporting  
Risk appetite 
Organisational factors 
„Interactive processes and 
communication with the 
environment‟ 
 
 Shareholder demands  
 Other stakeholder demands 
 Alliances/partnerships 
„Experimentation‟ 







 BoD‟s risk propensity 
 BoD diversity  
 BoD size  
 EC risk propensity  
 CEO risk propensity  
 CEO emotions  
 Performance-based 
remuneration  




 Expected Rewards 
 Economy 
 Degree of regulation 
 Level of competition 




4.2 „Stage two‟ findings – the case study 
 
4.2.1 Evaluating the case organisations‟ risk appetite with financial 
analysts 
 
This section presents the findings of the online questionnaire survey, 
conducted with the financial analysts of the case organisations. The purpose 
of the survey is to seek empirical support for the observation that the two 
case organisations display different risk appetites - one (organisation A) is 
more risk-averse and the other (organisation B) is more risk-seeking. 
 
Fifteen out of thirty-five analysts evaluated their respective organisation‟s 
risk appetite. In particular, nine out of twenty-six analysts completed the 
survey for organisation A, and six out of nine analysts completed the survey 
for organisation B. The respondents have a deep understanding of their 
respective organisation and are highly aware of the industry situation. As 
mentioned in the methodology chapter, these analysts are experienced 
financial analysts working for major investment banks and financial 
brokerage firms. They offer independent advice on whether an investor 
should begin or continue to invest in a company. Their knowledge of the 
case organisations derives from their daily scrutiny of the organisations as 
well as direct interactions with the CEO and other top decision makers in 
various occasions such as the annual and/or quarterly earnings-reporting 
conferences. As such, their evaluation of the case organisations‟ risk 
appetite can be regarded as highly credible. 
 
The credibility of the evaluation is also demonstrated by good response rates, 
36% for organisation A and 67% for organisation B was achieved. If one 
considers the fact that those analysts who declined to participate are mostly 
constrained by their own organisation‟s disclosure policy rather than their 
own will, these two response rates could be viewed as even better, as the 
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disclosure policy effectively reduces the potential survey population for 
both case organisations. 
 
The risk appetite evaluation results for both case organisations are presented 
below in Table 4.1 (p. 135) and a graphical representation is presented in 
Figure 4.3 (p. 136). In particular, several differences between the two case 
organisations can be noted: 1) Organisation A‟s score for each of the ten 
risk behaviour attributes is consistently lower than organisation B. This 
shows that organisation A is more conservative overall compared with 
organisation B. 2) Most of organisation A‟s evaluation scores are within the 
„risk-averse‟ domain (i.e. below „4‟), and most of organisation B‟s 
evaluation scores are within the „risk-seeking‟ domain (i.e. above „4‟). This 
leads to the conclusion that, on an overall basis, organisation A is relatively 
risk-averse (average „3.444‟), and organisation B is relatively risk-seeking 
(average „4.598‟). However, the distance between organisation A and B in 
the overall average is rather small and both organisations are quite close to 
the risk neutral point (average „4‟). This indicates that the risk appetites of 
both case organisations, while showing a distinct and clear preference, are 
not extreme. These findings confirm the study‟s case-selection observation 
that organisation A is slightly more risk-averse and organisation B is 
slightly more risk-seeking. 
 
Nevertheless, there are certain attributes in each case organisation whose 
evaluation score appears inconsistent with its overall evaluation. For 
example, the attributes of „risk reviews‟ (score = 4.67) and „risk incentives‟ 
(score = 4.00) for organisation A are in the domains of risk-seeking and 
risk-neutral, respectively. Equally, the attributes of „degree of regulation‟ 
(score = 2.83) and „risk perspective‟ (score = 3.83) for organisation B are in 
the domain of risk-averse. Not only does this inconsistency underscore the 
multi-dimensional nature of risk appetite, it also implies that an overarching 
attempt to characterise an organisation as either risk-averse or risk-seeking 
might be inappropriate, as the organisation could display a certain level of 
willingness to take risk in a particular aspect that is largely inconsistent with 














   
Risk approach 3.78 5.33 
   
Risk horizon 3.33 4.50 
   
Management style  3.11 5.33 
   
Degree of regulation 2.33 2.83 
   
Risk encouragement 2.22 4.50 
   
Risk perspective 3.78 3.83 
   
Risk reviews 4.67 5.17 
   
Risk rhetoric 3.89 4.83 
   
Risk incentives 4.00 5.33 
   
Risk ownership 3.33 4.33 
   




Figure 4.3 Risk appetite evaluation results for case organisations 
Risk behaviour attributes Positions on the rating scale 
                                          Very much                                          Neither                                            Very much 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
„Risk approach‟ Crisis  Planned 
          
„Risk horizon‟ Short term  Long term 
          
„Management style‟  Micro  Macro 
          
„Degree of regulation‟ Regulated  Unregulated 
          
„Risk encouragement‟ Cautious  Copious 
          
„Risk perspective‟ Negative  Positive 
          
„Risk reviews‟ Static  Dynamic 
          
„Risk rhetoric‟ Indirect  Direct 
          
„Risk incentives‟  Non-existent  Proportionate 
          
„Risk ownership‟ Forced  Voluntary 
 
Overall evaluation Risk-averse  Risk-seeking 
 




4.2.2 Exploring the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite 
from corporate executives and risk managers 
 
Building upon the previous findings, the case study seeks to identify and 
evaluate the factors that influence an organisation‟s risk appetite in real-life 
contexts. It begins with an exploration of the risk appetite conceptualisations 
held by the informants (section 4.2.2.1), followed by a presentation of 
factors that shape the case organisations‟ risk appetite (section 4.2.2.2). The 
interrelationships between different factors are also discussed (section 
4.2.2.3). 
 
4.2.2.1 Risk appetite conceptualisations from the perspective of 
corporate executives and risk managers 
 
This section explores how informants of the case organisations 
conceptualise risk appetite in the context of their own organisation, and 
whether there are any similarities or differences among those 
conceptualisations. This understanding is important as it facilitates the 
comprehension of the informants‟ accounts of factors influencing their 
organisation‟s risk appetite. 
 
In organisation A, there seems to be a shared understanding of risk appetite 
among all informants. The concept is considered as having a largely 
quantitative nature, representing the amount or level of risk that an 
organisation is willing to take in order to achieve its objectives. For example, 
informant P04A explained: 
 
„Whether you're an organisation or an individual we all have risk 
appetites, and the fact that it's - the amount of risk that we're willing 
to take in order to achieve our goals or to achieve desired objectives 
or outcomes.‟ (P04A) 
 
However, informant P02A contends that it is difficult for employees of the 
organisation to comprehend risk appetite, as the term „risk‟ is rather abstract 
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and elusive. He suggests that perhaps it is better to replace „risk‟ with 
„resource‟, which is more tangible and easier to understand. He also argues 
that the purpose of risk taking should not only be about achieving strategic 
objectives, but also protecting the organisation‟s assets, particularly the 
intangible assets such as the reputation. In this regard, risk appetite may be 
viewed as the amount of resources an organisation is willing to put at risk in 
order to achieve its objectives and protect its assets. 
 
Despite this nuance, three informants (P01A; P03A; P07A) realise that their 
view of risk appetite may be problematic, as it assumes that all risks can be 
quantified with a single measure and that risk appetite is an aggregated 
number of all risks. Whilst risk quantification is important for measuring 
and monitoring risk levels, attempting to quantify all risks in a unified 
measure is inappropriate, and many risks seem to be unquantifiable. To 
rectify this problem, two informants (P03A; P07A) suggest that an 
organisation may need to adopt a granular view of risk appetite and consider 
it as comprising many risk tolerances. Compared to risk appetite, risk 
tolerance is a more widely accepted concept in risk management, referring 
to the risk level an organisation is willing to take with regard to a particular 
risk type. Risk tolerance may be expressed in either quantitative measures or 
qualitative statements. Normally, an organisation‟s risk appetite at lower 
organisational levels tends to include quantifiable risk tolerance measures 
based on the organisation‟s policies and standards, on which a numerical 
value can be allocated. An example of such risk tolerance measures can be 
„zero tolerance of fire or theft incidents‟ (P07A). However, with regard to 
higher-level risks, particularly those at the strategic levels, risk tolerances 
tend to manifest themselves in more or exclusively qualitative statements, 
which are aimed at promoting desirable risk behaviour. An example of such 
qualitative statements could be, „we value our reputation and have no risk 
appetite for the conduct of activities which may potentially damage our 
reputation‟ (P06B). 
 
Whilst organisation A does not have a formal risk appetite statement or 
framework that is communicated to stakeholders, informants P01A and 
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P02A recognise that their organisation naturally has an inherent risk appetite, 
which is reflected in a number of key decision-making areas: policies and 
standards, delegation of authority, resource allocation, investment 
guidelines, corporate governance, and devising risk controls. For example, 
informant P01A argues that the way an organisation allocates resources may 
reflect its risk appetite. If an organisation allocates most resources to 
traditionally risk-seeking or risk-averse departments, it may indicate an 
overall risk-seeking or risk-averse appetite of the organisation. 
 
Recognising the complex nature of the risk appetite concept and a lack of 
formal guidance, informant P05A suggests that organisations should not 
overly focus on developing a risk appetite statement or framework. He 
perceives risk appetite as similar to the „black hole‟ in the universe, as both 
are invisible and difficult-to-measure, and both shape the ways in which 
their surroundings behave. He argues that it could be a waste of resources to 
directly measure the „black hole‟; what is more meaningful is to understand 
how and why its surroundings behave in certain ways. Equally, attempting 
to develop a risk appetite framework may be seen as similar to measuring 
the „black hole‟; perhaps what is more worthwhile is to examine how 
various aspects of the organisation behave in situations involving risk, 
which could in turn benefit the understanding of the risk appetite. 
 
Compared with organisation A, there appears to be less diversity in the risk 
appetite conceptualisations in organisation B. In particular, the informants 
seem to understand risk appetite in two ways: one focuses on the amount or 
level of risk an organisation is prepared to take (P01B; P02B; P04B; P05B; 
P08B), which is similar to organisation A; the other concerns the degree of 
the overall „willingness‟ or „boldness‟ of an organisation in risk taking 
(P03B; P06B; P07B). The latter conceptualisation is reflected below: 
 
„I would put it in the context of a company‟s willingness to accept 
uncertainty, and then make decisions against that. The greater the 
risk appetite, the more willing somebody is to make decisions in the 
absence of lots of information or facts. It becomes more of a gut 
thing than it does with empirical data that says, „this is what it 
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shows and this is what we want to do as a result of that 
information.‟‟(P03B) 
 
„…the risk appetite - how bold are we with our steps and to say, 
„okay, we want to take a stand‟ on certain issues or markets?‟(P06B) 
 
In the above examples, risk appetite is not a number; rather, it reflects a 
mental attitude of the organisation towards accepting uncertainties. This 
difference might partially explain why organisation A appears slightly more 
risk-averse than organisation B. Compared to determining the mental 
attitude towards risk taking, calculating a meaningful risk appetite number 
seems more challenging and time-consuming. Therefore, a certain amount 
of risk that is mentally acceptable for organisation B may not be 
numerically justifiable for organisation A. Perhaps, this mental 
conceptualisation of risk appetite can be ascribed to the specific job roles of 
the informants. Whilst those informants who view risk appetite as a number 
work exclusively in the Risk Management function of their respective 
organisation, informants who consider risk appetite as the willingness or 
boldness have significantly different responsibilities. For example, 
informant P03B is Head of the Procurement, informant P06B leads the 
Public Relations department, and informant P07B is Vice President of the 
organisation‟s Legal department. Compared with colleagues in Risk 
Management, these three informants may have less responsibility in risk 
control for the entire organisation, thus engendering a more relaxed and 
affective view of risk appetite.   
 
4.2.2.2 Factors that shape the case organisations‟ risk appetite 
 
The „stage one‟ framework (Figure 4.2, p. 132) was used as an analytical 
lens to explore the factors that shape case organisations‟ risk appetites. 
Overall, the findings (Figure 4.4, p. 141 and Figure 4.5, p. 142) seem to 
support the main components of the framework in both organisations, but 
disparities exist in how individual factors influence the risk appetite. The 
interrelationships between risk appetite factors also appear different from 
the stage one framework for both organisations.  
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+: positive association with the risk appetite;   
-: negative association with the risk appetite;  
M: mixed (both positive and negative) association with the risk 
appetite; Underlined factors: Key factors;  
Purple: Important disputed factors;  
Blue: Important undisputed factors;  
Brown: Less important disputed factors;  
Green: Less important undisputed factors 
„Identity‟ 
 
 Risk culture (+) 
 Leverage (-) 
 Firm size (M) 
 Performance (M) 
 Brand portfolio (M) 
 Degree of masculinity 
(+) 
 Organisation‟s age (-) 
 Ownership structure (-) 
„Perception of the environment‟ 




 Transparency of actions 
(M) 
 Degree of access to 
information (+) 
„Knowledge‟ 
 History of risk taking (M) 
 Organisation‟s knowledge of 
self and environment (+) 
 Organisation‟s risk management 
capability (+) 
„Strategy‟ 
 Ambitiousness of objectives (+) 
 
„Internal standards, processes, 
and communication‟ 
 Organisation‟s risk capacity (+) 
 Risk reporting (M) 
Risk appetite 
Organisational factors 
„Interactive processes and 
communication with the 
environment‟ 
 
 Shareholder demands (M) 
 Other stakeholder demands (M) 
„Experimentation‟ 




 Expected rewards (+) 
 Level of regulation (-) 
 Economy (+) 






 CEO risk propensity (+) 
 EC risk propensity (+) 
 BoD‟s risk propensity (+) 
 Performance-based 
remuneration (+) 
 BoD diversity (-) 
 CEO emotions (+) 
 BoD size (-) 
 Ability to sense (-) 
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+/-: positive/negative association with the risk appetite;   
M: mixed (both positive and negative) association with the risk 
appetite; Underlined factors: Key factors; Italic factor: Emerging 
factor 
Purple: Important disputed factors;  
Blue: Important undisputed factors;  
Brown: Less important disputed factors;  
„Identity‟ 
 
 Risk culture (M) 
 Firm size (+) 
 Performance (+) 
 Brand portfolio (+) 
 Degree of masculinity 
(+) 
 Organisation‟s age (+) 
 Ownership structure 
(M) 
„Perception of the environment‟ 




 Transparency of actions 
(+) 
 Degree of access to 
information (M) 
„Knowledge‟ 
 Organisation‟s risk management 
capability (+) 
 History of risk taking (+) 
 Organisation‟s knowledge of 
self and environment (M) 
„Strategy‟ 
 Ambitiousness of objectives (+) 
 
„Internal standards, processes, 
and communication‟ 
 Organisation‟s risk capacity (+) 
 Risk reporting (+) 
Risk appetite 
Organisational factors 
„Interactive processes and 
communication with the 
environment‟ 
 
 Shareholder demands (M) 
 Other Stakeholder demands (+) 




 Expected rewards (+) 
 Level of regulation (-) 
 Economy (+) 
 Level of competition (+) 






 CEO risk propensity (+) 
 EC risk propensity (+) 
 BoD‟s risk propensity (+) 
 Performance-based 
remuneration (+) 
 CEO emotions (+) 
 BoD diversity (M) 
 Ability to sense (M) 




Organisational factors - „Strategy‟ factor 
 
The „strategy‟ component appears as a key category that influences both 
organisations‟ risk appetite. This component comprises one shared factor: 
ambitiousness of objectives, which is considered as a key factor that 
positively drives an organisation‟s risk appetite (Table 4.2, p. 143). 
 
Table 4.2 „Strategy‟ factor 
Factors Organisation A Organisation B 
Ambitiousness of 
objectives 
Key Undisputed Positive Key Undisputed Positive 
 
 
A notable consensus between the two organisations is that this factor is 
described as instrumental in shaping the risk appetite. It seems that 
objectives provide an organisation with an overall direction for development, 
which determines the required level of risk taking. According to informant 
P02A, objectives are akin to a general‟s „orders‟ in a battlefield: once they 
are given, they will „orientate everything‟. Informant P06A explained how 
objectives have dictated the organisation‟s operational focus: 
 
“Last year one of the key objectives was „responsible business‟, so 
everything was about showing that we're a responsible company. So 
we had a lot of responsibility projects. We had charities. We had 
„….‟, „….‟, „….‟, „….‟, etc. This year is about „being number one‟, in 
terms of our employees saying „this is the best company to work for‟, 
our guests saying „this is the best company to stay with‟, so 
everything we do now is focused on guest service, employee 
experience.”(P06A) 
 
Interestingly, the level of influence that objectives have on risk appetite 
becomes much stronger when an organisation publicises them, especially in 
its annual reports or Annual General Meetings. Five informants (P02A; 
P05A; P06A; P01B; P06B) across the case organisations explicitly comment 
that their organisation will „do everything‟ to achieve publicly stated 
objectives, regardless of how challenging the situation may be, even though 
that requires the organisation to take on a huge amount of extra risk (and 
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contribute additional resources to devise corresponding controls). If an 
organisation fails to achieve its publicly stated objectives, the share value is 
likely to decrease and the organisation‟s reputation may deteriorate. 
 
Organisational factors - „Knowledge‟ factors 
 
The „knowledge‟ component consists of three factors that relate to an 
organisation‟s general and specific knowledge about itself, its capability to 
manage risk, and its environment. These three factors are history of risk 
taking, organisation‟s risk management capability, and knowledge of self 
and environment. The case organisations seem very different with regard to 
the influence of these three factors on risk appetite (Table 4.3, p. 144). 
 
Table 4.3 „Knowledge‟ factors 
Factors Organisation A Organisation B 
History of risk 
taking 
















The crucial role that an organisation‟s history of risk taking plays in shaping 
its risk appetite is unanimously recognised by both case organisations. This 
is because past risk-taking experience can form a powerful knowledge base 
to inform future risk decisions. However, the value of past experience seems 
a contentious topic in organisation A. While four informants (P01A; P02A; 
P03A; P05A) argue that past experience is key, as „senior decision makers 
always make decisions based on their past experience‟ (P05A), three others 
(P04A; P06A; P07A) posit that an organisation should be wary of over 
reliance on previous experience, because „past successes or failures do not 
guarantee future outcomes‟ (P07A). Informant P08A provides a highly 
cautious and conservative perspective, arguing that past experience only 
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increases an organisation‟s awareness of possible risk-taking outcomes, thus 
not necessarily influencing the risk appetite:  
 
„Depending on what that experience was, be it good, bad or 
indifferent, you would be better informed or better equipped, but you 
might not necessarily want to increase your risk appetite nor 
decrease it. I think past experience gives you awareness and 
knowledge rather than necessarily wanting to do - you may not do 
anything about it.‟ (P08A) 
 
Regarding the history of risk taking, another notable difference between the 
case organisations relates to the specific nature of its influence on risk 
appetite. Informants of organisation A argue that the history of risk taking 
could have either a positive or negative influence, depending on whether the 
outcome of past experience is positive or negative. Normally, positive 
experience boosts overall confidence and thus increases the organisation‟s 
willingness to take more risk, whereas negative experience leads the 
organisation to be more cautious and reduce its risk appetite. However, all 
informants of organisation B seem to believe that past experience is 
immensely valuable, and regardless of the outcome, an organisation could 
always learn from it. This learning would then increase the likelihood of 
future success, thus enabling an organisation to have a higher risk appetite. 
 
An organisation‟s risk management capability appears to positively 
influence the risk appetite. As a multidimensional construct, risk 
management capability encompasses the overall awareness and 
understanding of risk at various organisational levels, and the specific skills 
and know-hows in managing risk. The dominant view is that the more 
capable an organisation is in managing risks, the more confident its decision 
makers will be, and the more likely they will decide to take on extra risk in 
order to maximise potential rewards. As informant P01A explained: 
 
„The more [risk management] capability we have, the more 
propensity the company has to take risks, because it gives the 
decision makers comfort that the traditional risks are managed, 
surprises are minimal and that you could take more risks that you 




However, this positive influence may not always exist, as increased risk 
management capability also means a stronger ability in risk identification 
and analysis. As such, the organisation may highlight more risks to which it 
is exposed, thus rendering the decision makers to refrain from taking risks. 
 
With regard to the importance of risk management capability, there seems a 
clear distinction between the case organisations, with organisation A 
believing it as „less important‟ for risk appetite, and organisation B 
considering it as „important‟. This distinction is further strengthened by the 
fact that two informants of organisation A (P02A; P04A) even perceived 
this factor as „unimportant‟, whereas four others in organisation B (P02B; 
P05B; P06B; P07B) rated it as „important‟. Although the data is not 
sufficient to explain this disparity, a possible reason might be that risk 
management capability, within organisation A, is seen as more of an 
„enabler‟, rather than a „driver‟ for risk taking. As informant P07A 
commented: 
 
„If you've got a good risk management system in the business, it 
would enable you to take some of those risks, but it is not the reason 
why you should take those risks.‟ (P07A) 
 
Interestingly, two informants (P01A; P05A) highlight a need to clarify the 
scope of risk management capability in risk appetite discussions, as 
confusion may arise as to whether it is the capability of the entire 
organisation or the risk management department. It is suggested that one 
should not consider risk management capability within the scope of the risk 
management department, because this department is only one of many 
functions in an organisation that has responsibilities in managing risks. 
 
The last factor in the „knowledge‟ component is the organisation‟s 
knowledge of self and environment, which appears important for 
organisation A but less important for organisation B. Five informants of 
organisation A (P01A; P02A; P03A; P04A; P05A) believe that this factor is 
positively related with the risk appetite, because the better the organisation 
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knows itself (in terms of strengths and weaknesses) and its environment, the 
more confident it will be and the better control it will have towards taking 
risks. However, whilst partly agreeing with their counterparts in 
organisation A, four informants of organisation B (P01B; P04B; P05B; 
P07B) maintain that an increased knowledge of the environment, especially 
in emerging markets, could enable an organisation to identify more risks 
and thus reduces its risk appetite. Consequently, the decision-making 
process may be delayed and the organisation might „lose out on signing 
important hotel development deals to their competitors‟ (P07B). 
 
Organisational factors - „Internal standards, processes, and 
communication‟ factors 
 
This component contains two factors: organisation‟s risk capacity and risk 
reporting. Data analysis suggests that case organisations appear to hold 
similar views on these two factors (Table 4.4, p. 147). 
 
Table 4.4 „Internal standards, processes, and communication‟ factors 
Factors Organisation A Organisation B 
Organisation‟s 
risk capacity 









An organisation‟s risk capacity seems to play a key role in positively 
shaping the risk appetite. Four informants (P01A; P03A; P01B; P02B) 
across the case organisations argue that risk capacity enables and facilitates 
the organisation‟s risk taking, as it establishes a clear financial boundary for 
taking risks. The higher is the risk capacity, the more financial resources are 
available for risk taking. However, informant P07A contends that in 
organisation A the risk capacity hardly influences the risk appetite; even if it 
does, it is more likely to be a „constraint‟ than an „enabler‟, because the 
amount of financial resources the organisation committed to risk taking in 
the past were „nowhere close to its risk capacity‟. Further, the positive 
influence of risk capacity on risk appetite might be dependent on whether 
the organisation is a „saver‟ or a „spender‟. According to informant P02A, 
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increasing risk capacity would enhance the risk appetite if the organisation 
is a spender, but for a saver it would lead to a reduced risk appetite, because 
a saver is frightened of losing money: 
 
„Some people live to their credit limit. Maybe I'm rare, I don't. I'm a 
saver. I pay off my credit card every month. If you're that type of 
person giving me more resource makes me even more risk averse, 
strangely. If you gave it to my daughter she'd go and spend it then 
her appetite would increase. So I think it depends on the personality 
type of the company.‟ (P02A) 
 
Whilst increasing risk capacity generally provides an extra financial 
protection, it may also prompt an expectation from the stakeholders that the 
risk capacity should be adequately exploited. If the organisation fails to take 
risks at a level close to full capacity, the shareholders may demand a return 
of the excess capital. As informant P02A recalled: 
 
„We've had billions of pounds cash sitting there and we've not been 
able to find ways of using that money. The shareholders have made 
us - or we have given that money back to the shareholders. Having 
too much cash in a FTSE company is not a good idea because all 
that happens is an aggressive shareholder turns up and takes you 
over and strips the company off its money.‟ (P02A) 
 
Although returning excess capital in the form of dividends can certainly 
delight the shareholders, it could also result in a significant reduction in the 
organisation‟s overall cash reserve, which would impair the risk capacity 
and in turn the risk appetite. Thus, it may be difficult for the organisation to 
capitalise on emerging opportunities in the future. However, informant 
P05A argues that such a move (returning capital to shareholders) is justified, 
because it demonstrates that the organisation is committed to fulfilling one 
of its core purposes - driving shareholder value: 
 
„We have a very clear purpose which is to drive shareholder value. 
It's their assets, not ours. They own the company, not us.‟ (P05A) 
 
Compared with the risk capacity, the effect of risk reporting on risk appetite 
appears rather insignificant as both case organisations rated this factor as 
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„less important‟. While there is a difference between the two organisations 
with regard to the nature of risk reporting‟s influence, this was not further 
explored during the interviews. However, possible reasons underpinning 
this difference are explored in the discussion chapter. 
 
Organisational factors - „Identity‟ factors 
 
The „identity‟ component is the largest category of organisational factors, 
comprising seven shared factors and one unique factor for organisation A 
(i.e. Leverage). Table 4.5 (p. 149) presents a summary of the influence of 
various „identity‟ factors on risk appetite for case organisations. 
 
Table 4.5 „Identity‟ factors 
Factors Organisation A Organisation B 
Risk culture Key Disputed Positive Important Disputed Mixed 
Leverage Key Disputed Negative No influence 
Firm size Important Disputed Mixed Important Disputed Positive 



























Whilst the important role of risk culture for risk appetite is acknowledged 
between both case organisations, there seems to be a strong belief in 
organisation A that risk culture is a driving force that positively influences 
the risk appetite. Informant P01A argues that risk culture could shape an 
organisation‟s mindset towards risk, helping its members to recognise the 
value of risk management, and take calculated risks to make optimal 
decisions. A risk culture with a high level of risk-informed decision making 
fosters strong risk awareness and voluntary risk ownership in an 
organisation, thus providing key decision makers with assurances that 
potential risks are recognised and managed, which tends to increase their 
confidence and leads to increased risk appetite. However, two informants in 
150 
 
organisation B (P03B; P07B) highlight a potential issue for an organisation 
with such a risk culture. They warn that a high level of risk-informed 
decision making may render organisational members to be overly sensitive 
to uncertainties and so become ineffective in filtering out irrelevant and 
insignificant information. As such, it is possible that an excessive amount of 
risk information could be collected for the decision makers, delaying the 
risk decision making and therefore losing on potentially rewarding 
opportunities. As informant P03B explained: 
 
„I‟ve experienced on many occasions where there is a desire to try to 
get as much information to make a decision as possible, and it takes 
forever for the decision to be made and you lose an opportunity, 
because you were slow to get to the market.‟ (P03B) 
 
The differences between organisation A and B may be explained from their 
competitive positions in the hospitality industry. While organisation A is 
often regarded as one of the market leaders, the smaller size and less diverse 
geographical spread of organisation B render it a market follower. Although 
a strong risk culture could help organisation A to defend its position, in the 
context of organisation B it could impede timely and decisive decisions, 
resulting in lost opportunities. 
 
Interestingly, informants P01A and P04A argue that a lack of risk awareness 
and consideration among top decision makers have hindered the 
organisation‟s efforts in building a strong risk culture. It seems that risk is 
not an essential decision-making criterion, and many past decisions were 
made in the absence of risk consideration, where the outcomes were 
unsatisfactory. As informant P04A argued: 
 
„In the grand scheme of things, I am not convinced that our senior 
executive team is as risk aware as they probably should be. I still 
think we make a bunch of decisions based on our gut and on our 
business experience, rather than looking through a „risk lens‟, where 





The leverage of an organisation appears to have a very different influence 
on risk appetite in the two case organisations. For organisation A, leverage 
seems a key factor that negatively affects the risk appetite, because 
increasing debt will create an extra burden on the business, and there would 
be severe consequences if the repayment obligations could not be fulfilled. 
As borrowing more debt is already a risk-taking activity in itself, the 
organisation will not want to take any more risks which could threaten its 
ability to repay the debt. 
 
Unlike organisation A, it appears that leverage is not a concern for the risk 
appetite of organisation B. The main reason appears to be related to the fact 
that the organisation has a very low level of debt. As informant P07B 
explained: 
 
„We have very low investments [in assets]. We still have a number of 
leased hotels but that‟s minority. The strategy of us is „asset-light‟ 
which basically means we don‟t take ownership investment in our 
projects. Given that we don‟t really have much debts and the way we 
operate through franchising and management agreements, it [the 
debt] doesn‟t have an impact on the way we do business.‟ (P07B) 
 
However, two informants (P06B; P08B) of organisation B added that if their 
decision makers choose to take on more debt in the future, the organisation 
would probably behave in a more risk-averse manner, due to the increased 
pressure from repayment obligations. Despite this, informant P04B offers an 
interesting perspective that strongly contests this view. He argues that due to 
the organisation‟s nature, i.e. being a public limited company, individual 
members of the organisation will not be held liable for its debts, thus even if 
the organisation takes on a substantial amount of debt, there is very little for 
the key decision makers to lose, therefore leverage is not a factor to consider 
in risk taking decisions. The following quote captures this point: 
 
„To me, the fact that the company have debt or it could be a lot of 
debt doesn‟t change the risk appetite at all. That is a limited 
company. If I‟m an individual, a person who has finances, am I 
going to go to the casino and bet it all on 21? No, of course not. 
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That would be foolish, but when it comes to companies, no, I don‟t 
see it as a factor.‟ (P04B) 
 
The effect of firm size on risk appetite seems disputed for both organisations. 
While it is rated as „important‟ for both organisations, a considerable 
number of informants find it difficult to comprehend the influence of this 
factor on risk appetite. For example, informant P04B commented: 
 
„I don‟t think it changes for us. I‟m trying to think, if we were double 
the size we are for now, would that change our strategy in terms of 
what we do and how we do it? I don‟t think so. I think we would stay 
the course; we would keep doing what we‟re doing. I don‟t know 
how it would actually change our risk appetite at this stage.‟ (P04B) 
 
There is an important element towards the end of the above quote, which is 
„at this stage‟. Whilst the informants of organisation B consider the 
organisation to be in the „growth‟ stage of the lifecycle, it is still relatively 
small in size and scale, and is trying to gain more market share through an 
accelerated expansion. The smaller size may limit the likelihood for the 
organisation to experience certain issues that only larger counterparts, such 
as organisation A, could encounter. For example, informant P07A explains 
that large organisations face greater challenges in staff compliance to 
policies and standards, which tends to decrease the risk appetite: 
 
„If you're a small to medium company, you probably have the ability 
to monitor a lot more of your staff.  We have 360,000 colleagues. We 
can't monitor them all the time and although you have standards and 
policies in place, it's impossible to make sure that everybody is 
doing everything against those policies. So things go wrong and that 
decreases your risk appetite. For example as the company size spans 
more global markets, you've got to consider the culture of those 
markets. So very much the USA, UK, very heavy on regulation and 
legislation. You go to some developing parts of the world the same 
ethical behaviour might not be there. So you don't want to take 
greater risks around those people.‟ (P07A) 
 
While informant P07A makes a valid point, two of his colleagues (P06A; 
P08A) and another five counterparts in organisation B (P02B; P04B; P05B; 
P06B; P07B) seem to disagree. They believe that the larger is the size, the 
more experiences, knowledge and resources (e.g. financial and human) the 
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organisation tends to have. In this sense, a large organisation may have 
more capacity and capability to manage its risks, and therefore ought to 
have a higher risk appetite. This view seems to imply a too-big-to-fail 
mentality, suggesting that the informants may have grown complacent about 
their organisation‟s ability to thrive in the uncertain environment. 
 
The important influence of an organisation‟s overall performance on risk 
appetite is widely acknowledged across both organisations. Performance is 
related to targets and there are two aspects: an organisation that is meeting 
the targets or on course to meeting the targets is considered as performing 
well, whereas one fails or is struggling to meet the targets is considered as 
under-performing. Both organisations seem to agree that underperformance 
negatively influences the risk appetite, i.e. an under-performing organisation 
tends to increase their risk taking in order to achieve their targets. As 
informant P05A explained: 
 
„I think definitely underperforming leads to [increased risk appetite] 
- and in our environment there are certain parts of the business that 
are definitely underperforming, which is creating increased risk 
appetite to enter the new markets, to enter emerging economies in 
Africa and try to find new streams of revenue which can increase 
risk. The company is willing to take that risk because they need that 
revenue and growth.‟ (P05A) 
 
Despite this consensus on the impact of underperformance on risk appetite, 
differences appear to exist regarding well-performing organisations. The 
major view in organisation A seems to be that a well-performing 
organisation tends to become more cautious and slightly reduce its risk 
appetite, because it wants to maintain the momentum and does not want to 
take unnecessary risks that might jeopardise the performance. However, 
informant P07A argues that this is unlikely as he cannot recall any case 
where the organisation was asked to „scale back a little bit‟ on risk taking 
when it was performing well. Conversely, the organisation was almost 
always required to further „stretch‟ and see if the performance could be 
improved with more risk taking. This view is echoed in organisation B. 
According to informant P03B, the organisation was always pushed to take 
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more risks when it performed well, because the BoD and the shareholders 
prefer a steadily improved performance to a sustained performance. This 
mindset reflects the comment of informant P02A, who believe that human 
„greed‟ contributes largely to an organisation‟s risk-seeking behaviour. 
 
The number and geographical diversity of the brand portfolio could be an 
important factor that positively influences an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
Although it is perceived as overall „less important‟ for organisation A (as 
only three informants, i.e. P02A, P06A, P07A, believe this factor could have 
some influence), it is considered „important‟ for organisation B. According 
to informant P06B, a multi-brand portfolio that operates in diverse 
geographical markets could allow the organisation to take more risks, as it 
provides a flexible means to effectively mitigate the organisation‟s risk 
exposure according to different circumstances. For example, depending on 
different demand conditions, the organisation could choose to take more 
risks for a particular brand at a particular location, and at the same time 
reduce the risk exposure for another brand at a different location.    
 
The influence of an organisation‟s degree of masculinity on its risk appetite 
seems disputed for both organisations. Whilst half of all informants reject 
the effect, the others argue for a positive relationship with the risk appetite. 
This positive association, however, appears „less important‟ for organisation 
A but „important‟ for organisation B. Unfortunately, the data could not 
explain this difference.  
 
The two remaining „identity‟ factors, organisation‟s age and ownership 
structure, both appear insignificant for the case organisations. Therefore, no 
efforts are made to explain the underlying reasons. 
 
Organisational factors - „Information and communication systems‟ 
factors 
 
This component consists of two factors, namely transparency of actions and 




Table 4.6 „Information and communication systems‟ factors 
Factors Organisation A Organisation B 
Transparency of 
actions 
Key Disputed Mixed Important Undisputed Positive 










Transparency of actions seems to be a highly influential factor of risk 
appetite for both organisations. While the dominant view in organisation B 
is that transparency positively affects the risk appetite, there are mixed 
views in organisation A. One is that transparency of actions facilitates the 
flow of information and accurate recording of various activities being 
undertaken by the organisation, thus providing the decision makers with a 
clear picture of the organisation‟s risk taking situation. Consequently, the 
decision makers tend to be more confident that the organisation‟s risks are 
properly covered and managed, and are likely to increase the risk appetite. 
As informant P01A illustrated: 
 
„If you have good transparency about all of the actions, clarity that 
inherent risks to businesses are well mitigated, that all risk taking 
actions are known and documented, then you'll know how much 
more you want or could afford to take. You wouldn't be as worried 
about taking risks closer to the line or fear that someone else has 
already crossed the line that you don't know about.‟ (P01A) 
 
Another view in organisation A is that transparency could have a negative 
influence on risk appetite (P04A; P05A). It seems that increased 
transparency provides stakeholders with more opportunities to express their 
comments regarding the organisation‟s decisions. As such, decision makers 
may hear different views and thus it may become difficult to reach an 
agreement in risk-taking decisions, which tends to reduce the risk appetite. 
 
Furthermore, informant P04A cautions that the organisation may not be as 
transparent as it should be with regard to making risk-taking decisions. He 
claims that despite his seniority in the organisation, he and his colleagues 
are sometimes excluded from the decision-making processes for important 
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projects, and the outcomes of those decisions, which are made by a small 
group of senior leaders, are not always satisfying. As he noted: 
 
„I head up the [company division]. I can tell you for a fact that I was 
not involved [in the project] whatsoever. There was only one 
individual here who was involved. All he was asked to do was to visit 
a couple of hotels. He didn't talk to their team. He didn't even tell me 
what he was asked to do. I knew there was something going on. I 
specifically asked a question of our regional CEO and my boss if 
there's something I need to know or be involved with. They said, „no‟. 
I said, okay.‟ (P04A) 
 
Degree of access to information is found to affect the risk appetite for both 
organisations, but to a relatively low level. While this factor seems to 
positively influence the risk appetite of organisation A, its influence for 
organisation B appears rather mixed. In particular, although informants 
(P01B; P02B; P04B; P06B) believe that a higher degree of information 
access could allow the key decision makers to make informed decisions 
based on quality and timely data, others (P03B; P07B) argue that enhanced 
information access may provide the decision-makers even more risk 
information, thus making the decision making difficult and time-consuming 
and possibly leading to lost opportunities. 
 
Organisational factors - „Perception of the environment‟ factor 
 
This component includes one factor, namely „perceived level of risk in the 
environment‟ (Table 4.7, p. 156).  
 
Table 4.7 „Perception of the environment‟ factor 
Factors Organisation A Organisation B 
Perceived level of 











The two organisations are largely similar on this factor, suggesting that it is 
a rather insignificant factor that could negatively influence the risk appetite. 
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Since the importance of this factor is low for both organisations, no efforts 
are made to explain the underlying reasons. 
 
Environmental factors - „Triggers‟ factors 
 
The „triggers‟ component is the largest category of „Environmental‟ factors, 
encompassing four shared factors and one specific factor for organisation B. 
This component also seems to be one of the most important for organisation 
B, as all of its factors are rated as „important‟. By contrast, this component 
appears less critical for organisation A (Table 4.8, p. 157). 
 
Table 4.8 „Triggers‟ factors 
Factors Organisation A Organisation B 
Expected rewards Key Undisputed Positive Important Disputed Positive 









Disputed Positive Important Disputed Positive 
General business 
development trends 
No influence Important Emerging Positive 
 
 
For both organisations, expected rewards seem to be a very important factor 
that positively drives an organisation‟s risk appetite. The reason could be 
that it is perceived as the expected return on investment, which helps to 
ensure the organisation‟s financial viability. As informant P06A explained: 
 
„Financial return is a huge one for us, because it pays for all of us 
and it gives back money to the shareholders, so that keeps us 
working. But whatever our strategy is, it all has to come back to „are 
we making money?‟, because if we're not we can't expand, we can't 
have staff, we can't do all these great charity work that we do.‟ 
(P06A) 
 
Another informant (P07A) suggests that the expected rewards are a critical 
factor because the process of seeking the rewards is often associated with a 
large commitment of considerable financial resources, thus it becomes even 




There is a consensus between the case organisations that the level of 
regulation is a critical factor that often exerts a negative influence on risk 
appetite, because regulations are believed to prevent organisations from 
unlawful and improper behaviour. Five informants (P01A; P03A; P04A; 
P05A; P07A) of organisation A argue that regulations have a strong 
influence on risk appetite, as a compliance failure can cause significant 
damage to share price and more importantly to the reputation. This is 
something the organisation is not prepared to accept. For example, 
 
„Our risk appetite for regulatory compliance is zero. We don't want 
any investigations; we don't want any acts of regulatory breach; 
we‟re just not prepared to accept it.‟ (P07A) 
 
Another informant (P03A) provides an example showing how a recent 
regulation has affected the organisation‟s willingness to take risk: 
 
„A few years ago the […] government published the „[…]‟, so all […] 
companies, regardless where they operate, must comply with the law. 
That has become very important for us. If we don't comply our 
reputation will be seriously damaged and that‟s unacceptable. So 
the introduction of this regulation had significantly limited our risk 
appetite in some areas...‟ (P03A) 
 
This particular regulation mentioned by P03A, however, is not mentioned 
by any informants of organisation B. Despite the majority of them rating the 
influence of regulation as „important‟, two informants (P02B; P07B) believe 
that in the context of organisation B regulation does not affect its risk 
appetite. They claim that although there are certain safety and security 
standards and various local legislations, the hotel industry is a relatively 
less-regulated industry, and drawing on their experiences they have not seen 
any risk-taking decisions of the organisation being influenced by regulatory 
considerations. 
 
Moreover, the condition of the economy seems to be an insignificant for 
organisation A, but appears highly important for organisation B. Economy 
is perceived as having two dimensions that positively shape the risk appetite: 
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the general global economic condition, and the specific economic condition 
of a particular market. Two informants (P03B; P06B) particularly highlight 
the influence of global economy on risk appetite by pointing out that the 
organisation‟s risk appetite was very low in tough economic climate such as 
the aftermath of 2008 global financial crisis. However, informant P06B 
further argues that the financial crisis is an extreme case and the 
organisation‟s risk appetite is to a larger extent influenced by the specific 
economic conditions of its particular markets. As she commented: 
 
„It depends more on where the economy in the markets is going, and 
because we are spread out over 70 plus countries, our risk appetite 
in one market may be very little compared to the others.‟ (P06B) 
 
In addition, informant P06B added that organisation B has been tracking 
and expanding in emerging markets rather than mature markets. Despite 
these markets being considered „riskier‟ due to issues such as political 
instability and poor infrastructure, their economic outlook in the long term 
seem more favourable than mature markets. It is this positive economic 
outlook that has made the organisation to expand and build up a market-
leading presence in those emerging markets. 
 
In organisation A, the level of competition in the industry seems to be a less 
important factor. Although informants did not explicitly state the underlying 
reasons, it could be linked to the fact that the organisation is a market leader 
and has generally outperformed other competitors. As such, the pressure of 
competition might not be strong enough to propel an increased risk taking. 
 
On the contrary, competition appears to be an important factor that drives 
the risk appetite of organisation B. Informants P04B, P06B and P07B posit 
that competition is one of the key driving forces of the organisation‟s risk 
behaviour. For example, informant P06B, who has worked in the 
organisation for 15 years, strongly believes that the ever-increasing industry 
competition has propelled the organisation into a constant search of new 
markets and new ways of operation, as otherwise the organisation could 




„We tend to take more risk of being more creative and more nimble 
and quicker than competition, which means not all of the campaigns 
are as successful as we expect them to be, but we do them anyway 
because there is so much competition out there and we want to be 
ahead of the game. There are just so many other players who were 
more innovative and faster than us.‟ (P06B) 
 
However, this thinking is challenged by another informant (P08B), who 
contends that the competition has not been an important consideration for 
risk appetite in the recent years. He argues that the organisation has realised 
that there are internal problems that need to be addressed first, i.e. to make 
the business more profitable, before focusing on competing with other 
industry players. Perhaps this is because the organisation has recognised that 
there is a significant „gap‟ in market position between itself and other 
players and the increase of risk taking without addressing internal problems 
cannot help close the gap. 
 
There is an emerging factor for organisation B that has been highly 
influential for the organisation‟s risk appetite over the last decade. The 
factor is named as general business development trends, which includes 
businesses of most other industries rather than the hotel industry only. 
Informant P01B notes that the organisation‟s expansion strategy over the 
past decade has largely followed the general business development trends. 
For example, the organisation decided to focus the expansion in emerging 
countries as it noticed a shift from mature markets to emerging markets in 
many industries. He believes that this change of focus has significantly 
increased the organisation‟s risk appetite as the emerging countries 
presented greater risks in various aspects, but it was also highly rewarding, 
because the organisation was faster than most competitors in entering those 







Environmental factors - „Interactive processes and communication 
with the environment‟ factors 
 
This component consists of two shared factors and one specific factor to 
organisation B. According to Table 4.9 (p. 161), the two case organisations 
are similar in the influence of shareholder demands, but different in how 
other factors influence the risk appetite.  
 
Table 4.9 „Interactive processes and communication with the environment‟ 
factors 
Factors Organisation A Organisation B 
Shareholder 
demands 

















There is a consensus between case organisations that shareholder demands 
play a key role in shaping an organisation‟s risk appetite. This might be 
attributed to the fact that both organisations are publicly listed companies 
and thus delivering shareholder returns is one of their key objectives. In fact, 
three informants of organisation A (P02A; P05A; P06A) explicitly state that 
the organisation is operating for its shareholders. For example, informant 
P06A explained:  
 
„Even if we have a slow year our first returns go to the shareholders 
to keep them happy. They're priority one, and we need them happy. 
We‟re a PLC company, so they own us. You want them happy first; 
that needs to be the first thing to get out of the way and then we can 
handle everything else. So whatever financial returns we get they go 
first.‟ (P06A) 
 
The significance of shareholders means that their demands are given priority 
for consideration in decision-making processes. While the dominant view is 
that the shareholders would push an organisation to engage in more risk-
taking activities for an increased return, informant P05A contends that 
shareholders may also demand the organisation to be more prudent and risk-
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averse. For instance, he suggests that shareholders are more likely to 
demand a lower risk appetite if the organisation has recently suffered a 
reputational damage. In this sense, the nature of shareholder influence on 
risk appetite is dependent on the nature of the shareholder requirement.  
 
However, informant P06B adds that shareholders‟ demand for more return 
on investment may sometimes provoke risk-averse behaviour in 
organisation B. Other than increasing risk-taking activities to drive profits, 
the organisation is more likely to halt its risk-seeking projects and adopt a 
conservative approach of reducing operational costs. As she explained:  
 
„If our shareholders push us to be more profitable, we will probably 
have to cut down on operations cost, which means that we will take 
less risk. We will control every penny. We will probably get rid of 
some of the human resources. We will drive the profitability through 
cutting cost. So we will retract rather than push forward. From an 
operations perspective, we will hold off all the innovative ideas and 
just drive business to existing clients, which is not really taking risks.‟ 
(P06B) 
 
Although most informants across both organisations recognise the key role 
of shareholder demands on risk appetite, three informants in organisation B 
(P01B; P03B; P07B) point out that although the organisation had previously 
listened to the demands of their shareholders, the influence on risk appetite 
seemed insignificant as the decisions were unchanged. The reason might be 
traced from informant P03B, who states that an organisation‟s decision on 
risk appetite is ultimately made by its BoD rather than shareholders, thus 
their demands „might not have any influence at all‟. 
 
In addition to shareholder demands, the demands of other stakeholders of an 
organisation (e.g. owners, guests, employees, etc.) is argued to influence an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. While this factor is considered „less important‟ 
for organisation A, it appears to have much more influence for organisation 
B. Many informants of organisation A (e.g. P01A; P05A; P07A) assert that 
the organisation‟s risk decision making is the result of an internal analysis 
of the external environment, hence the views of the stakeholders, despite 
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being heard and considered, do not affect the risk appetite. However, for 
organisation B, such demands from the stakeholders appear to play a bigger 
role. For example, informants (P03B; P04B) imply that the organisation 
values the requirements of the hotel owners and always tries to meet their 
demands. As the organisation is growing via the „asset-light‟ approach, 
securing and maintaining deals with as many hotel owners as possible is of 
paramount importance for the organisation to grow its market share and 
compete with other rivals. 
 
Regarding the way other stakeholders‟ demand would influence risk 
appetite, informants of both case organisations suggested a mixed view: 
while stakeholders such as hotel owners and guests would typically push the 
organisation to take more risks, others stakeholders such as government, 
NGOs, and regulators tend to decrease the organisation‟s risk appetite. As 
informant P07A argued: 
 
„So you look across public, you look across regulators, you look 
across governance. They tend to tone down your risk appetite a little 
bit. They tend to say something, then you need to comply. So that's 
kind of restricting you from doing… Or in a society you want their 
licence to operate in the country. You wouldn't take huge risk in 
developing a hotel and then employing slave labour, child labour 
and slave labour, just to get ahead in that market. They would put 
too much pressure on you.‟ (P07A) 
 
The remaining factor, Alliances/Partnerships, is found to have no influence 
on organisation A and „less important‟ for organisation B, therefore it was 
not explored further in the interviews. 
 
 
Environmental factors - „Experimentation‟ factor 
 
The „experimentation‟ component comprises only one factor, need for 





Table 4.10 „Experimentation‟ factor 
Factors Organisation A Organisation B 
Need for innovation Key Disputed Positive No influence 
 
 
The need for innovation seems a key factor that positively drives the risk 
appetite of organisation A. However, it appears to have no influence on the 
risk appetite of organisation B. Five informants (P01A; P02A; P03A; P07A; 
P08A) consider innovation as a necessary means for the organisation to 
create sustained competitive advantages and to maintain its leading position 
in the hotel industry. Informant P02A explains that as the industry becomes 
increasingly competitive, the need for the organisation to continually 
innovate its products and services has also become greater. This need for 
innovation then drives the organisation to undertake increasing R&D 
activities, which require the support from a stronger risk appetite. Thus, the 
growing need for innovation increases the organisation‟s risk appetite. 
Moreover, informant P02A suggests that the need for innovation may only 
push risk taking in specific business areas, and in certain areas where 
innovation is not necessary the influence on risk appetite is minimal. This is 
reflected in the following quote: 
 
„…[Innovation] is by itself risky but if you don't do it that's even 
riskier. So you've got to innovate. It absolutely drives your 
appetite…for instance we want to innovate. Where we want to 
innovate is in the guests' experience driven by technology. So we are 
spending a huge amount of money at very high-risk appetite on 
technology. Do I want to have any risk appetite in my day-to-day 
relationship with guests? No. I've got no appetite for risk. But when 
I'm dealing with my IT systems I need to have a very high risk 
appetite, I've got to do it. If I don't do it I'm not going to be here in 
five, ten years' time.‟(P02A) 
 
Decision-maker factors - „Boundary elements‟ factors 
 
The „boundary elements‟ component is a special category that overlaps with 
the „organisational factors‟ and „environmental factors‟. Factors in this 
category are predominantly related to the key decision-makers of an 
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organisation, hence the name „decision-maker‟ factors. Notably, this 
category includes eight shared factors and two individual factors that are 
each specific to an organisation. According to Table 4.11 (p. 165), there are 
four key factors for organisation A, which seem to make this component the 
most important among others.  
 
Table 4.11 „Boundary elements‟ factors 
Factors Organisation A Organisation B 
CEO risk 
propensity 




Key Undisputed Positive Key Undisputed Positive 
EC risk 
propensity 
Key Undisputed Positive Important Disputed Positive 
BoD risk 
propensity 















Disputed Negative No influence 







EC diversity No influence Important Emerging Mixed 
 
 
The risk propensities of an organisation‟s key decision makers, which 
include the BoD, the CEO and the EC, are found to be a key set of factors 
that positively drive an organisation‟s risk appetite. This seems particularly 
likely for organisation A. For example, informant P02A explains the crucial 
role of the BoD‟s and the CEO‟s risk propensity in influencing the 
organisation‟s willingness to take risk: 
 
„If the BoD and the CEO are very risk averse then we are not going 
to take any risk, and nobody else will. People catch what you've got 
as a leader. If the BoD and the CEO, are sending out messages and 
demonstrating that you're really up for taking risk, then yeah, 
absolutely the company will take risk.‟(P02A) 
 
In addition, several informants in organisation A note that the organisation‟s 
risk appetite is in fact the sole reflection of the BoD‟s risk propensity, 
because the BoD is the ultimate decision-making body on the organisation‟s 
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risk taking. For instance, informant P01A commented: „BoD's propensity to 
take risk – that answers the whole question; that is the whole risk appetite‟. 
 
However, this belief is challenged by three informants (P05A; P07A; P08A) 
in organisation A, who argue that the organisation‟s risk appetite is largely 
the reflection of the CEO‟s and the EC‟s risk propensity, to which the BoD 
only provides a balance. According to informant P07A, this is because the 
CEO and the EC are those who run the organisation on a daily basis, 
whereas the BoD‟s role is to oversee that operation. With regard to making 
risk-taking decisions, it is the CEO (on behalf of the EC) who makes 
recommendations to the BoD. Informant P05A adds that despite that the 
BoD has the „final say‟ on the CEO‟s recommendations, based on his 
experiences the BoD never questions any proposal made by the CEO, even 
if „the BoD might not think it was a good one‟. 
 
There are two potential reasons to explain the reluctance of the BoD in 
challenging the CEO. According to informant P05A, the BoD has a clearly 
defined role, which is overseeing rather than running the organisation. „If 
they stop something the CEO wants to do, almost by definition, they are 
running the company‟, explained informant P05A. Another reason is that 
the CEO and the EC are closer to the organisation‟s daily operation than the 
BoD, thus having greater depths of knowledge and information about the 
organisation and the external environment. The following accounts of 
informants P05A and P06B illustrated this point: 
 
„If you take an Executive Committee member who is responsible for 
our global sales and marketing function, who has a team of 200 
people who report to him, he has intimate knowledge of the business, 
the sales strategy, the marketing strategy, what's going to work, 
what's not going to work, and all the numbers in a detailed granular 
fashion. He knows what's happening. But that gets summarised into 
a very small piece of information for the BoD to receive. So [the 
BoD] are very aware that they do not have the depth of knowledge of 
the company and that puts them in a position far less inclined to 




„Our CEO is very much into the day to day operations of the 
business. He understands if he makes this step, what the 
consequences on profitability, people, and the long-term vision of 
the company would be. The BoD may not have that insight.‟ (P06B) 
 
It is worthwhile to note that compared with organisation A where the CEO 
and two other EC members also sit on the BoD, none of organisation B‟s 
EC members sit on the BoD, not even the CEO. This might explain the „less 
important‟ view of BoD‟s risk propensity for organisation B. Three 
informants (P01B; P02B; P08B) of organisation B even indicate that their 
BoD seems like an „advisor‟ to the CEO and EC. Due to the lack of 
closeness to the operations, the BoD has been overly conservative in taking 
risk decisions, which reduces organisation B‟s risk appetite. As informant 
P01B noted: 
 
„Right now the BoD is not completely up to speed on how we take 
our risks; and therefore they are providing some push back, to say 
„are we really sure?‟, „do we really know what we're doing?‟ There's 
a bit of fear in there and that has decreased our risk appetite. We 
want to have ambitious plans but we are being held on a pretty tight 
leash by the BoD…‟ (P01B) 
 
Regarding organisation A, having a mixed BoD has created extra challenges 
in risk decision making due to internal conflicts. Two informants (P02A; 
P05A) describe the BoD‟s risk decision making as „a game of two halves‟. 
One half includes executive directors who are usually risk-seeking, and the 
other half contains non-executive directors who are usually risk-averse. As 
such, there is always an on-going battle of risk propensities within a mixed 
BoD. The winner of the battle is more likely to be the more powerful party, 
and the overall risk propensity of the BoD may concur with this winner. 
 
Performance-based remuneration, i.e. the bonuses that members of the EC 
receive for achieving short-term performance targets, seems to be a key 
factor that positively drives the risk appetite of both organisations. It is 
widely recognised that as people are naturally drawn to rewards, which not 
necessarily refer to money, but also praise and recognition, thus the offering 
of such rewards would almost certainly increase the risk-taking activities in 
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an organisation. „If you are incentivising risk taking, then people are ready 
to take more risk. It‟s just human nature‟, stated informant P08B. It appears 
that both organisations remunerate decision-makers for short-term 
performance in the area of business development. In particular, 
remuneration is offered for achieving a short-term growth target, i.e. the 
signings of a certain number of hotel deals within a certain period. Three 
informants (P02A; P07B; P08B) criticise this type of remuneration 
mechanism, claiming that it has resulted in careless risk-taking decisions 
and caused trouble for other departments in the organisation. As informant 
P07B argued: 
 
„I am in the legal department. I know „developers‟ [business 
development team] get rewarded for the projects they sign. There is 
a bonus mechanism which means they‟re more likely to take 
risk…I‟ve seen some contracts that were signed, where after the 
facts we all questioned, „Why did we enter that market?‟ and I think 
if there was no bonus for the developers, probably we wouldn‟t have 
done certain things.‟ (P07B) 
 
According to informant P05A, the danger of having such a short-sighted 
remuneration mechanism in place is that it may create a false expectation 
among people or even foster an inappropriate culture within the organisation, 
which makes everyone align risk-taking decisions to short-term 
performance, rather than focusing on the organisation‟s long-term strategy 
and sustainability. He argued: 
 
„It's also about the expectation that you set in people. So [it might be] 
„hit this target no matter what you do, I don't care what you do, just 
hit this target‟. If you don't give any other counter-targets to it in 
terms of the risk that's being taken, you're sending a message that 
this is the way the company wants you to behave… More importantly 
there is a culture created because of those [remuneration] structures. 
You can create a culture and environment that people think, „this is 
how the company is going to remunerate me, so therefore this is 
what the company wants me to do‟.(P05A) 
 
In order to address the potential problem, three informants (P02A; P07B; 
P08B) recommend that an organisation should perhaps reward on „quality 
strategic growth‟, which means that offering bonuses to signings that are in 
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the organisation‟s strategic markets and with the preferred brands, and the 
company-owner relationships are still of good quality after a number of 
years. 
 
The emotion of the CEO could be an important factor that positively 
influences the risk appetite. However, it appears „less important‟ for 
organisation A. Two informants (P02A; P03A) argue that this is because 
risk-taking decisions are the result of a collective thinking of the BoD 
members rather than an individual responsibility, thus the influence of CEO 
on the final decisions is minimal. Also, informant P01A argues that the 
CEO is highly mature and professional, so he understands well enough that 
decisions cannot be made emotionally. The organisation also has a 
comprehensive decision-making mechanism that is designed to minimise 
emotional influence on key decisions.  
 
However, CEO emotions appear quite influential for organisation B. Three 
informants (P01B; P03B; P06B) particularly note that their current and 
previous CEOs are all highly emotional individuals, whose style have had a 
positive influence on the organisation‟s risk appetite. For example, 
informant P06B commented: 
 
„The CEO‟s mood, his temper, and his attitude have a big influence 
on the strategies we take. It always has. Every CEO that we‟ve had 
in the past has had the same impact. He is the big boss and it really 
depends on his leadership style and his mood, in terms of what risks 
do we take and what we don‟t take.‟ (P06B) 
 
BoD diversity seems an important factor that is negatively associated with 
the risk appetite for organisation A. While BoD diversity is necessary to 
tackle groupthink and moderate extreme decisions (P02A; P03A; P04A; 
P07A), because diversity offers a wide range of different experiences and 
perspectives, it also means that consensus on risk decisions is more difficult 
to achieve, which could delay important decision making and reduce the 
organisation‟s willingness to take risks. Nevertheless, informant P07A 
argues that the influence of BoD diversity on risk appetite could be 
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dependent upon the overall outcome of BoD members‟ previous risk-taking 
experience. As he argued: 
 
„…it depends on the experiences they have to bring in. If you had on 
your board someone from Toyota, someone from Tesco, someone 
from a major bank, I would argue that the risk appetite would 
decrease because of the [negative] experiences that they've been 
through. If we've got people from the likes of Google, BMW, Apple 
[on our board], their experiences are how they are doing really well, 
they'd probably encourage the company to take more risk.‟(P07A) 
 
By contrast, BoD diversity is considered „less important‟ for organisation B. 
Although the findings could not reveal the reason, one could speculate that 
it is related to its BoD being less important in the organisation‟s decision-
making structure. Nevertheless, the value of diversity is recognised, as two 
informants (P01B; P06B) suggest EC diversity as a highly influential factor. 
They argue that a successful organisation needs a balanced, rather than one-
sided, leadership in order to make informed and calculated decisions on risk 
taking. Having a certain level of diversity in the EC can increase the 
organisation‟s versatility and provide a balance to the risk appetite. The 
following quote from informant P01B demonstrates this point: 
 
„If you look at our management team it's pretty White Western and 
male. Right now it's almost exclusively that. It increased our risk 
appetite quite a bit. We're the Western industrialised world; we have 
a tradition of colonising places. I think some of that subconsciously 
still drives it. When there's more adversity out in the emerging 
markets, it might decrease [our risk appetite] a little bit. We think, 
„oh, is there really opportunities there‟. However, the more diverse 
we were, both culturally and otherwise, we would have more people 
that were not necessarily outside their comfort zone if they were in 
Central Africa, whereas White Western people are definitely outside 
their comfort zone if they step off a bus in the middle of Nairobi. 
Having more diversity might balance out the risk appetite a little bit 
better and protect us from swinging back and forth.‟ (P01B) 
 
The influences of other factors such as „BoD size‟ and „Ability to sense‟ on 
risk appetite are found insignificant for both organisations. Therefore, they 




4.2.2.3 Interrelationships of risk appetite factors 
 
Whilst showing varying perspectives regarding the importance and 
influence of multifarious factors on risk appetite, the case organisations also 
seem to exhibit different levels of sophistication in relation to the 
interrelationships among different factors. The blue arrow lines in Figure 
4.4 (p. 141) and Figure 4.5 (p. 142) represent these interrelationships. 
 
Regarding organisation A, the ambitiousness of objectives appears to play a 
central role, relating to four other factors in the framework, including BoD 
risk propensity, shareholder demands, other stakeholder demands and 
performance. For example, similar to the view of risk consultants, the level 
of ambitiousness of objectives is positively influenced by the BoD risk 
propensity, because the BoD has the „ultimate responsibility in setting the 
company‟s objectives‟ (P01A). In other words, the higher is the BoD risk 
propensity, the more ambitious are the objectives, and thus the higher is the 
risk appetite. 
 
The ambitiousness of an organisation‟s objectives is also affected by the 
demands of the organisation‟s shareholders and other key stakeholders. 
While there are a variety of stakeholder groups, informant P08A particularly 
points out that the requirements of the activist shareholder and other key 
stakeholders such as regulators and employees must be considered in setting 
the organisation‟s objectives. Depending on their specific demands, the 
ambitiousness of the objectives need to be set at an appropriate level to 
reflect the stakeholders‟ desired balance between risk and rewards. 
 
Furthermore, it is suggested that an organisation‟s objectives, once 
determined, would be translated into measurable performance targets for the 
organisation to benchmark against (P02A). It is expected that more 
ambitious objectives are likely to lead to higher targets, which increases the 
level of difficulty for the organisation to achieve the performance targets. 
Consequently, the organisation may need to take more risks in order to 




Additionally, leverage is argued to positively influence an organisation‟s 
risk capacity. Since risk capacity concerns an organisation‟s financial 
strength in terms of supporting risk-taking activities and withstanding 
potential loss from risk-taking failures, according to P01A, a higher level of 
leverage, if achieved through an increased borrowing, is likely to increase 
the amount of financial capital available for risk taking, which could in turn 
enhance the risk capacity. However, informant P01A notes that if an 
organisation borrows to clear existing debts, the available financial capital 
for risk taking would not increase, let alone the risk capacity. 
 
Data analysis reveals that compared with organisation A, there are 
considerably fewer interrelationships between risk appetite factors in 
organisation B. In particular, it is suggested that the positive relationship 
between risk capacity and risk appetite may be moderated by the risk 
propensities of the organisation‟s top managers, particularly the CEO and 
the EC (P08B). The positive relationship between risk capacity and risk 
appetite tends to hold true when these key decision makers are at least 
„modest‟ risk takers. If they are very risk-averse, however, the positive 
relationship may become insignificant and increasing risk capacity may not 
necessarily enhance the risk appetite. As informant P08B noted: 
 
„I think it [risk capacity] is more related to the willingness of the 
people taking decisions. Increasing risk capacity doesn‟t necessarily 
have an influence on the kind of decisions you are taking if they are 





This chapter has presented the findings emerging from the two stages of the 
primary research. Using unstructured interviews with risk consultants, stage 
one validated and enriched the conceptual framework and identified the key 
factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. Employing an online 
survey of financial analysts, stage two started with an evaluation of the case 
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organisations‟ risk appetite and confirmed that one organisation is more 
risk-averse and another is more risk-seeking. Using semi-structured 
interviews (complemented by questionnaires) with corporate executives and 
risk managers, the case study revealed what (and how) a set of factors shape 
the case organisations‟ risk appetite, and identified several interrelationships 
between different risk appetite factors. Whilst the factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite are largely consistent for both case organisations, 
some appear to have different levels of significance in shaping the risk 
appetite, and the ways in which many factors shape the risk appetite appear 
slightly different between the case organisations. Also, the complexity of 
the interrelationships between different risk appetite factors varies between 
the case organisations, with organisation A appearing to have more dynamic 
and comprehensive interrelationships than organisation B. The next chapter 









This study sets out to explore the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite within the context of international hotel industry. Having presented 
the main research findings in the preceding chapter, this chapter discusses 
and interprets them in light of the literature. In doing so, this chapter seeks 
to address the fourth and fifth objectives of this research: to explain the 
factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite, and to make a theoretical 
contribution by proposing a framework for the analysis of an organisation‟s 
risk appetite in the international hotel industry. The chapter is divided into 
three main sections: section 5.1 discusses three conceptual issues regarding 
risk appetite and offers a new account of the risk appetite construct. Section 
5.2 explains in detail how a set of internal and external factors shapes an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. Emerging interrelationships between different 
risk appetite factors are discussed in section 5.3. All factors and the 
interrelationships are integrated into a risk appetite framework (Figure 5.1, 
p. 185), which is the main contribution to knowledge of this study. 
 
5.1 Conceptualising the risk appetite  
 
Over the last decade, the concept of risk appetite has attracted increasing 
attention from both academics and industry practitioners (Alix et al., 2015; 
Aven, 2013; Bromiley et al., 2015). Following the 2008 global financial 
crisis, risk appetite has become a focus of several corporate governance 
regulators (e.g. FRC, 2014; FSA, 2011; Weydert, 2010) and professional 
risk management bodies (e.g. IRM, 2011; RIMS, 2012; Rittenberg and 
Martens, 2012). However, there remains a disparity on the definition of risk 
appetite (Baldan et al., 2016; Gontarek, 2016), and practitioners of different 
professions conceptualise the concept in different ways (Aven, 2013; 
Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012). This study finds that the disparity is 
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not only limited to the risk appetite definition per se, but also related to 
three other conceptual issues: quantitative versus qualitative nature of risk 
appetite, dispositional versus situational nature of risk appetite, and risk 
appetite analogies. These three conceptual issues provide critical 
perspectives to better understand risk appetite. The following sections (5.1.1, 
5.1.2 and 5.1.3) discuss these conceptual issues. Section 5.1.4 presents a 
unified account of the risk appetite concept. 
 
5.1.1 Quantitative versus qualitative nature of risk appetite 
 
A key conceptual issue emerged from the findings concerns whether an 
organisation‟s risk appetite is quantitative or qualitative in nature. The 
literature seems to suggest a quantitative view, as most risk appetite 
definitions from the practitioner authorities emphasise the total „amount‟ or 
„level‟ of risk an organisation is willing to take (FRC, 2014; IRM, 2011; 
ISO, 2009; RIMS, 2012; Rittenberg and Martens, 2012). In other words, the 
major view from the literature is that risk appetite should be represented 
numerically.  
 
This quantitative view of risk appetite is supported by a majority of 
informants across both case organisations, as evidenced in the quote of 
P04A (p. 137) as well as the following: 
 
„For me risk appetite is the amount of effort, resources, that a 
company's prepared to put at risk but also invest into in order to 
achieve its aims.‟ (P02A) 
 
„It [risk appetite] is just about the level of risk that we as a company 
are willing to accept.‟ (P02B) 
 
„My opinion is that it is the amount of risk that a company is willing 
to take to create shareholder value‟ (P07B) 
 
This quantitative view of risk appetite is not surprising, as the informants‟ 
conceptualisations of the construct are likely to be shaped by the guidance 
provided by practitioner authorities (Power et al., 2013). Although defining 
risk appetite in a quantitative manner could help decision makers to better 
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measure and control the organisation‟s exposure to risk, this study finds that 
a pure quantitative view of risk appetite could be problematic. One reason is 
that the quantification of risks is not always possible. Lam (2014) noted that 
risk quantification is difficult and time-consuming, and many strategic-level 
risks cannot be effectively quantified. As informant P07A explained: 
 
„At the very lowest layers [of the organisation]… you could almost 
put a numerical value on the risks - we will not tolerate any, not 
even one, fire in a hotel. As you move up the organisation through 
tactical risk and strategic risk, and the higher you get to a board 
level, they can't set a risk appetite in numerical values. That's more 
about the behaviours that they expect, the strategy that they want to 
follow, the tone, the message that they send out. It becomes a bit 
more blurred into what they want and risk appetite out there is 
defined by behaviour, by actions, by communication, etc.‟ (P07A) 
 
The consequence of focusing solely on risk quantification could mean that 
the organisation‟s risk appetite statement is never fully articulated. Perhaps, 
this might explain the fact that very few organisations could claim that they 
have successfully quantified all risks and articulated their risk appetite (Alix 
et al., 2015; Gontarek, 2016). Another reason could be that the quantitative 
view of risk appetite might imply an emphasis on risk control, therefore 
allowing little room for decision makers to promote desired, potentially 
value-adding risk-taking activities. Given that the purpose of risk appetite is 
to aid organisational risk decision making and drive performance (Aven, 
2013; Lamanda and Voneki, 2015), emphasising risk control might result in 
a conservative mindset in decision makers and a failure to achieve optimised 
business performance. 
 
Recognising the above limitation, a small number of case organisation 
informants (P07A; P03B; P06B) suggested a more qualitative approach to 
viewing the risk appetite. They argued that risk appetite should be 
considered as an organisation‟s „mental attitude‟ towards taking risks, i.e. 
the „willingness‟ or „boldness‟ of an organisation to actively take risks. This 
view of risk appetite, as Aven (2013) suggested, allows an organisation to 
include qualitative statements on a range of risk-taking activities that are 
actively supported and/or discouraged by the decision makers. However, 
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this more qualitative view of risk appetite does not discard risk 
quantification; in fact, it acknowledges that risk quantification is essential 
for the articulation of an organisation‟s risk appetite. The key difference, 
compared to the dominant, quantitative view of risk appetite, is that this 
perspective advocates the use of explicit, qualitative statements as necessary 
for decision makers to communicate expectations towards unquantifiable 
risks or certain behaviour that the organisation clearly wishes to encourage 
or avoid. This more qualitative view of risk appetite is echoed in recent 
literature where academics and scholars suggest that an effective risk 
appetite statement needs to include both quantitative measures and 
qualitative expressions (Alix et al., 2015; Gontarek, 2016; Lam, 2014). In 
this regard, it might be more appropriate to argue that an effective approach 
to viewing risk appetite is to take a „combined‟ view that includes both 
quantitative measures and qualitative statements. 
 
An interesting finding is that those case study informants who conceptualise 
risk appetite in a dominant quantitative manner work in the Risk 
Management function of their organisation, whereas those with the 
combined view work in other functions. While this could be coincidental, it 
is possible that informants‟ perceptions of the nature of risk appetite are 
influenced by the responsibility of their job. In both case organisations, the 
prime responsibility in the Risk Management function seems to be 
identifying, monitoring and controlling the risks faced by the organisation 
and its departments. Such a responsibility requires the informants to use 
quantitative measures and metrics to effectively monitor the organisation‟s 
risk exposure. In other functions, there is less of a need for informants to 
adopt the quantitative view of risk, since their main task is not related to risk 
management. As the Risk Management function of both case organisations 
is leading the task of defining and articulating the risk appetite, the resulting 
risk appetite statement might seem overly quantitative, and focused on 
controlling rather than encouraging risk taking. Such a risk appetite 
statement is not well suited to exploit potential opportunities, therefore 





5.1.2 Dispositional versus situational nature of risk appetite 
 
Inspired from the individual risk taking literature where scholars question 
the nature of individual risk propensity as dispositional or situational 
(Roszkowski and Davey, 2010; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992), a similar question 
could be asked on risk appetite, which is whether risk appetite is 
dispositional or situational. The answer to this question has important 
implications for this study because it determines the „scope‟ of the 
influential factors. If risk appetite is considered as dispositional, i.e. an 
inherent and stable organisational trait, then it is only influenced by factors 
inherent in an organisation (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012). If risk 
appetite is seen as situational, i.e. a behavioural tendency affected by the 
external environment, it is only shaped by environmental factors external to 
an organisation.  
 
This research finds that an organisation‟s risk appetite is influenced by a set 
of dispositional (internal) and situational (external) factors. This „combined‟ 
view of risk appetite factors was validated in both stages of the fieldwork by 
risk management consultants (Figure 4.1, p. 116) and case organisation 
participants (Figure 4.4, p. 141 and Figure 4.5, p. 142). It offers empirical 
support to the long-standing argument that an organisation‟s willingness to 
take risks is shaped by its internal and external contexts (Alix et al., 2015; 
Baird and Thomas, 1985; Harwood et al., 2009; Lamanda and Voneki, 
2015). 
 
5.1.3 Risk appetite analogy 
 
Due to the elusive nature of risk appetite (Aven, 2013) and the lack of 
consensus on its definition (Gontarek, 2016), different analogies emerged in 
the literature to help practitioners better understand the concept. The most 
popular analogies might be Hillson and Murray-Webster‟s (2012) „physical 
appetite for food and drink‟, where an organisation‟s appetite for risk is 
considered similar to a human being‟s appetite for food and drink, and 
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IRM‟s (2011) „fight-or-flight response‟, where risk appetite is viewed as an 
organisation‟s natural reaction to various risk situations.  
 
Whilst confirming the above two analogies (more details in section 4.1) this 
research also identifies an alternative analogy to view risk appetite. Because 
of the invisible nature of risk appetite and the current challenges in 
articulating a risk appetite statement, informant P05A suggested that 
organisations might need to take an alternative approach in order to better 
understand the concept. He proposed that an understanding of the risk 
appetite concept could benefit from the study of Astronomy, where risk 
appetite could be considered as similar to a „black hole‟ in the universe. As 
informant P05A illustrated: 
 
„I think risk appetite is more like a study of science in a way - you 
don't have to measure necessarily, or understand the actual, or be 
able to see the „chemical reaction‟. You don't have to be able to see 
it, because often in science what you're measuring - in astronomy 
you're measuring the impact of something on other things. So 
without having to see a black hole, you know there's a black hole 
because of the way things around it behave. And I think that's a good 
analogy for risk appetite.‟ (P05A) 
 
Because a „black hole‟ is invisible and difficult to measure directly, 
scientists attempt to understand the „black hole‟ by examining its impact on 
surrounding objects. In the same vein, one could understand risk appetite by 
observing its impacts on an organisation as a whole and its various 
components. Because risk appetite is a crucial determinant of an 
organisation‟s behaviour, the impacts of risk appetite will be reflected in 
how an entire organisation and its various components behave. As informant 
P05A further argued: 
 
„I don't have to be able to say what the risk appetite is, because my 
delegation of authority, my capital investment criteria, my cultural 
surveys, my investment guidelines, and my allocation of resources, 
all of these things are impacted intuitively by the appetite of the 
company. So I don't need to able to say in a statement what it is, 
because actually everything around me will tell me what it is. That's 




The above view of informant P05A concurred with another informant 
(P01A), who expressed similar views when commenting on risk appetite 
and how it might be reflected in various aspects of the business: 
 
„Even though we don't have a tangible risk appetite statement or 
framework and communicate it, the company naturally has a risk 
appetite…we are currently thinking that risk appetite is intrinsically 
tied into all of these things around how we control risk, what targets 
we set. So if we set aggressive targets we're inherently saying we 
want to take more risk. If we're setting very conservative targets then 
we're a more conservative company. If you put more resources in 
risk-taking functions such as sales and marketing and development, 
then that means you're hungry to take the risk there. If you're 
allocating less or more resources to risk mitigating teams, finance, 
HR, IT, security, risk management, or legal, those are departments 
that are naturally mitigating risk. So how you allocate those 
resources is a reflection of the company's inherent risk appetite just 
built in. In terms of „decision making‟, clearly we've just made an 
acquisition of a new brand. It shows that we're willing to take risks 
not just sit and watch. So there are other pieces around 
„governance‟. So how frequently the Board and audit committees 
and different committees meet and how seriously they take their role. 
So all of that has a reflection on the company's risk appetite‟ (P01A) 
 
As suggested in the above quotes, the behaviour of an organisation and its 
various components/aspects may provide valuable insights about the effect 
that risk appetite has on the organisation. These insights could provide 
important feedback to the decision makers and enable them to identify 
situations where a certain risk level or particular risk behaviour becomes 
inappropriate. An accumulation of this observation for a long period of time 
may therefore contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the 
organisation‟s risk appetite and what ranges of risk level or behaviour are 
acceptable.  
 
Overall, the „black hole‟ analogy extends current literature by offering a 
novel approach to understand the rather elusive concept of risk appetite. The 
various behavioural aspects of risk appetite identified by informants P01A 
and P05A could contribute to the identification of meaningful risk appetite 




5.1.4 A unified understanding of risk appetite 
 
Current risk appetite literature shows little consensus on the definition and 
meaning of risk appetite. By synthesising the empirical evidence and the 
literature, a unified understanding of risk appetite can be provided as 
follows: 
 
 In the field of business and management, risk appetite refers to a 
dynamic representation of an organisation‟s intrinsic desire for risk 
taking at a particular point in time in order to achieve the 
organisation‟s current strategic objectives.  
 
 Risk appetite needs to be explicitly communicated to all stakeholders 
of an organisation, often in the form of a written document, about the 
types and amount of risk the organisation is prepared or willing to 
take, as well as the specific behaviours that are expected and/or 
prohibited. The organisation should identify clear measures on which 
to set desired limits for taking quantifiable risks, and articulate 
qualitative statements to clarify expectations for taking difficult-to-
quantify risks. 
 
 An organisation‟s risk appetite is not static but dynamic. It changes 
from time to time and is shaped by specific circumstances in the 
organisation‟s internal context as well as the external environment in 
which the organisation operates. 
 
 Risk appetite impacts how an organisation behaves. An 
understanding of risk appetite can be achieved by examining the 
behaviour of the organisation, which is reflected in the choices that 
the organisation makes for itself and in various components/aspects. 
Examples of the components/aspects include setting targets and 
strategy, delegation of authority, capital investment criteria, 
allocation of resources, and structure of governance. Observing how 
an organisation behaves in these aspects provides decision makers 
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with insights about the impacts of risk appetite, enabling the 
organisation to formulate a „knowledge base‟ about the acceptable 
range of risk-taking limits and/or situations where a particular choice 
becomes inappropriate. Over time, this „knowledge base‟ can help 
decision makers to develop better quantitative measures and 
qualitative statements for their risk appetite statement. 
 
Compared with most accounts of risk appetite offered in the literature, the 
above statement provides a more unified explanation of the concept. This 
explanation integrates empirical evidence with key literature arguments that 
„organisations have appetites for risks‟ (Fischhoff et al., 1981; Hillson and 
Murray-Webster, 2012), which includes „quantitative measures of risks‟ 
(Gontarek, 2016; Lam, 2014) and „qualitative statements‟ (Aven, 2013). It 
extends the literature by explicitly highlighting the „dynamic‟ and „implicit‟ 
nature of risk appetite. 
 
5.2 Factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite 
 
Overall, the case study of two international hotel companies has explored 
what (and how) a set of internal and external factors influence an 
organisation‟s risk appetite (Figure 4.4, p. 141 and Figure 4.5, p. 142). 
While the factors that shape the risk appetite are largely consistent for the 
case organisations, the significance of many factors and the way they 
influence the risk appetite appear different. It is these differences that lead to 
the two case organisations displaying different appetites for risk, as 
suggested in the analyst evaluation and company document analysis. 
 
Comparing the case study findings with the literature and the stage one 
framework (Figure 4.2, p. 132), a „living organisation‟ framework (Figure 
5.1, p. 185) of factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite has been 
developed, which is the main contribution to knowledge of this study. The 
framework extends previous studies (Baird and Thomas, 1985; Harwood et 
al., 2009; Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012; Pablo and Javidan, 2002) by 
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offering a more comprehensive, structured and applicable approach to 
investigate an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
 
A key difference between the „living organisation‟ framework of risk 
appetite factors (Figure 5.1, p. 185) and the stage one framework (Figure 4.2, 
p. 132) is the evaluation of the significance of individual factors to risk 
appetite. Based on each factor‟s level of significance to risk appetite and 
whether it is shared between the case organisations or specific to one 
organisation, all factors have been classified into three categories: primary, 
secondary and tertiary factors.  
 
The „primary‟ category includes shared factors that are key or important to 
risk appetite. Factors within this category are highly likely to shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite and also to a great extent. As such, primary 
factors are argued to be essential considerations for understanding and 
analysing an organisation‟s risk appetite.  
 
The „secondary‟ category also contains key or important factors, but their 
significance to risk appetite is only specific to one organisation. In other 
words, secondary factors are organisation-specific: a factor which exerts a 
significant influence on the risk appetite for a particular organisation may 
have little or no influence on the risk appetite of another organisation. It is 
therefore suggested that the secondary factors to be considered after the 
consideration of primary factors.  
 
The „tertiary‟ category comprises factors that are shared between the two 
case organisations, but are less important to risk appetite than primary and 
secondary factors. However, this does not mean that tertiary factors should 
be discarded. While a single tertiary factor may have a limited impact on the 
risk appetite, a group of them could exert much stronger impacts and change 
the risk appetite considerably. Hence, the tertiary factors are suggested to be 




Such an importance-based categorisation of risk appetite factors addresses a 
limitation in the literature that the importance of risk appetite factors is 
ignored or assumed to carry equal weighting in shaping the organisation‟s 
risk appetite. Therefore, it provides a more structured approach for 
prioritisation and analysis of factors that shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite. The factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite are discussed 
individually in light of the literature in the following sections.  
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 Risk culture 
 Performance 
 Firm size 
Secondary 
 Leverage 
 Brand portfolio 
 Degree of masculinity 
Tertiary 
 Organisation‟s age 
 Ownership structure 
 
Tertiary 
 Perceived level of risk in the environment 
Primary 
 Transparency of actions 
Tertiary 
 Degree of access to 
information 
Primary 
 History of risk taking 
Secondary 
 Risk management capability 
 Organisation‟s knowledge of 
self and environment  
 
Primary 
 Ambitiousness of objectives 
 
Primary 
 Risk capacity 
Tertiary 




 Shareholder demands 
Secondary 
 Other stakeholder demands 
Secondary 
 Need for innovation 
Environmental Factors 
Primary 




 Level of competition 








 CEO risk propensity 
 Performance-based 
remuneration 
 EC risk propensity 
Secondary 
 BoD risk propensity 
 CEO emotions 
 BoD diversity 
 EC diversity 
Tertiary 

















„Interactive processes and 





5.2.1 Organisational factors that shape risk appetite 
 
Organisational factors concern an organisation‟s internal characteristics, 
functions, and processes. In total, the findings have highlighted seven 
primary, five secondary and five tertiary factors, which are further placed in 
six components of the „living composition‟ model (Figure 5.1, p. 185). 
Apart from the „perception of the environment‟ component, all other five 
components comprise at least one primary factor, suggesting that these 
components are essential for risk appetite consideration. 
 
5.2.1.1 „Identity‟ factors 
 
Primary „identity‟ factor - Risk culture 
 
Consistent with the idea that an organisation‟s risk culture could shape its 
risk appetite (Gontarek, 2016; Hillson and Murry-Webster, 2012; IRM, 
2012; Power et al., 2013), it has been found in this study that risk culture 
plays a highly important role in shaping an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
There is a general consensus among most informants that risk culture 
reflects the shared values and beliefs in an organisation as to how risk is 
viewed and understood, to what extent risk is considered in the decision-
making process, and whether the managerial ownership of risks is voluntary 
or forced. A strong risk culture would have a high level of risk-awareness in 
the decision-making process, the risk ownership is highly voluntary, the risk 
impacts and potential rewards are well considered, and the management of 
risks is proactive. This finding describes the characteristics of a strong risk 
culture, therefore particularly addressing the call of Gontarek (2016) for 
more understanding of organisational risk culture. 
 
Regarding the way risk culture influences the risk appetite, it has been 
widely agreed among informants that risk culture encourages organisational 
risk taking. This is because a strong risk culture provides assurances to 
decision makers that the organisation‟s risks are properly recognised and 
managed. The stronger the risk culture, the more confident the decision 
187 
 
makers are in the organisation‟s ability to manage risks, therefore leading to 
a higher risk appetite. For example, informant P01A explained: 
 
„If you are more risk-informed then inherently it allows you to take 
more risk actually.  Because it gives you comfort that all of the 
things that you're worried about is either mitigated or not.  Then 
you're clear about how much capacity you've got to take risk.  So it 
gives you confidence to go and buy that, acquire that company.  You 
don't have some unexpected uncertainty that will say oh actually 
how you need money to pay here and you didn't think about it.‟ 
(P01A) 
 
However, the above positive association between risk culture and risk 
appetite may not always be the case. Two informants of organisation B 
(P03B; P07B) argued that a strong risk culture with a high level of risk-
informed decision making may render the decision makers to be overly 
sensitive to potential risks and become less effective in assessing the 
relevance of risk information. As a result, the amount of risk information 
may overwhelm the decision makers and delay the decision making process, 
thus losing potentially rewarding business opportunities. For example, 
informant P03B‟s account on p. 150 demonstrates this point. 
 
According to Zinn (2015), this negative association between risk culture and 
risk appetite, as suggested by informant P03B and P07B, could be 
contingent upon the level of risk propensity of the decision makers. Zinn 
(2015) argued that risk appetite is likely to be the result of a combination 
between risk culture and individual desire for risk taking. This means that 
decision maker risk propensity may have a moderating effect on the 
relationship between risk culture and risk appetite. In particular, if the 
decision makers have a low risk propensity, i.e. they are relatively risk-
averse, a stronger risk culture is more likely to lead to the identification of 
more risks, which decision makers could become uncomfortable to bear, 
therefore forcing them to lower the organisation‟s risk appetite. Therefore, 
organisations need to seek an alignment among risk culture, decision-maker 




Primary „identity‟ factor - Performance 
 
The performance of an organisation has long been recognised in the 
literature as an important factor shaping the organisation‟s willingness to 
take risks (Chen and Miller, 2007; Jung and Bansal, 2009; Lee, 1997). 
Prominent organisational risk taking theories such as BTOF (Cyert and 
March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958) and TRT (Staw et al., 1981) were 
particularly developed to explain the relationship between performance and 
organisational risk propensity. Overall, the literature suggests that 
performance is a key factor that drives an organisation‟s risk appetite, but it 
fails to explain why performance is important, and the way in which 
performance influences risk appetite was inconclusive among scholars. 
 
Confirming the primacy of performance as a key factor driving an 
organisation‟s risk appetite (Chen and Miller, 2007; Jung and Bansal, 2009; 
Lee, 1997), informants explained that an organisation‟s level of 
performance could provide crucial information to decision makers regarding 
the extent to which the organisation‟s strategic objectives can be achieved. 
Given that strategic objectives play a central role in driving an 
organisation‟s risk appetite in this study, it is not surprising to expect the 
important role of performance in shaping the risk appetite. 
 
In analysing the effect of performance on risk appetite, the literature 
suggests that it is crucial to recognise whether the performance has met the 
organisation‟s targets or aspirations (Lee, 1997; Lohrke et al., 2006; Park, 
2007). If the performance has met the target or on course to meet the 
aspiration, the organisation can be considered as performing well; whereas 
if the performance has already failed to meet the target or is failing to meet 
the aspiration, the organisation can be considered as underperforming. The 
literature has demonstrated that an organisation tends to show different risk 
appetites during good performance and underperformance. Regarding the 
effect of underperformance on organisation‟s risk appetite, two schools of 
thoughts prevail in the literature. One school, which is led by the BTOF 
(Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958), argues that 
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underperformance will make the organisation more willing to take risk, 
because the potential rewards from increased risk-taking activities may 
compensate the underperformance and drive the performance to meet or 
even exceed the target (Bromiley, 1991; Chen and Miller, 2007; Greve, 
1998). By contrast, another school of thoughts, led by the TRT (Staw et al., 
1981), suggests that underperformance will lead to a reduced risk appetite, 
because the decision makers believe that limiting the amount of uncertainty 
in the organisation‟s activities and returning to established operating 
procedures could improve the performance (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; 
Jung and Bansal, 2009; Lee, 1997). 
 
In line with Bromiley (1991), Chen and Miller (2007) and Greve (1998), 
this study finds that both case organisations tend to take more risks in the 
event of underperformance, due to the belief that increased risk-taking 
activities may bring more rewards and therefore compensate the 
underperformance of the organisation. Informant P05A provided an 
example on p. 153 to illustrate how underperformance could lead to an 
increase in risk appetite. 
 
However, this finding is not enough to refute the other school of thoughts 
advocated by Chattopadhyay et al. (2001) and Jung and Bansal (2009), 
because it was not clear whether informants perceived the 
underperformance as repairable or not (Shimizu, 2007). If the 
underperformance is deemed repairable, i.e. the performance level is 
relatively close to target, the organisation tends to become more willing to 
take risks; however, if the underperformance is perceived as irreparable, i.e. 
the performance level is far from the target, the organisation tends to 
become less willing to take risks, and focus on domains of activities it feels 
most comfortable and has the greatest control (Shimizu, 2007).  
 
Concerning organisations with good performance, i.e. performance level 
meets or exceeds the targets, the literature, which is primarily influenced by 
BTOF (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958), suggests that such 
organisations tend to become less willing to take risks (Chen and Miller, 
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2007; Ketchen and Palmer, 1999; Park, 2007). This is due to a belief from 
decision makers that any extra risk taking could bring unnecessary 
uncertainty to the organisation and potentially jeopardise its good 
performance (Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996). The case study suggests a 
mixed view in this regard. Whilst some informants confirmed the negative 
relationship between good performance and risk appetite, many others 
identified a positive relationship, i.e., an organisation whose performance 
meets or exceeds the targets will be more willing to take risks. This finding 
contradicts most empirical evidence in the literature (Chen and Miller, 2007; 
Ketchen and Palmer, 1999; Park, 2007; Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996). The 
main reason for this positive relationship could be an internal drive from the 
decision makers. Informant P07A indicated that good performance boosts 
the decision makers‟ confidence in the organisation‟s ability to achieve 
elevated targets and manage associated risks. As a result, the decision 
makers are more likely to „stretch‟ the organisation further by taking on 
more risks to achieve a better performance. As he argued: 
 
„I can't think of anything where we've been told „we're performing 
well so scale back a bit on your risk‟.  So I think it's increase, but not 
very much, because if you're doing well then it's very much continue 
what you're doing and pushing it a little bit.  Yes, continue to stretch.  
So a lot of - we've been running metrics now, so to increase 
performance you set targets and every year those targets, if you hit 
them the next year, expect it to be stretched.‟ (P07A) 
 
This internal drive could also be linked to external pressures, particularly 
from the shareholders. Informant P03B indicated that international hotel 
groups are under constant pressure to drive shareholder value. Once the 
existing performance targets are met, the shareholders will push to the 
organisation to set higher targets, which usually require an increased level 
of risk taking to achieve. As he explained: 
 
„If you‟re not achieving your targets, then you‟re willing to take 
more risk because you have to improve. The street is not going to be 
willing to accept that. Whether it‟s leadership changes or strategic 
changes, it will come about because you‟re not delivering 
shareholder expectations. If you are delivering and you are 
successful, then it sort of creates that cycle of „This has been 
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working, let‟s keep it going and maybe we need to do a little bit 
more; how else can we improve it‟, because nobody‟s going to be 
satisfied with of you did deliver a great performance, the 
shareholders‟ expectation is you can do that again – „plus‟, and how 
do you get to that „plus‟?‟ (P03B) 
 
This constant pursuit of rewards as mentioned above reflects human greed, 
which informant P02A argues is a fundamental driver of human risk taking.   
 
Primary „identity‟ factor - Firm size 
 
The size of an organisation has been recognised as a critical factor that 
influences its survival in its industry (Gemar et al., 2016). Due to the 
characteristics of the hotel industry, international hotel companies appear to 
measure firm size in the number of rooms, rather than measuring the total 
amount of resources as suggested in the more generic business literature 
(Audia and Greve, 2006; Chung and Yoon, 2013; Walls, 2005b). Despite 
some different opinions by P01A and P05A, this study has found that firm 
size plays an important role in shaping the risk appetite of international 
hotel companies. Whilst the reason underpinning this importance is not 
revealed, it could be the case that firm size is seen a key indicator of a hotel 
company‟s competitiveness in the global market (Lee et al., 2014; Pereira-
Moliner and Tari, 2015). In the context of the international hotel industry, 
the larger the size, the more competitive and resourceful the organisation 
would seem, and the more attention the organisation could draw from 
potential investors and partners (Sami and Mohamed, 2014). As the 
development of hotel companies relies increasingly on the third-party 
property owners due to the use of asset-light strategies (Sohn et al., 2013), it 
is not surprising to find out that decision makers in this study have placed 
greater emphasis on firm size. 
 
Regarding the effect of firm size on risk appetite, the literature suggests a 
positive relationship from two perspectives: from a resource perspective, 
large organisations have more experiences, knowledge and capital (e.g. 
financial and human) than smaller organisations, hence they are more 
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capable to support increased risk-taking activities and absorb potential 
losses (Audia and Greve, 2006; Walls, 2005b). From a psychology 
perspective, large organisations are often equipped with a too-big-to-fail 
mentality (Bhagat et al., 2015; Chang, 2010; Mattana et al., 2015), 
assuming that the government will intervene and save them in case of 
failure (Gropp et al., 2014; Volz and Wedow, 2011). 
 
The data analysis showed a positive relationship between firm size and risk 
appetite from a majority of informants. However, while the abovementioned 
„psychology‟ explanation could be supported, there was no data to confirm 
the „resource‟ explanation. Nevertheless, the too-big-to-fail mentality in the 
psychology explanation is not underpinned by the same view of the 
literature that the government will bail them out in case of a failure (Gropp 
et al., 2014; Volz and Wedow, 2011). Rather, the mentality is formulated by 
a growing complacency among decision makers about the organisation‟s 
capability to manage risks in the uncertain global environment. It is found 
that decision makers seem to believe the sheer size of the organisation can 
effectively contain and absorb any potential damage. For example, as 
informant P06A noted: 
 
„It did hit home when you mention size. Our size actually allows us 
to take a lot of risks.  Because we're so big, it's always that thing that 
if we lose a hotel it's not the end of the world… because we have the 
capacity and we're huge, so we can actually take a lot of risks.‟ 
(P06A) 
 
This too-big-to-fail mentality can be detrimental to the achievement of the 
organisation‟s strategic objectives because it may not only drive 
unnecessary risk taking, but also contribute towards higher impact risks, 
such as the systemic risk (Bierth et al., 2015; Park and Kim, 2016;). The 
collapse of large banks during the 2008 financial crisis is the best example 
of the potential damage systemic risk can impose on large organisations 




Despite the major view of positive relationship between firm size and risk 
appetite, some informants (P02A; P07A; P08A) also suggested that larger 
organisations might reduce their risk appetite, because larger organisations 
„have more to defend‟ (P02A). Informant P07A explained this negative 
relationship from a compliance breach perspective. He argued on p. 152 that 
because large international hotel companies tend to face greater challenges 
in oversight and quality control compared to their smaller counterparts, and 
given their global scale, it is more difficult for them to ensure constant 
compliance to standards and policies. 
 
The statement of informant P07A (p. 152) is in line with Ettredge et al. 
(2011), who found that large organisations are less likely to comply with 
information disclosure regulations. If the organisation is a publicly listed 
organisation, a single compliance failure might attract wide media coverage, 
causing negative sentiments among stakeholders and damaging the 
organisation‟s reputation (Berezina et al., 2012). 
 
Secondary „identity‟ factor - Leverage 
 
Generally, leverage refers to the use of debt to fund an organisation‟s assets 
and/or operations (Bhagat et al., 2015). It is a common means of financing 
in the hospitality industry (Jang and Tang, 2009), and if used properly, can 
lead to greater profitability for an organisation than issuing equity (Madan, 
2007; Sheel and Wattanasuttiwong, 1998; Yoon and Jang, 2005). Although 
the decision to use debt financing is arguably the result of an organisation‟s 
risk appetite (Bhagat et al., 2015; Chen, 2013; Dell‟Ariccia et al., 2014), 
because it is fundamentally risk-seeking (Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010), 
the question regarding whether an organisation‟s leverage level could 
influence its risk appetite appears to have been neglected in the literature.  
 
This study finds that leverage could have a significant constraining impact 
on an organisation‟s risk appetite. This is primarily due to the fact that 
organisations that use debt financing are under constant pressure to meet 
repayment obligations. Informants seemed to understand well the 
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repercussions of repayment failure, which, according to Lee et al. (2011), 
could include the repossession of organisation‟s assets and damage to the 
organisation‟s reputation and investor confidence.  
 
However, the study also finds that leverage might only become a concern 
for risk appetite if the organisation is moderately or highly leveraged. This 
is because repayment obligations can be relatively easy to meet if the 
organisation‟s level of leverage is low. For example, informant P07B 
explained on p. 151 the reason why leverage was not a concern for the 
organisation. 
 
Although the current leverage level in organisation B does not cause a 
concern, informants still recognise the potential impacts leverage could have 
on the business. Two informants (P06B; P08B) suggested that if the 
organisation‟s leverage increases, the pressure for repaying the debt and the 
organisation‟s risk of bankruptcy will increase (Upneja and Dalbor, 2001; 
Upneja and Dalbor, 2009; Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010); this, in turn, 
tends to make the decision makers more prudent in making future risk 
decisions, because any risk-taking failure could seriously hinder the 
organisation‟s ability to repay its debt. 
 
An interesting issue that emerged from the findings is that leverage might 
not be a concern for risk appetite, even if the organisation has a high level of 
leverage. This argument is based on the view that organisations are publicly 
limited entities, where decision makers are not individually held liable for 
its financial loss (see quote of P04B, p. 151). In other words, there is little to 
lose for the decision makers, even though their decisions could result in the 
collapse of the organisation. 
 
Whilst the view of informant P04B is rather surprising, it is supported by 
Mitchener and Richardson (2013), who found a significant positive 
relationship between limited liability and level of leverage in companies of 




Secondary „identity‟ factor - Brand portfolio 
 
The important role of brand portfolio to the success of hospitality 
organisations has been well documented in the literature (Jackson and Qu, 
2008; Jiang et al., 2002; Wang and Chung, 2015). As different brands 
enhance the organisation‟s product offering and attract customers from 
various segments, operating a diverse brand portfolio has been recognised as 
an effective means of risk diversification and return maximisation (Aaker, 
2004). If the brand portfolio also targets various geographical locations, the 
organisation could effectively mitigate the risks associated with a particular 
market (Morgan and Rego, 2009). However, the diversity of the brand 
portfolio needs to be appropriately balanced. Excessive diversity in a brand 
portfolio could create complications in marketing and management 
(Sichtmann and Diamantopoulos, 2013), confuse customers (Aaker, 2004), 
and even dilute the meaning of the corporate brand (Wang and Chung, 
2015). 
 
Congruent with the arguments of Aaker (2004) and Morgan and Rego 
(2009), this study finds that a geographically diverse, multi-branded 
portfolio can effectively mitigate an organisation‟s overall risk exposure in 
the international markets. This diversity, in turn, enhances the organisation‟s 
capability to proactively manage its risk taking to suit local market 
conditions. In this regard, the diversity of brand portfolio enhances an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. Informant P06B explains why a diverse brand 
portfolio is important: 
 
„If you have only one brand to manage, you can literally put all your 
resources, all your money, all your time, all your focus on one brand, 
which means you probably take a bigger risk. If you have a much 
deeper portfolio of brands like we do, you have to prioritize. You 
might be able to take a higher risk for [Brand A] or the other way 
around because you also sort of evaluate where are you are likely to 
lose more money, and it‟s also not just number of brands but number 
of markets you target. If you operate in one market, you can take 
very little risk but if you operate in more than one market you can 
hedge your risks accordingly. If the market is suffering in Middle 
East, then you can optimize Western Europe, but if the market is 
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suffering in Western Europe, you can maybe optimize Eastern 
Europe.‟ (P06B) 
 
While the diversity of brand portfolio is an important factor influencing the 
risk appetite of organisation B, it is „less important‟ for organisation A. This 
difference might be related to the different levels of diversity in the case 
organisations‟ brand portfolios. Compared with organisation A whose brand 
portfolio is often regarded as highly diverse, the diversity of brand portfolio 
of organisation B is comparably lower. It could be the case that when an 
organisation‟s current brand portfolio lacks diversity (e.g. organisation B), a 
new brand addition could significantly enhance the organisation‟s capability 
to diversify market risks. If, on the other hand, the organisation already has 
a largely diverse brand portfolio that covers most customer segments and 
geographical markets (e.g. organisation A), a new brand addition may have 
little impact on the organisation‟s ability to diversify risks. As such, the 
impact of brand portfolio diversity on risk appetite is more prominent when 
the diversity is at a lower level. 
 
Secondary „identity‟ factor – Degree of masculinity 
 
Inspired by the extensive research into the influence of gender on individual 
risk propensity (Hariharan et al., 2000; Neelakantan, 2010; Powell and 
Ansic, 1997; Schubert et al., 1999; Wang et al., 2009; Watson and 
McNaughton, 2007), degree of masculinity was conceptualised as the 
organisational equivalence for gender in this study. At the organisational 
level, degree of masculinity describes the extent to which an organisation 
exhibits masculine cultural values. Such values typically refer to emphasis 
on self-assertion, independence, control, competition, focused perception, 
rationality, analysis and achieving results (Alvesson, 2002). Opposed to 
these masculine values are feminine values, which include interdependence, 
cooperation, receptivity, acceptance, emotion, intuition, synthesising and 
learning from the process. This study assumed that an organisation that 
displays more masculine characteristics would be more likely to behave like 
a man when it comes to taking risks. As men are generally more willing to 
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take risks than women (Hariharan et al., 2000; Neelakantan, 2010; Wang et 
al., 2009; Watson and McNaughton, 2007), an organisation exhibiting a 
higher degree of masculinity would display a higher willingness to take 
risks. 
 
Despite some mixed opinions in both case organisations, the degree of 
masculinity was found to be „less important‟ for organisation A but 
„important‟ for organisation B. Nevertheless, the influence of masculinity on 
the risk appetite was unanimously considered to be positive. While the 
reason underpinning this positive relationship is unknown, possible 
explanations could be drawn from the literature. Neelakantan (2010) argued 
that the effect of gender on individual risk propensity is only robust when 
other influential factors are controlled. In other words, gender is also 
associated with other factors, which could have moderating and mediating 
effects on the relationship between gender and individual risk propensity. 
Schubert et al. (1999) demonstrated that if the factor of framing is 
introduced to the relationship between gender and individual risk propensity, 
the effect could change. In this regard, it could be reasonable to suspect that 
other factors might have interfered with the relationship between degree of 
masculinity and the risk appetite, therefore resulting in the observed 
differences between case organisations. 
 
Tertiary „identity‟ factor – Age of the organisation 
 
Originating in the individual risk taking literature, age is an important factor 
influencing the individual risk propensity (Wang et al., 2009; Faff et al., 
2009). Whist empirical evidence seems inconclusive (Grable and Lytton, 
1998; Mata et al., 2016), the most convincing argument appears that age has 
a U-shaped effect on the risk propensity (Al-Ajmi, 2008; Ardehali et al., 
2005; Riley and Chow, 1992). That is, the risk propensity is likely to 
decrease as one ages; once the individual reaches a certain point in age, the 
risk propensity will start to increase (Faff et al., 2008). Based on the living 
organisations thinking, the age of an organisation is envisaged to have a 




However, this study finds that age is a „less important‟ consideration for an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. Instead of having a direct effect on the risk 
appetite, the association between age and risk appetite is more likely to be 
indirect, since age is often discussed with increased past experience and 
knowledge, which are found to be more prominent factors influencing the 
organisation‟s risk appetite. 
 
With regard to the relationship between age and risk appetite, data analysis 
reveals a negative relationship with organisation A, but a positive 
relationship with organisation B, therefore showing some incongruence with 
literature predictions. This finding indicates that the relationship between 
age and risk appetite is likely to be organisation-specific, and different 
organisations in different circumstances might have different associations of 
age and risk appetite. 
 
Tertiary „identity‟ factor – ownership structure 
 
Referring to the types and composition of different shareholders within an 
organisation (Tricker, 2012), the ownership structure of an organisation is 
argued to influence its risk appetite (Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Barry et al., 
2011; Carpenter et al., 2003; May, 1995; Saunders et al., 1990). This is 
based on the assumption that the organisation‟s risk decisions will 
inevitably impact on the organisation‟s financial performance as well as the 
shareholder value (Barry et al., 2011; Weissman, 2012). Because the 
shareholders have invested their personal wealth into the organisation, they 
often demand the organisation to take more risks to maximise the value of 
their investments (May, 1995).  
 
However, this study finds that ownership structure has little influence on 
both case organisations‟ risk appetite. This is surprising, given the findings 
that both case organisations consider driving shareholder value or delivering 
shareholder satisfaction as one of their key priorities. While the data does 
not explain this low importance of ownership structure, a possible 
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explanation could be linked to the argument (P05A; P06B) that the 
shareholders are not always pressing the case organisations to take risks. 
Saunders et al. (1990) noted that not all shareholders of an organisation 
would act opportunistically and demand quick returns (Saunders et al., 
1990); instead, many shareholders, such as family investors and REITs 
(Paligorova, 2010), are known to prefer returns that are slower but more 
sustainable (Weissmann, 2012; Wright et al., 1996). If the case 
organisations in this study are mainly owned by such „patient‟ shareholders 
who do not place unnecessary pressure on decision making, it is reasonable 
to expect that the factor of ownership structure will have a minimal effect on 
its risk appetite. 
 
5.2.1.2 „Knowledge‟ factors 
 
Primary „knowledge‟ factor – History of risk taking 
 
An organisation‟s history of risk taking refers to the organisation‟s past 
experiences of taking risks as well as the outcomes (Carothers, 2011). As a 
living entity (Maula, 2006), an organisation has the ability to draw lessons 
from its prior successes and failures to inform its future behaviour (Desai, 
2008; Maula, 2006). While such experienced-based learning cannot 
guarantee future success (Thornhill and Amit, 2003), it could increase the 
possibility (Sorenson, 2003) by lowering the operational costs and 
enhancing the quality and reliability of products and services (Darr et al., 
1995; Levin, 2000).  
 
Congruent with the arguments that organisations draw on their historical 
experiences to determine future risk taking (Bouwman and Malmendier, 
2015; Kaufmann et al., 2013), the history of risk taking is found as a vital 
source of reference for case organisations to make future risk decisions, 




„Past risk-taking experience is very important because that's how 
most people behave. Their judgments are usually based on their 
experience, especially senior people in this organisation.‟ (P05A) 
 
This finding of relying on prior experience to understand and analyse risk 
situations supports the argument of Hertwig et al. (2004) and Kaufmann et 
al. (2013) that human beings are more likely to estimate the possible 
outcomes of risky choices by sampling from their own experience, rather 
than basing on external statistical calculation. However, this estimation is 
often based on a relatively small number of experience occasions as well as 
from the most recent experience, therefore the decisions are likely to be 
biased and important information regarding potential risks might be 
overlooked (Hertwig et al., 2004). As such, it is crucial for organisations to 
recognise the limitation of drawing on past experience. 
 
Despite acknowledging the importance of past experience to risk decision 
making, the literature has been inadequate in explaining how past 
experience might affect an organisation‟s risk appetite. Carpenter et al. 
(2003) argued that prior experience of taking a particular risk could reduce 
an organisation‟s future assessment of the same risk. This is due to the 
belief that lessons learned from the risk-taking experience, regardless of the 
outcome, could become valuable knowledge that improves the 
organisation‟s understanding of the risk and the design and implementation 
of risk controls (Carpenter et al., 2003; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
This enhanced understanding of the risk and its control could therefore 
lower the perceived likelihood of the risk happening and/or the magnitude 
of the risk impact (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992).  
 
Notwithstanding the literature, this study finds that different outcomes of 
past risk-taking experience influence the risk assessment in different ways. 
Whilst past success is likely to reduce the assessment of risk exposure and 
enhance management confidence, past failure indicates that the organisation 
is ineffective in understanding and managing the risk, and as such, is likely 
to damage the confidence of decision makers and render them even more 
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risk-averse. Therefore, prior unsuccessful experience in risk taking is more 
likely to reduce the risk appetite. 
 
Nevertheless, the influence of past risk-taking experience on risk appetite is 
not recognised by all informants. For example, on p. 145 informant P08A 
argued that past experience only increases the organisation‟s awareness of 
potential risk taking outcomes. 
 
Secondary „knowledge‟ factor – Risk management capability 
 
The risk management capability of an organisation refers to its ability to 
perform risk management tasks in order to effectively manage its risks and 
attain organisational objectives (Gao et al., 2013). The higher the risk 
management capability, the better the organisation is at understanding and 
managing its risks (Lam, 2014). It has been demonstrated that risk 
management capability can positively drive an organisation‟s financial 
performance (Chao et al., 2014). While recent literature has concentrated on 
developing instruments to assess an organisation‟s risk management 
capability (Hopkinson, 2011; Mu et al., 2014; Zou et al., 2010), work that 
focuses on the relationship between risk management capability and risk 
appetite is rare.  
 
Practitioner literature (Buehler and Pritsch, 2003; COSO, 2009; IRM, 2011; 
Stijnen, 2011) suggests that an organisation‟s risk management capability is 
an important determinant of its risk appetite – good risk management 
capability should positively drive the risk appetite. This argument is 
supported by organisation B, as its informants unanimously agreed that risk 
management capability is a key factor that drives the organisation‟s risk 
appetite.  
 
However, the findings indicate that the importance of risk management 
capability could well be organisation-specific. The question as to whether 
risk management capability shapes the risk appetite could be contingent 
upon how the decision makers consider the role of risk management 
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capability within an organisation. Most informants in organisation A (e.g. 
P07A, p. 146) argued that risk management capability is a relatively less 
important factor influencing the risk appetite, because risk management 
capability is more of an „enabler‟, rather than a „driver‟, for risk taking. As 
Informant P07A argued: 
 
„If you‟ve got a good risk management system in the business, it 
would enable you to some of those risks, but it is not the reason why 
you should take those risks.‟ (P07A)  
 
Regarding organisation B, risk management capability is argued to be 
positively associated with an organisation‟s risk appetite. According to 
some informants (P02B; P05B; P06B; P07B), this is because higher risk 
management capability leads to more efficient and effective risk 
management in the organisation. As such, the decision makers are more 
confident that the organisation can better manage a higher level of risks than 
others, hence leading to a higher willingness to take risks. This view 
suggests that risk management capability in organisation B might have been 
seen as a competitive advantage of the organisation. Several scholars have 
argued that an organisation‟s ability to manage risks better than others is 
indeed a distinct source of competitive advantage and should be actively 
exploited to generate more rewards (Britten, 2013; Elahi, 2013; Strongin 
and Petsch, 1999). However, this does not mean that the organisation should 
increase its risk appetite in all aspects. Since it is unlikely for an 
organisation to have strong management capability in all types of risks 
(Elahi, 2013), it is important for the organisation to identify areas where the 
organisation has better expertise or competence in managing risks, so that 
the organisation could increase its appetite in those more competent areas. 
 
Secondary „knowledge‟ factor – Knowledge of self and environment 
 
Risk taking literature suggests that knowledge plays a highly important role 
in shaping the risk propensity of either an individual (Grable, 2000; Grable 
and Joo, 2004; Watson and McNaughton, 2007) or an organisation (Baird 
and Thomas, 1985; Wang, 2009; Xue, 2014). However, this study finds 
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mixed evidence in this regard. While knowledge is an important 
consideration to organisation A, it is less so to organisation B.  
 
Organisation A considers knowledge as a highly important and useful 
source to inform organisational risk decisions. Informants commented that 
increased knowledge will enhance the organisation‟s understanding of its 
risks, particularly in terms of their causes, their likelihood of happening and 
potential impacts. This enhanced understanding will in turn make the risks 
seem more reasonable and easier to manage. This is compatible with the 
literature argument that knowledge could make the organisation become 
more familiar with the problem domain and thus reduce the assessment of 
the risks (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Xue, 2014). As such, for organisation A, 
increased knowledge is likely to boost the confidence of the decision makers 
in effectively managing the risks, therefore leading to a higher risk appetite. 
 
On the other hand, knowledge is not an important consideration for risk 
appetite in organisation B. This is because that increased knowledge, 
particularly about the organisation‟s external environment, is perceived as 
resulting in the identification of more risks to the organisation, therefore 
deterring the decision makers from making risky but potentially rewarding 
decisions. As argued by informant P07B: 
 
„Too much knowledge about the environment, the local market, tends 
to delay our decision-making, and the company might lose out on 
signing important hotel development deals to competitors‟. (P07B) 
 
As such, in organisation B knowledge is considered as an unfavourable 
factor for risk decision-making and thus has been discarded in the 
consideration of risk appetite. This finding contradicts to the literature, 
where knowledge has been suggested as a key factor that positively drives 
an organisation‟s willingness to take risks (Baird and Thomas, 1985; Wang, 
2009; Xue, 2014). 
 
The above difference with regard to the importance of knowledge on risk 
appetite could be related to the specific circumstances of the case 
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organisations. Although both organisations compete on an international 
scale, their priority markets are highly different and with varying levels of 
uncertainty. As a leader of the hotel industry, organisation A‟s priority 
markets are concentrated on the mature markets. Conversely, organisation B, 
as an industry follower, targets primarily the emerging markets, where the 
levels of political, economic, and social-cultural uncertainty are 
considerably higher than the mature markets. With such a background, 
increased knowledge for organisation A is likely to be seen as providing 
assurances to decision makers that potential risks are well-understood and 
can be effectively managed; however, for organisation B who wishes to 
catch up with the industry leaders, increased knowledge is likely to be 
perceived as more of a barrier to achieving growth targets. This finding 
suggests that knowledge cannot be taken for granted as a value-adding 
factor for risk appetite; rather, one needs to consider the wider context of the 
organisation to understand the effect of knowledge on risk appetite. 
 
5.2.1.3 „Strategy‟ factors 
 
Primary „strategy‟ factor – Ambitiousness of objectives 
 
Due to the notion that the ultimate aim of having a risk appetite is to assist 
an organisation in achieving its objectives (Aven, 2013; Lam, 2014), there 
has been a consensus in the literature that an organisation‟s objectives play a 
vital role in affecting its risk appetite (Carothers, 2011; Hillson and Murray-
Webster, 2012; IRM, 2011; Rittenberg and Martens, 2012). Consistent with 
this argument, this study finds that the ambitiousness of objectives is one of 
the key factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
 
The main reason why objectives are vital for an organisation‟s risk appetite 
is that they provide clear goals and directions for an organisation (Hillson 
and Murray-Webster, 2012; IRM, 2011). Describing objectives as „orders in 
the battlefield‟ (P02A), informant P06A‟s quote on p. 143 illustrated how 




Extending the literature, an interesting finding is that objectives can become 
even more prominent if the organisation publicly announces them. In this 
study, the fact that both case organisations publicly communicate their 
objectives to the stakeholders has made achieving those objectives the top 
business priority. Whilst publicising the objectives can be helpful in 
demonstrating transparency and attracting potential investors, it sets 
stakeholder expectations that these objectives must be met. Informants 
across both case organisations commented that if the organisation fails to 
meet such expectations, it is likely to experience reduced investor 
confidence and possibly reputational damage. As informant P08A explained: 
 
„Company strategy is advertised and articulated in a number of 
media, but certainly our stakeholders, shareholders, investors are 
very aware of our strategy and failure to deliver on that strategy 
would create implications in terms of share price and performance. 
So if you have publicly stated objective you've absolutely got to 
deliver it. That drives your risk appetite. If your objectives are 
testing and challenging you've got to have an appetite to achieve 
that because failure in the public world doesn't sit very well. So I 
think that is probably one of the key drivers [of risk appetite].‟ 
(P08A) 
 
Regarding the relationship between the ambitiousness of strategic objectives 
and risk appetite, this study has found a two-way, positive association. Most 
informants indicated that the achievement of a highly ambitious objective 
would require the organisation to increase its risk appetite. In turn, an 
organisation with a large risk appetite is more likely to set future objectives 
that are highly ambitious (P01A; P05A). This adds to the literature another 
dimension on the relationship between strategic objectives and risk appetite, 
where existing arguments seem to have only acknowledged a one-way 









5.2.1.4 „Internal standards, process, and communication‟ factors 
 
Primary „internal standards, process, and communication‟ factor – 
Risk capacity 
 
Risk capacity refers to the maximum amount of risk an organisation is able 
to assume given its current level of resources, before breaching constraints 
determined by regulatory capital and liquidity needs (FSB, 2013). As a 
measure of an organisation‟s financial strength in risk taking (IRM, 2011; 
Sabato, 2009), risk capacity provides the decision makers with a clear limit 
for taking risks (Carothers, 2011; Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012; 
Shortreed, 2010). This study finds that risk capacity is a key risk appetite 
consideration for both case organisations, as the desired level of risk taking 
needs to be set within the scope of available resources. This supports the 
practitioner argument that risk appetite must always be set at a level within 
the risk capacity (FSB, 2013; Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012; Lam, 
2014), as a breach in capacity would seriously undermine the organisation‟s 
financial viability as well as damaging the reputation (EY, 2010; Rittenberg 
and Martens, 2012). 
  
Despite the recognition that risk capacity is important to risk appetite, the 
literature is inadequate in explaining how risk capacity could influence the 
risk appetite. This study addresses this limitation and identifies a 
relationship between risk capacity and risk appetite. While risk capacity is 
traditionally seen as a constraint for risk appetite, as it imposes a limit on the 
organisation which cannot be exceeded (FSB, 2013; Hillson and Murray-
Webster, 2012; Lam, 2014), a stronger and larger risk capacity may 
positively drive an organisation to take more risks. Informants argued that 
an increase in the organisation‟s risk capacity should result in an increase in 
risk appetite, as the organisation is expected by its stakeholders to exploit 
that extra capacity in order to generate more rewards. 
  
However, this positive association between risk capacity and risk appetite 
might be contingent upon the risk propensity of the key decision makers, 
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especially the BoD and the CEO. Informant P02A (p. 148) suggested that 
the positive association is likely to be the case if the decision makers are 
overall risk-neutral or risk-seeking; but if the decision makers are risk-
averse, an increase in risk capacity may have no impact on the risk appetite, 
or even lead to a decrease in the risk appetite. This is because increasing risk 
capacity might place extra pressure on a risk-averse decision maker, who 
would feel a heightened responsibility towards safeguarding the 
organisation‟s resources, therefore resulting in an even more conservative 
attitude towards taking risks. 
 
The account of informant P02A (p. 148) also highlights a need to take into 
account the overall risk propensity of the decision makers when considering 
the effect of risk capacity on risk appetite. This influence of decision-maker 
risk propensity on the relationship between risk capacity and risk appetite is 
further discussed on p. 234 (section 5.3) 
 
Tertiary „internal standards, process, and communication‟ factor – 
Risk reporting 
 
In the aftermath of financial crisis, the reporting of key risks that an 
organisation is exposed to has gained an increased attention from corporate 
governance regulators (Tong, 2013), many of whom have made risk 
reporting an essential requirement in their official corporate governance 
guidance (FRC, 2014; FSA, 2011; Weydert, 2010). One of the key purposes 
of risk reporting is to better communicate the organisation‟s risk profile and 
assess its ability to manage those risks, so that the shareholders are better 
informed about whether to (continue) invest in the organisation (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2005; Palenchar and Heath, 2007). As Deumes (2008) and Fuller 
and Jensen (2002) argued, being transparent about the risks can prevent 
severe damage to the reputation and long-term viability of an organisation. 
Also, by regularly reporting the risks to the shareholders and other 
stakeholders, it is hoped that an organisation can become more aware of its 
risks as well as be more effective in devising strategies for managing those 
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risks (Harwood et al., 2009). In this sense, risk reporting can improve an 
organisation‟s quality of risk management.  
 
Nevertheless, putting the organisation‟s risk profile under public scrutiny 
could also make the decision makers more prudent in future risk taking, 
because the stakeholders will be more effective in monitoring the 
organisation and better positioned to sanction the organisation if the risks 
are not satisfactorily managed (Deumes, 2008; Linsley and Shrives, 2005). 
In this regard, risk reporting might hinder an organisation‟s willingness to 
take risks. 
 
However, whilst a minority of informants in this study embraced the idea 
that risk reporting undermines the risk appetite, many argued that risk 
reporting tends to encourage an organisation to take more risks. The main 
reason is that frequent reporting provides the decision makers with more 
clarity of the organisation‟s risk exposure, so they are assured that major 
risks of the organisation are well recognised and understood, therefore are 
more confident in effectively managing those risks. This heightened 
confidence will in turn lead to an increase in the organisation‟s willingness 
to take risks. 
 
Despite this positive link between risk reporting and risk appetite, data 
analysis indicated that, overall, risk reporting is not viewed as an important 
business activity in both case organisations. Although Linsley and Shrives 
(2005) and Tong (2013) argued that greater risk reporting could provide an 
organisation with access to cheaper and easier finance, in this study risk 
reporting seems to have been perceived as a resource-draining regulatory 
requirement, which not only takes a great amount of time and efforts to 
meet, but also offers little tangible value for the organisation. This issue of 
cost has been recognised by Botosan (1997) and Deumes (2008) as the key 
obstacle for organisations to undertake risk reporting. Another reason 
explaining the little importance of risk reporting could be that the case 
organisations are concerned about their unique information regarding risk 
management being learnt by their competitors (Deumes, 2008). Overall, this 
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study suggests that the intended purpose of risk reporting from regulators 
may not be effectively realised in practice. 
 
5.2.1.5 „Information and communication systems‟ factors 
 
Primary „information and communication systems‟ factor – 
Transparency of actions 
 
Corporate transparency refers to the extent to which relevant and reliable 
information about an organisation, such as its performance, governance, 
business model and strategy, is available to its external stakeholders 
(Bushman, 2015; Jayaraman and Kothari, 2013). The literature on the effect 
of transparency on organisational risk taking suggests that transparency 
tends to undermine an organisation‟s willingness to take risks (Dhouibi et 
al., 2016; Houston et al., 2010; Nier and Bauman, 2006). This seems to be 
related to the so-called „monitoring effect‟, where increased transparency 
provides stakeholders with more information about the organisation, so that 
they can better monitor its performance and scrutinise the organisation‟s 
decisions (Jayaraman and Kothari, 2013; Leuz et al., 2009; Wang et al., 
2015), and impose sanctions if necessary (Deumes, 2008; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2005). This fear of receiving negative stakeholder reactions tends 
to discourage the decision makers from making risk-taking decisions 
(Dhouibi et al., 2016), therefore leading to a lower risk appetite. 
 
Although a few informants acknowledged the possibility of this negative 
association (P04A; P05A), the majority of informants argued for a positive 
relationship between transparency and risk appetite. It is believed that 
higher transparency would facilitate the quality and speed of information 
flowing across the organisation, providing the decision makers with 
assurances that the organisation‟s risks are properly recognised and 
managed. This leads to an increase in decision-maker confidence regarding 
risk taking and consequently an enhanced willingness to take risks. For 




The notion of increased transparency resulting in a better understanding of 
the organisation‟s risk profile as reflected in the above quote is well noted in 
the literature. It has been highlighted that increased information disclosure 
in the organisation could lead to improved risk identification and 
management practices (Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Palenchar and Heath, 
2007; Tong, 2013), thus significantly reducing the likelihood of the 
organisation in taking careless risk decisions (Bourgain et al., 2012; Hirtle, 
2007; Wang et al., 2015). As such, the finding highlights the importance of 
promoting transparency to ensure appropriate risk appetite. 
 
An emerging issue is that demonstrating transparency also involves ensuring 
important information is always made available to internal members who 
also participate in organisation‟s risk decision making. Failure in being 
transparent to all decision makers could not only hinder the quality of risk 
decisions but also undermine employee morale and trust in the organisation. 
This is inferred from the account of informant P04A on p. 156. 
 
Tertiary „information and communication systems‟ factor – Degree 
of access to information 
 
In the highly chaotic, competitive and dynamic business environment, 
decision makers need quality information to make risk decisions (Pirson and 
Turnbull, 2011; Rubin and Rubin, 2013). As different organisations have 
different abilities to gain, retrieve and process information (Bhatta, 2003), 
managers are often faced with incomplete or inaccurate information when 
making risk decisions. Thus, the ability to access reliable information in a 
timely manner is critical (Goodman, 1993). Wang and Yuan (2011) found 
that access to complete and relevant information is a prerequisite for high-
quality risk management in the construction industry. Better access to 
information can not only provide decision makers with quality and relevant 
data, but also reduce intuition-based decisions and boost decision maker 




This study finds a mixed effect of access to information on risk appetite. 
While organisation A advocates the positive association between access to 
information and risk appetite as suggested by Bhatta (2003), organisation B 
argues that risk appetite could be impeded, because enhanced access to 
information might prolong the decision-making process and also make it 
more difficult for decision makers to reach consensus, therefore leading to a 
reduced willingness to take risks. This negative association between access 
to information and risk appetite might depend on the organisation‟s ability 
to process information and more importantly, to filter out irrelevant 
information. The ability to find relevant information in an efficient manner 
has been demonstrated as a key determinant of the quality of risk decisions 
(Zheng and Prislin, 2012). Without the ability to quickly find relevant 
information, enhanced access to information can only provide the decision 
makers with a large amount of information that not only confuses the 
decision makers and slows down the decision making process, but also 
reduces decision quality. 
 
5.2.1.6 „Perception of the environment‟ factors 
 
Tertiary „perception of the environment‟ factor – Perceived level of 
risk in the environment 
 
This study finds that the perceived level of risk in an organisation‟s external 
environment is a „less important‟ risk appetite factor for both organisations. 
This finding is surprising, because the „perception of the environment‟ is an 
essential component of an organisation‟s „living composition‟ and is also 
considered to partly determine an organisation‟s behaviour (Maula, 2006). It 
also contradicts to previous studies (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) suggesting that 
„risk perception‟ is a crucial determinant of an organisation‟s risk behaviour.  
 
Regarding how this factor influences risk appetite, informants agreed that it 
is negatively related to risk appetite, i.e. the higher/lower the perceived risk, 
the lower/higher the risk appetite. This negative association is however 
incompatible with much of the literature on „framing effect‟ (Kuhberger et 
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al., 1999; Roszkowski and Snelbecker, 1990; Tversky and Kahnemann, 
1981), where a positive perception (low level of perceived risk) reduces 
individual risk propensity while a negative perception (high level of 
perceived risk) increases risk propensity. 
 
5.2.2 Decision-maker factors that shape risk appetite 
 
In addition to organisational factors, the consideration of risk appetite will 
not be appropriate without taking into account the characteristics of an 
organisation‟s top decision makers and their unique governance features. 
These decision-maker factors belong to the „boundary elements‟ component 
within the „living composition‟ model, connecting the organisation and its 
internal mechanism with the wider external environment (Maula, 2006). 
Section 5.2.2.1 discusses these decision-maker factors. 
 
5.2.2.1 „Boundary elements‟ factors 
 
Primary „boundary elements‟ factors – EC risk propensity and CEO 
risk propensity 
 
Inspired by the upper echelon theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), which 
assumes that an organisation‟s strategic decision making is largely 
influenced by the personal attributes of its leaders (Baird and Thomas, 1985; 
Bromiley and Rau, 2016; Das and Teng, 2001), it is reasonable to expect 
that the collective risk propensity of an organisation‟s top decision makers, 
most notably, BoD, and EC, play a vital role in determining the 
organisation‟s risk appetite (Baird and Thomas, 1985; Bhatta, 2003; Pablo 
and Javidan, 2002). 
 
Broadly in line with this expectation, this study finds that the collective risk 
propensity of the EC and the individual risk propensity of the CEO are two 
critical factors that positively drive an organisation‟s risk appetite. As 
informant P02A argued on p. 165, the CEO and other senior decision 




More specifically, data analysis suggests that the individual risk propensity 
of the CEO plays an even more important role than that of EC in 
determining the risk appetite. While the central role of CEO in 
organisational risk decision making is often observed in the literature 
(Belghitar and Clark, 2012; Kraiczy et al., 2015), allowing the CEO too 
much power could lead to excessive risk-seeking decisions being made 
(Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 2012). 
 
Compared with the CEO and the EC, the study finds that the influence of 
BoD (which is often seen as the top decision-making body in an 
organisation) in determining an organisation‟s risk appetite is rather lower. 
Whilst the literature proposes that the BoD should determine the 
organisation‟s risk appetite (FRC, 2014; IRM, 2011; Rittenberg and Martens, 
2012), it has been found that both case organisations had delegated this task 
to the CEO and the EC. This is because the CEO and the EC are considered 
as being closer to the organisation than the BoD, hence they have better 
knowledge of the organisation and are better positioned to make informed 
decisions. This is reflected in the quotes of informants P05A (p. 166) and 
P06B (p. 167). 
 
As such, the organisation‟s risk appetite is collectively determined by the 
EC in accordance with their collective risk propensity, and then put forward 
by the CEO to the BoD for approval. In this regard, this „approved‟ risk 
appetite partially reflects the EC‟s and the CEO‟s risk propensity. While the 
BoD may have different views towards the „proposed‟ risk appetite, it was 
argued that they rarely challenge the CEO, even though the BoD disagrees 
with the CEO and has authority to disapprove the proposal. Apart from the 
reason that BoD does not have the same depth of knowledge as the CEO 
regarding the organisation, it is also because the BoD is wary of „crossing 





„There is a very fine line between running the company and 
overseeing the running of the company. If they [the BoD] stops 
something the CEO wants to do, almost by definition, they are 
running the company.‟ (P05A) 
 
Overall, the finding that it is the top management team (i.e. the EC), rather 
than the BoD, plays a central role in driving an organisation‟s strategic 
decision making contributes to the emerging literature on the role of top 
management team (Chen, et al., 2010; Sahaym, et al., 2016; Wright et al., 
2007). Nevertheless, given that EC has more intimate knowledge of the 
organisation than the BoD and the fact that the BoD is reluctant to challenge 
the executives, leaders of an organisation need to understand that this „shift‟ 
in decision-making authority (i.e. from the BoD to the EC) may render the 
organisation overly aggressive and takes more risks than it probably should 
be, as evidenced in the financial services industry (McNulty et al., 2013). 
Further, given the corporate governance requirements that the BoD needs to 
exercise effective oversight upon the executives (Pathan, 2009), it appears 
that both case organisations‟ BoDs are not effectively fulfilling this 
particular responsibility. 
 
Primary „boundary elements‟ factor – Performance-based 
remuneration 
 
Comprising mostly cash bonuses and stock options (Chien et al., 2013; 
Murphy, 1999), performance-based executive remuneration is often used in 
large corporations to resolve the agency problem of misaligned interests 
between management and shareholders (Zalewska, 2014). The original 
rationale is that because the management is risk averse, offering 
performance-based rewards could encourage them to take more risks and 
maximise potential return on investment. Performance-based executive 
remuneration has been proved to be a useful tool to drive an organisation‟s 
financial performance in many industries (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006; Scholtz 




It has been found that both case organisations offer performance-based 
remuneration to their EC members. In fact, in both organisations this type of 
reward is a key factor that increases the organisation‟s risk appetite. „It is 
just human nature that people are drawn towards rewards‟, noted by 
informant P08B. This finding is consistent with many studies in the 
executive compensation literature where a positive relationship is found 
between managerial remuneration and firm risk taking (Baixauli-Soler et al., 
2015; Coles et al., 2006; Eisenmann, 2002; Sanders and Hambrick, 2007). 
 
Informants recognise that whilst this type of remuneration often leads to an 
increase in organisational performance, it could also induce unnecessary 
risk taking. This is because considerable bonuses are rewarded to EC 
members for achieving a short-term hotel development target, which is 
usually in the form of a quarterly signings number or a growth percentage. 
Consequently, the executives tend to become overly focused on achieving 
the target, therefore neglecting other crucial aspects of hotel growth, such as 
the credibility of the hotel owner, the specific location of the hotel and the 
political and economic prospects of the market. As a result, hotel 
development projects might show various problems during the development 
phase and may eventually fail to convert into actual openings. For example, 
informant P07B explained on p. 168 how the offering of bonus payments to 
the „business development‟ team had resulted in trouble for other 
departments of the organisation. 
 
The quote of informant P07B (p. 168) highlights that the current design of 
executive remuneration policy in hotel companies may be flawed. Such a 
remuneration mechanism may have far-reaching consequences on the 
organisation. Informant P05A argued on p. 168 that ill-designed 
remuneration could create an inappropriate expectation or culture that 
focuses on short-term performance targets rather than long-term lasting 
success of the business. 
 
The above short-sighted and target-oriented remuneration design is similar 
to the one in the financial services industry (Bebchuk, 2010; Shlomo et al., 
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2013), which has been blamed for causing careless and excessive risk-
seeking behaviour in organisations (Bannier et al., 2013; Efin et al., 2015; 
Marcinkowska, 2014). Moreover, this form of governance practice has been 
found to have detrimental effect on the long-term innovativeness of an 
organisation (Honoré et al., 2015). Agreeing with this view, informant 
P02A argued that remuneration should be designed in a way which rewards 
„quality strategic growth‟, meaning that the hotel growth should be in the 
organisation‟s strategic markets, with the preferred brands, and the 
company-owner relationships are still of good quality after a number of 
years. This is consistent with the argument of Callan and Thomas (2014) 
that apart from financial performance, an organisation‟s social performance 
also needs to be assessed in order to determine executive remuneration. 
 
Secondary „boundary elements‟ factor – BoD risk propensity 
 
BoD risk propensity has been widely recognised by practitioners (Allan et 
al., 2011; Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012; IRM, 2011) and scholars 
(Bhatta, 2003; McNulty et al., 2013; Pablo and Javidan, 2002; Pathan, 2009) 
as a factor that could influence an organisation‟s risk appetite. Because risk 
appetite is essentially a corporate-level decision that needs to be made by 
the BoD (Alix et al., 2015; Gontarek, 2016), the collective risk propensity 
of the BoD members will inevitably shape the types and amount of risks that 
the organisation chooses to take and avoid. In other words, the BoD is likely 
to align the organisation‟s risk appetite with its own risk propensity.  
 
Confirming the argument that BoD risk propensity is positively associated 
with the risk appetite (Allan et al., 2011; Bhatta, 2003; Hillson and Murray-
Webster, 2012; IRM, 2011; McNulty et al., 2013; Pablo and Javidan, 2002; 
Pathan, 2009), this study goes further and finds that BoD risk propensity can 
be a key determinant of an organisation‟s risk appetite. As informant P01A 
noted, „BoD‟s risk propensity – that is the whole risk appetite‟. This is 
because BoD is seen as the top decision-making authority in an organisation, 
and even if it does not directly participate in the process of determining the 
risk appetite (i.e. delegating the task to the CEO and EC), the BoD still 
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needs to endorse the proposed risk appetite, and it has the power to 
disapprove any element that is not consistent with its own risk propensity. 
 
Nevertheless, in different organisational contexts, the role of BoD risk 
propensity on risk appetite may be less influential. While organisation A 
regarded BoD risk propensity as „key‟, organisation B considered it as „less 
important‟. Even in organisation A there are informants (P05A; P07A; 
P08A) who believed that BoD risk propensity is not an important 
consideration. This finding suggests that the importance of BoD risk 
propensity to risk appetite is context-specific, therefore further extending 
the literature. 
 
A main reason explaining the limited importance of BoD risk propensity to 
risk appetite in organisation B is that there is a lack of BoD input in 
determining the risk appetite. In organisation B, BoD is detached from the 
CEO and the EC. In other words, none of the EC members sits on the BoD 
of the organisation. This type of BoD composition is rather different from 
the conventions (Berger et al., 2014; Chen, 2009), where the CEO at least is 
also a BoD member. As such, the organisation B‟s strategic decisions, 
including the risk appetite, are made solely by the CEO and the EC, with 
limited input from the BoD. 
 
Secondary „boundary elements‟ factors – BoD diversity and EC 
diversity 
 
Despite a recent study by Sila et al. (2016) where no relationship is found 
between BoD‟s gender diversity and firm risk taking, much empirical 
research into the composition of BoD and its effect on firm risk taking 
suggests that BoD diversity could be negatively related to risk appetite 
(Goodstein et al., 1994; Gulamhussen and Santa, 2015; Lenard et al., 2014). 
This is because higher diversity among the BoD members tends to create 
conflicting views about engaging risky activities, thus limiting the 




In line with Goodstein et al. (1994), Gulamhussen and Santa (2015) and 
Lenard et al. (2014), informants confirmed that increasing BoD diversity 
provides many differing and even contradictory perspectives, thus making it 
more difficult for the BoD members to reach a consensus in risk decisions 
and consequently decreasing the organisation‟s risk appetite. However, data 
analysis also revealed that this negative relationship between BoD diversity 
and risk appetite could change into „positive‟, if most BoD members have 
recently experienced success in their risk-taking decisions. In other words, 
even if BoD members are highly diverse in gender, background, and 
professional experience, the particular outcome of the recent risk-taking 
experience of the BoD members may determine the relationship between 
BoD diversity and risk appetite. For example, informant P07A illustrated 
this point on p. 170 by referring to some companies that have recently 
experienced major successes or failures.  
 
Whilst BoD diversity has been found as an important factor influencing 
organisation A‟s risk appetite, it is „less important‟ for organisation B. 
Although the reason is unclear from the interviews, it is likely to be related 
to the particular importance of the case organisation‟s BoD in strategic 
decision making. It has been discussed previously (in the section on BoD 
risk propensity) that BoD plays a key role in strategic decision making of 
organisation A, whereas in organisation B the effect of BoD on decision 
making is rather negligible. Moreover, it is clear that in organisation A the 
value of BoD diversity is recognised. Several informants (P02A; P03A; 
P04A; P07A) noted that the wealth of valuable experiences offered by a 
diverse BoD could help to tackle groupthink, an issue commonly seen in 
homogeneous BoDs (Berger et al., 2014; McNulty et al., 2013). 
 
While BoD diversity is of little importance in organisation B, the potential 
benefits of diversity are well noted by the executives. Rhode and Packel 
(2010) argued that diversity in leadership could improve the quality of the 
decisions due to the consideration of different views. Consistent with this 
argument, the diversity of the EC emerged as a key risk appetite 
consideration in organisation B. Informants P01B and P06B particularly 
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noted that ensuring a certain level of diversity in the EC team, which the 
organisation has been lacking, can significantly improve informed decision 
making and provide a balance to one-sided, extreme decisions. This is 
captured in the quote of informant P01B on p. 170. This quote also indicates 
that EC diversity could positively or negatively shape the risk appetite, 
depending on whether the previous risk appetite is overly conservative or 
aggressive. This finding confirms, but also extends the literature on top 
management team composition and firm risk, which exclusively suggests a 
positive relationship between the top management team diversity and the 
firm‟s risk-taking propensity (Berger et al., 2014; Kor, 2006). 
 
Secondary „boundary elements‟ factor – CEO emotion 
 
Due to a belief that CEO is the top decision-making figure of an 
organisation (Barker and Mueller, 2002; Herrmann and Datta, 2005), the 
effect of CEO characteristics on firm risk taking has generated considerable 
research interest. One common characteristic investigated is CEO emotion. 
Since an individual‟s emotional state has been proved to influence his/her 
risk propensity in psychology research (Forgas, 1995; Grable and 
Roszkowski, 2008; Isen and Geva, 1987; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Kliger and 
Levy, 2003), it is expected that CEO emotion would also shape the 
organisation‟s risk appetite. 
 
Confirming this expectation, CEO emotion is found to be an important risk 
appetite consideration in organisation B. Informants (P01B; P03B; P06B) 
indicated that the emotional state of the CEO is likely to provide a 
temporary „push‟ or „pull‟ to the organisation‟s risk appetite. A positive 
emotion would enhance the risk appetite while a negative emotion would 
decrease the risk appetite. This implies a positive relationship between CEO 
emotion and risk appetite, which is consistent with Delgado-Garcia and 
Fuente-Sabate (2010) and Yuen and Lee (2003). While this emotional input 
from the CEO has resulted in many successes in organisation B, it was also 
recognised that this emotional „pull‟ or „push‟ to risk appetite could be 




Compared with organisation B, it is found that CEO emotion is unlikely to 
have any effect in organisation A. This finding suggests that the influence of 
CEO emotion on risk appetite is organisation-specific, hence extending the 
literature. One underlying reason is due to the professionalism of the CEO, 
as argued by informant P01A, is that „the CEO is a mature and professional 
individual who clearly understands that decisions need to be made free from 
emotional influence‟. Another reason is that organisation A has a 
comprehensive decision-making structure in place that is designed to 
minimise emotional influence on decisions. The structure comprises the 
BoD, the EC and many independent committees, all of which is facilitated 
by a „consensual decision-making culture‟ (P02A). 
 
Tertiary „boundary elements‟ factor – Ability to sense 
 
Confirming the argument of Maula (2006) that an organisation‟s sensing 
ability determines its behaviour, this study finds that an organisation‟s 
ability to sense changes in its internal and external environment does 
influence the risk appetite. Although a stronger ability to sense is more 
likely to be associated with stronger decision-maker confidence (and 
appetite) in covering potential risks, a number of informants noted that it is 
possible for an organisation to become overly sensitive to risky information, 
which might lead to risk-averse decisions. This suggests that the relationship 
between ability to sense and risk appetite is an inverted U-shape. 
 
In addition, informants from both case organisations did not view this factor 
as an important consideration for risk appetite. Given that the ability to 
sense is a crucial risk propensity indicator at the individual level (Al-Ajmi, 
2008; Grable and Joo, 2004; Grable and Lytton, 1999; Pavic and Vojinic, 







5.2.3 Environmental factors that shape risk appetite 
 
Alongside with Organisational Factors and Decision-maker Factors, the 
effect of an organisation‟s external environment on its risk appetite cannot 
be overlooked. The case study has identified nine environmental factors, 
eight of which may have significant impacts on risk appetite. The nine 
factors are discussed below. 
 
5.2.3.1 „Interactive processes and communication with the 
environment‟ factors 
 
Primary „interactive processes and communication with the 
environment‟ factor – Shareholder demands 
 
According to both academic literature (García-Kuhnert et al., 2015; Mishra, 
2011; Nguyen, 2012) and practitioner literature (Carothers, 2011; 
Chatzinikoli and Toner, 2009; COSO, 2009; EY, 2010; Govindarajan, 2011), 
the shareholder demands could exert an important influence on an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. This argument is confirmed in this study, as 
both case organisations rated „shareholder demands‟ as a key factor of risk 
appetite. While this is partly due to the fact that both organisations are 
publicly listed companies and thus they have to take risks to drive 
shareholder value, several informants pointed out that their organisation has 
explicitly set „driving shareholder value‟ as one of its key organisational 
objectives. In explaining the key role of shareholder demands, informant 
P05A argued: 
 
„Its influence [on risk appetite] is quite high because obviously we 
are here to drive value for our shareholders. That‟s what we are 
here for as a company. So if they want us to move in a certain way 
we certainly have to take that on board.‟ (P05A) 
 
Regarding how shareholder demands influence risk appetite, the findings 
suggest a mixed view. While most informants argued that shareholders 
would push the organisation to take more risks in order to drive the return 
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on investment, informant P06B pointed out that this objective can also be 
achieved via reduced risk taking by limiting operational expenses and/or 
halting ongoing risk-seeking projects. As she argued: 
 
„If our shareholders push us to be more profitable, we will probably 
have to cut down on operations cost, which means that we will take 
less risk. We will control every penny. We will probably get rid of 
some of the human resources. We will drive the profitability through 
cutting cost. So we will retract rather than push forward. From an 
operations perspective, we will hold off all the innovative ideas and 
just drive business to existing clients, which is not really taking risks.‟ 
(P06B) 
 
This finding, therefore, offers contradictory evidence to the traditional 
argument that shareholder demands increases an organisation‟s willingness 
to take risks (García-Kuhnert et al., 2015; Mishra, 2011; Nguyen, 2012). 
 
Additionally, data analysis reveals that the essence of shareholder demands, 
which is often to increase shareholder value, may change. John et al. (2008) 
explained that shareholders are becoming increasingly conscious of the 
challenging environment, thus are not always demanding the organisation to 
take more risks. Informant P05A added that under certain circumstances 
such as adverse economic conditions or that the organisation has recently 
experienced reputational damage, shareholders may demand the 
organisation to be more prudent and risk-averse in its strategic decision 
making, so that the return on investment can be protected. This finding also 
supports Diez-Esteban et al. (2016), who found that shareholders discourage 
firm risk taking when facing a lack of growth opportunities.  
 
Secondary „interactive processes and communication with the 
environment‟ factor – other stakeholders demands 
 
Within the context of international hotel industry, the importance of other 
stakeholders‟ (not including shareholders) demands (typically including 
hotel owners/property developers, employees, guests, etc.) to strategic 
decision making has been increasingly recognised (Lo, 2013; Teng et al., 
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2015). Risk appetite practitioners (Carothers, 2011; Govindarajan, 2011) 
have argued that the demands of other stakeholders in an organisation could 
significantly influence its risk appetite. This study finds that while the 
influence of other stakeholders‟ demands on risk appetite is acknowledged 
by both case organisations, the significance of this factor on risk appetite is 
organisation-specific. Specifically, other stakeholders‟ demand is a key risk 
appetite factor for organisation B but appears less important in organisation 
A. According to informants P01A and P07A, this is because organisational 
risk taking decision is the result of an internal analysis among top decision 
makers, thus whilst the demands of stakeholders are heard, they would not 
necessarily impact on strategic decisions. 
 
Lo (2013) suggested that hotel owners are the most important stakeholder 
group for international hotel companies. This is supported in this study, as 
hotel owners have been identified as one of the most important stakeholders, 
in addition to the shareholders. While informants from both case 
organisations claim that hotel owners‟ demands are valued and considered 
in decision making, the two case organisations seem to have reacted 
differently in the past in addressing those demands. In particular, 
organisation A tended to transform their demands into specific strategic 
objectives before taking actions, therefore the demands of hotel owners 
indirectly influenced the risk appetite. Organisation B, however, tended to 
quickly react upon the hotel owners‟ demands and as a result directly 
influenced the risk appetite. The two approaches of organisation A and 
organisation B indicate two different levels of willingness towards risk 
taking, which are in line with the evaluation of the case organisations‟ 
analysts, which suggests that organisation A is relatively risk-averse and 
organisation B is more risk-seeking. 
 
While it is difficult to suggest that which approach is more superior, both 
approaches could result in negative organisational consequences. For 
instance, organisation A, which converts demands into new strategic 
objectives, might fail in addressing hotel owners‟ demands in a timely 
manner, and possibly instil a bias in hotel owners that their demands are 
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overlooked, therefore damaging trust and the organisation‟s reputation. 
Similarly, although organisation B can satisfy its hotel owners promptly, 
reacting too quickly may cause the organisation to deviate from its current 
course, therefore resulting in a failure to achieve the original objectives and 
also damaging the reputation. Therefore, organisations need to strike a 
balance between addressing stakeholder demands and achieving original 
strategic objectives. 
 
5.2.3.2 „Triggers‟ factors 
 
Primary „trigger‟ factor – Level of regulation 
 
Designed to set standards and prevent organisations from unlawful and 
improper conduct, regulations have been well documented as a critical 
factor that reduces an organisation‟s willingness to take risks (Baird and 
Thomas, 1985; Cohen et al., 2013; Harwood et al., 2009; Pablo and Javidan, 
2002). In line with the literature, this study finds that the level of regulation 
is negatively related with the risk appetite. For example, informant P03A 
explained on p. 158 how a recent regulation had affected the risk appetite of 
the organisation. 
 
However, two informants (P02B; P07B) argued that some key decision 
makers do not always take regulations into account in considering risk 
appetite. This is because the international hotel industry is considered as 
relatively less regulated than other industries, and most regulations are 
localised and focused on constraining improper risk behaviour at the 
operational level other than at the strategic level. This is consistent with the 
hospitality literature since previous studies have primarily focused on 
employment (Lv et al., 2012) and anti-smoking regulations (Simons et al., 
2016). 
 
The quote of informant P03A (p. 158) also explains why regulations are a 
critical consideration for risk appetite, because failure to comply will not 
only expose the organisation to potential penalties, it will also result in 
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reputational damage, leading to reduced trust from stakeholders and a 
decrease in share price. This is consistent with the arguments of several 
empirical studies on regulation and firm risk (e.g. Cohen et al., 2013; 
Devers et al., 2008; Konishi and Yasuda, 2004).  
 
Primary „trigger‟ factor - Rewards 
 
Individual risk taking literature has highlighted that the expected rewards of 
risk taking can have a significant positive impact on a person‟s risk 
propensity (Holt and Laury, 2002; Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Post et 
al., 2008). This is especially the case when the expected rewards are large in 
scale (Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992). Based on the living organisations 
thinking, this study assumed that expected rewards would have a significant, 
positive influence on an organisation‟s risk appetite. This assumption is 
confirmed in the case study, which finds that rewards are a highly important 
factor influencing the risk appetite for both organisations. For example, the 
quote of informant P06A on p. 225 indicates that rewards play an 
instrumental role in ensuring the long-term viability of an organisation, 
which is consistent with Mahto and Khanin (2015). Another reason 
underpinning the importance of rewards is that in the process of seeking the 
rewards the organisation will often have to commit a considerable amount 
of resources (informant P07A), which makes it even more important for the 
organisation to secure the expected rewards. 
 
Regarding the influence of rewards on risk appetite, both case organisations 
indicate that they are willing to take greater risks if the expected return on 
investment is greater. This suggests a positive relationship between rewards 
and risk appetite, implying that organisations and human beings appear to 
behave in a similar way. 
 
Secondary „trigger‟ factor - Economy 
 
Economy, which comprises both the general global economic condition and 
the specific economic condition of a particular market, could exert a 
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significant positive influence on an organisation‟s risk appetite. This is 
because the economic conditions, to a large extent, are positively associated 
with the demand for the products and services offered by an organisation 
(Corgel and Woodworth, 2012; Slattery, 2009), which in turn affects the 
organisation‟s performance and the achievement of strategic objectives. 
While the effect of global economy on an organisation‟s risk appetite cannot 
be overlooked, this study finds that the economic condition of a particular 
market seems to have a bigger impact on an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
This is particularly the case for organisation B, where a long-term 
favourable economic outlook in a particular market tends to create a sense 
of optimism in the minds of the decision-makers, thus offsetting the threats 
presented by other risks (e.g. political instability and poor infrastructure) 
and lead to an increased willingness to take risks.  
 
However, economy, regardless of its scope, appeared „less important‟ to 
organisation A. This could be explained from a few perspectives. Since the 
defining feature of the organisation‟s business model is that a significant 
proportion of the organisation‟s hotels are operated under a franchising 
agreement, the organisation receives a relatively stable income from a fairly 
„fixed‟ set of fees paid by the franchisees. Compared to other operation 
modes such as management contract, leasing or owning, the revenue 
generated from franchising appears to be least affected by the economic 
fluctuations of a particular market or on a global scale (Alon et al., 2012; 
Xiao et al., 2008). As such, changes in economy may have little impact on 
the organisation‟s financial performance and would usually not trigger a 
change in the risk appetite.  
 
Another reason could be related to the prominent global presence of the 
organisation. Compared with organisation B, organisation A has a 
considerably wider presence across the world, which effectively mitigates 
the influence of a particular „local‟ economy on the organisation‟s 
performance. In other words, the impact of a „weak‟ economy in a particular 
market could be complemented by a „stronger‟ economy in another market. 
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Therefore, the overall influence on the economy on the organisation‟s 
willingness to take risks is rather insignificant for organisation A. 
 
Secondary „trigger‟ factor – Level of competition 
 
Practitioners and academics have long recognised that the level of 
competition among rivals could influence an organisation‟s willingness to 
take risks. However, the literature has presented mixed evidence towards 
how competition influences the risk appetite. For example, while Boyd and 
De Nicolo (2005) and Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) advocate the 
traditional idea that competition induces further risk taking, Liu et al. (2012) 
and Yeyati and Micco (2007) proved that competition reduces 
organisational risk-taking activities. Further, Tabak et al. (2012) found an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and bank risk, 
suggesting that the relationship between competition and risk appetite 
depends upon the level of competition. 
 
In line with the literature, the case study shows that the level of competition 
in the industry does affect an organisation‟s risk appetite. In particular, 
competition has been found to positively affect an organisation‟s risk 
appetite, therefore supporting Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) and Martinez-
Miera and Repullo (2010). Informants argued that increasing competition 
motivates the organisation to constantly search for new markets and new 
ways of operation, which in turn help the organisation to stay in competition 
with other key industry players. This is compatible with Liu et al. (2012) 
who argued that competition encourages organisational efficiency and 
information sharing, and creates a sense of urgency to continuously improve 
oneself.  
 
Regarding the importance of competition to risk appetite, data analysis 
shows that whilst it is a highly important factor for organisation B, it is less 
important for organisation A. This could be explained by the market 
position of organisation A in comparison with other competitors. In this 
study, organisation A is a market leader in the international hospitality 
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industry and generally outperforms other competitors. The pressure from the 
competition, while being felt by the organisation, might not be strong 
enough to propel more risk-seeking actions. Conversely, organisation B is 
positioned as a market follower, whose strategic decision making is 
contingent more upon the actions of its leading peers. If organisation B is 
not actively responding to the competition, its market position is more likely 
to drop. This finding indicates that the importance of competition to an 
organisation‟s risk appetite is negatively moderated by its competitive 
position. 
 
Secondary „trigger‟ factor – General business development trend 
 
The general business development trend, which in this study refers to a 
specific shift of business focus from mature to emerging markets observed 
in industries other than the hospitality, emerged from the interviews as a 
strong factor that induces risk taking for organisation B. As informant P01B 
explained: 
 
„I think one and I'm not exactly sure how to word it - what are other 
companies doing. Not only hotel companies but in general, what is 
the trend towards development strategy. If we're talking about risk 
appetite, for a while, the past five to ten years there's been this huge 
focus on emerging markets. It's emerging markets, emerging markets, 
and emerging markets. Those kinds of things did it; I think maybe 
subconsciously for a lot of people, it influences our risk appetite to a 
huge degree.‟ (P01B) 
 
While it is apparent that many industries have noticed and capitalised on the 
opportunities presented in the emerging markets over the past two decades 
(Yoder et al., 2016), the decision of organisation B to follow this trend and 
adopt a similar approach to business development appears to be based on 
the specific circumstances of the organisation. In this study the two case 
organisations had large differences in market share and global presence. 
Compared with organisation A, who was the market leader on a global scale, 
it was more challenging for organisation B to grow in the mature and well-
developed markets. However, emerging markets, with its long-term 
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economic outlook, provided a relatively untapped territory for organisation 
B. Nevertheless, organisation B needed to increase its appetite for risk in 
order to accommodate the uncertainty brought by higher levels of political 
instability and less-developed infrastructure in emerging markets. This 
increased risk appetite has consequently rewarded organisation B with a 
strong competitive advantage in those emerging markets compared to its 
larger peers such as organisation A. 
 
5.2.3.3 „Experimentation‟ factors 
 
Secondary „experimentation‟ factor – Need for innovation 
 
Several scholars have linked innovation and firm risk in the organisational 
risk taking literature. Despite the argument of Baysinger and Hoskisson 
(1989) and Chen (2009) that innovation is the outcome of an organisation‟s 
risk appetite, as only firms that are willing to take risks would innovate, 
increasing evidence such as Ottenbacher and Harrington (2010) has shown 
that the need for innovation is likely to encourage an organisation to take 
risks. This is possible in the international hotel industry, because companies 
are under increasing pressure to innovate its product and services in order to 
remain competitive (Fraj et al., 2015; Thomas and Wood, 2014). Since 
innovation requires a considerable investment of financial and human 
resources, an organisation needs to have a higher willingness to accept the 
risks involved, therefore it was expected that the need for innovation would 
be positively associated with the risk appetite. 
 
The finding demonstrates that the impact of the need for innovation on risk 
appetite is organisation-specific. In particular, the need for innovation is an 
important factor that positively drives the risk appetite of organisation A, 
but not for organisation B. In explaining the importance of the need for 
innovation, informant P02A indicated on p. 164 that innovation is a business 
imperative to become long-term sustainable. This idea is consistent with the 
arguments of Chen (2009) and Ottenbacher and Harrington (2010), who 
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stressed that an organisation needs to constantly innovate its product and 
services through R&D activities, or it risks falling behind in the competition.  
 
Nonetheless, the need for innovation might only increase an organisation‟s 
appetite for risks in certain areas, for example, the area of information 
technology. The appetite for risks in other areas, such as guest relations, is 
unlikely to be influenced by the need for innovation. This is also captured in 
the quote of informant P02A on p. 164. 
 
5.3 Interrelationships of risk appetite factors 
 
The case study identifies six interrelationships between different risk 
appetite factors. In Figure 5.1 (p. 185), these interrelationships are presented 
using blue arrow lines connecting the specific components where the related 
factors reside. The existence of these interrelationships may have 
implications for analysing an organisation‟s risk appetite. The following 
briefly summarises these six interrelationships: 
 
 The ambitiousness of objectives is positively related with the risk 
propensity of the organisation‟s key decision makers, which may be 
the BoD, the CEO or the EC. For example, in an organisation (e.g. 
organisation A) where the BoD has the „ultimate responsibility in 
setting the company‟s objectives‟ (P01A), the higher is the BoD risk 
propensity, the more ambitious are the strategic objectives, and thus 
the higher is the risk appetite. If the top decision makers of an 
organisation are the EC rather than the BoD, which is the case of 
organisation B, the risk propensity of the EC and the CEO is likely 
to influence the ambitiousness of objectives. 
 
 The ambitiousness of objectives is also influenced by the demands 
of shareholders and other key stakeholders. For example, informant 
P08A implied that the requirements of an organisation‟s activist 
shareholder and other key stakeholders such as regulators and 
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employees must be taken into account when determining the 
organisation‟s strategic objectives. The ambitiousness of the 
objectives needs to be at a level that reflects the desired level of risk 
taking by shareholders and other key stakeholders. This suggests that 
the ambitiousness of objectives may mediate the relationships 
between shareholder‟s and other stakeholders‟ demands and risk 
appetite. 
 
 The performance targets that an organisation set are influenced by 
the organisation‟s objectives and the level of ambitiousness. 
Informant P02A indicated that an organisation‟s objectives, once set 
by the BoD, will be broken down and translated into measurable 
performance targets for various departments and functions of the 
organisation to benchmark against. Typically, more ambitious 
objectives are more likely to lead to higher performance targets. 
Therefore the organisation may need to increase its risk appetite to 
meet the targets. This could indicate that performance mediates the 
relationship between the ambitiousness of objectives and risk 
appetite. 
 
 An organisation‟s risk capacity is positively influenced by the 
amount of leverage. Because risk capacity concerns an 
organisation‟s financial strength in relation to taking risks, taking on 
more debts (thus resulting a higher leverage) would mean that the 
organisation has more financial capital available for risk taking, 
which enhances the risk capacity. 
 
 The positive relationship between risk capacity and risk appetite may 
be moderated by the risk propensities of the organisation‟s key 
decision makers. The positive relationship between risk capacity and 
risk appetite tends to hold true when key decision makers are at least 
„modest‟ decision makers. If the decision makers are risk-averse, the 
positive relationship between risk capacity and risk appetite may 
become insignificant (informant P08B) or even change into negative, 
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as informant P02A noted: „maybe I am rare. I am risk-averse. Giving 
me more resources would make me even more nervous, strangely.‟ 
 
 The risk propensity of key decision makers may have a moderating 
effect on the positive relationship between risk culture and risk 
appetite. In particular, if key decision makers are risk averse, a 
stronger risk culture may lead to the identification of more risks that 
are uncomfortable for the decision makers, therefore forcing them to 
reduce the organisation‟s risk appetite. 
 
The above interrelationships add a new dimension to the risk appetite 
literature. They particularly provide empirical support to Baird and Thomas 
(1985), who suggested that factors influencing an organisation‟s willingness 
to take risks are not independent from each other but are interrelated. The 
understanding of these interrelationships could facilitate a better analysis 
and articulation of an organisation‟s risk appetite. Since the 
interrelationships in organisation A are more complex than organisation B, 
and that organisation A has a relatively lower risk appetite than organisation 
B, it could be conjectured that the level of complexity of the 
interrelationships is negatively associated with the risk appetite. In other 
words, the more complex are the interrelationships, the lower is the risk 
appetite. The reason is that more complex interrelationships indicate a 
greater number of mediating and/or moderating relationships, which 
complicates the mechanism that underpins the risk appetite and adds more 
uncertainty for decision makers when determining appropriate level for risk 
taking. As decision makers are generally risk-averse (Kim and Buchanan, 
2008; Seo and Sharma, 2014), increasing uncertainty in risk appetite 
consideration is likely to result in a lower willingness to take risks, hence a 
lower risk appetite. 
 
It is worthwhile to note that the interrelationships were not explicitly 
questioned during the case study. They emerged from the interviews 
focused on eliciting factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite, rather 
than understanding their interrelationships. Hence it would be inappropriate 
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to claim that the six interrelationships are exhaustive. As suggested in the 
conceptual framework (Figure 2.4, p. 74) and the „stage one‟ framework 
(Figure 4.2, p. 132), there might be hidden interrelationships that have not 




This chapter discussed and interpreted the primary research findings in the 
light of the literature. Based on a synthesis of the empirical evidence and the 
literature, a unified definition of the risk appetite concept, derived from the 
„end user‟ perspective, was proposed. A new perspective to view risk 
appetite, i.e. the „black hole‟ analogy, was identified and its implications for 
articulating an organisation‟s risk appetite statement were discussed. In 
addition, a „living organisation‟ framework of factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite was developed (Figure 5.1, p. 185). The 
framework illustrates what and how a set of „organisational‟, 
„environmental‟ and „decision-maker‟ factors shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite, as well as the relative importance of each individual factor to the 
risk appetite. The interrelationships between different factors were also 
identified. The framework offers a robust conceptual tool for the 
understanding and analysis of an organisation‟s risk appetite. While the 
factors that influence risk appetite are common across organisations, their 
importance to the risk appetite and the ways in which they influence the risk 
appetite are likely to be different, leading to different organisations 










This chapter presents the conclusion of the study. It explains how the 
research aim and research objectives have been achieved, followed by the 
articulation of this study‟s original contribution to knowledge. The 
limitations of the study are then discussed and the recommendations for 
future research are suggested. The chapter closes with a brief personal 
reflection of the research journey. 
 
6.1 Research aim and objectives  
 
As stated in Chapter One, the Introduction, this study aimed to identify and 
evaluate the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite in the context 
of international hotel industry. To achieve this aim, five research objectives 
were identified: 
 
The first objective of the study was to understand the concept of risk 
appetite and its theoretical underpinnings by critically reviewing the generic 
risk taking literature and the specific risk appetite literature. This objective 
was accomplished in Chapter Two, the Literature Review. Constructs that 
are fundamental to risk appetite, such as risk and risk taking, and the key 
theories underpinning risk taking at both individual and organisational 
levels, were examined. The current state of risk appetite knowledge was 
evaluated and the gap for this study was highlighted. 
 
The second objective of the study was to identify the factors that could 
shape an organisation‟s risk appetite by analysing both the practitioner and 
academic literature and drawing upon the „living organisations‟ thinking. 
This objective was also accomplished in Chapter Two, the Literature 
Review. Several streams of research, i.e. the literature on risk appetite (both 
235 
 
from an academic and a practitioner‟s perspective), the business literature 
on organisational risk taking, and the psychology literature on individual 
risk taking, were critically analysed to identify the factors that might shape 
the risk appetite at both organisational and individual levels. Identified 
factors were mapped onto the „living composition‟ model to construct a 
conceptual framework of factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
 
The third objective, to explore the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite and evaluate their importance by conducting qualitative empirical 
research, was accomplished in Chapter Three, the Methodology, and 
Chapter Four, the Findings. A two-stage fieldwork was carried out from 
January 2013 to November 2015. Stage one was conducted with ten 
internationally recognised risk appetite experts using unstructured in-depth 
interviews. These experts were risk management consultants who provided 
a generic business (and non-hospitality-specific) perspective on risk appetite, 
therefore enabling the researcher to validate and enrich the conceptual 
framework. This revised framework (Figure 4.2, p. 132) was subsequently 
used in stage two (a case study of two international hotel companies with 
seemingly different risk appetites) to inform the investigation of risk 
appetite factors. A total of sixteen semi-structured interviews (eight in each 
organisation), complemented with a paper questionnaire, were conducted 
with corporate executives and risk managers to explore the key factors that 
shape their organisation‟s risk appetite. As a result, two case-specific 
frameworks of factors that shape the risk appetite were developed (Figure 
4.4, p. 141 and Figure 4.5, p. 142). 
 
The fourth objective of the study was to explain the factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. This objective was accomplished in Chapter 
Five, the Discussion. To achieve this objective, the two case-specific 
frameworks (Figure 4.4, p. 141 and Figure 4.5, p. 142) were incorporated 
and the factors that shape the risk appetite were organised into „primary‟, 
„secondary‟ and „tertiary‟ categories based on their relative significance to 
risk appetite. Each factor was then explained as to why it is „important‟ or 
„less important‟ to risk appetite and how it shapes the risk appetite. This 
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discussion was presented in the context of the literature to highlight 
congruencies as well as seeking for explanations for contradictory and 
unexpected findings. 
 
The final objective of the study, to make a theoretical contribution to 
knowledge by proposing a framework for the analysis of an organisation‟s 
risk appetite in the context of hotel industry, was accomplished in Chapter 
Five, the Discussion. A „living organisation‟ framework of factors that 
shape an organisation‟s risk appetite was proposed (Figure 5.1, p. 185), 
which is the main contribution to knowledge of this study. 
 
6.2 Contribution to knowledge 
 
6.2.1 Contribution to theory 
 
Over the last decade the business world has witnessed an increasing use of 
the term „risk appetite‟ (Alix et al., 2015; Baldan et al., 2016; Gontarek, 
2016). In particular, this term has become a popular topic among corporate 
governance regulators, risk management professionals and senior corporate 
decision makers. However, research on risk appetite is still at an early stage, 
and current practitioner-dominated literature often provides inconsistent 
views (Bromiley et al., 2015; Gontarek, 2016). There is a need to alleviate 
the confusion and identify a convergence of diverse opinions. In response to 
the calls for more risk appetite research from an increasing number of 
academics (Aven, 2013; Baldan et al., 2016; Bromiley et al., 2015; Lam, 
2014) and practitioners (CRO Forum, 2015; Hillson and Murray-Webster, 
2012; IRM, 2011; Willis, 2016), this research explored the factors that 
shape an organisation‟s risk appetite in the context of the international hotel 
industry. To the researcher‟s knowledge, this study is among the first 
empirical works on risk appetite conducted in the business management 
field and certainly the first in the context of the international hotel industry. 
It is hoped that the findings (and any subsequent publications) can stimulate 
more scholarly attention towards risk appetite. In particular, this research 




1) Provides a unified definition of risk appetite 
 
A key issue that undermines the development of risk appetite research is the 
lack of a universally agreed definition (Baldan et al., 2016; Bromiley et al., 
2015). Although a wide range of definitions have been provided by 
regulators, management consultancies and other professional risk 
management organisations, there remains no clear consensus on the 
meaning of risk appetite (Baldan et al., 2016; Berlinger and Varadi, 2015). 
For example, existing definitions of risk appetite offered in the literature can 
be broadly grouped into several key themes: the (aggregated) amount or 
level of risk an organisation is prepared to take (Alix et al., 2015; Gontarek, 
2016), the willingness of an organisation in taking risks (Aven, 2013), the 
organisation‟s internal desire to take risk (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 
2012), and a written document of the types and amount of risk an 
organisation is willing to take (Baldan et al., 2016; Berlinger and Varadi, 
2015). In addition, existing risk appetite definitions in the literature are 
almost exclusively proposed by organisations (e.g. regulators and risk 
consultancies) promoting the concept, and there is no definition that is 
developed from the conceptualisations of the actual „end users‟ of risk 
appetite (Bromiley et al., 2015), i.e. corporate executives and risk managers. 
Providing a unified risk appetite definition from the end-user perspective, 
therefore, would be a theoretical contribution to knowledge. 
 
Through in-depth interviewing with the corporate executives and risk 
managers, this study finds that the end users‟ understanding of risk appetite 
varies considerably within and across case organisations (section 4.2.2.1). In 
other words, individual participants do not have a shared understanding of 
the concept of risk appetite. However, the range of definitions provided by 
the participants are broadly consistent with the main themes in the literature, 
such as the „amount (or level) of risks‟ (Alix et al., 2015; Gontarek, 2016), 
the „willingness to take risks‟ (Aven, 2013), and the „organisation‟s internal 
desire to risk taking‟ (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012). This means that 
any individual definition provided in the literature can only offer a partial 
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explanation of risk appetite, therefore indicating a need to synthesise 
existing themes and develop a unified definition of risk appetite. In addition, 
this research demonstrates that organisations have a variable risk appetite, 
which is in constant change depending on changes in the organisation‟s 
internal and external environments. This reflects the „dynamic‟ nature of 
risk appetite, suggesting that the concept of risk appetite has an embedded 
„time‟ dimension and only concerns an organisation‟s desire for risk taking 
at a particular point in time. Incorporating this „time‟ dimension with the 
key themes of the literature, a unified definition of risk appetite is provided 
(p. 181): 
 
Risk appetite refers to a dynamic representation of an organisation‟s 
intrinsic desire for risk taking at a particular point in time in order 
to achieve the organisation‟s current strategic objectives.  
 
Compared to previous risk appetite definitions in the literature (e.g. Aven, 
2013; Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012; Lam, 2014), the above definition 
provides a more practice-grounded conceptualisation of risk appetite, based 
on the real-life accounts of the „end users‟. By incorporating their 
perspective with key themes of the literature, it is hopeful that this unified 
risk appetite definition can effectively alleviate the conceptual confusion 
experienced by practitioners and researchers. 
 
2) Identifies a novel perspective to view risk appetite – the „black hole‟ 
analogy 
 
Due to the elusive nature of risk appetite and the lack of consensus on its 
meaning, different analogies, particularly Hillson and Murray-Webster‟s 
(2012) „physical appetite for food and drink‟ and IRM‟s (2011) „fight-or-
flight response‟, emerged in the literature to help practitioners better 
understand the concept. While these two analogies provide interesting 
angles to approach the risk appetite concept, they are derived from 
conceptualisations of management consultants, and therefore do not reflect 
how the real „end users‟, i.e. corporate executives and risk managers, 
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approach the concept. Such a limitation was also noted by Bromiley et al. 
(2015), who called for risk appetite research from the end users‟ perspective.  
 
Addressing this limitation, this research identified a novel risk appetite 
analogy from the perspective of corporate participants, namely the „black 
hole‟ (section 5.1.3). This analogy suggests that an understanding of the risk 
appetite concept can benefit from the study of Astronomy, in that an 
organisation‟s risk appetite can be viewed as a „black hole‟ within the 
universe. Because the „black hole‟ is invisible and difficult to measure in a 
direct manner, scientists attempt to achieve an understanding by examining 
its impact on the surrounding objects, e.g. how certain planets move. In the 
same vein, one can understand risk appetite by examining its impact on the 
organisation, which is reflected in a variety of behavioural displays of the 
organisation, i.e. the choices that the organisation makes for its entirety and 
for its components or aspects of operation, such as setting targets and 
strategy, delegation of authority, capital investment criteria, allocation of 
resources, and structure of governance. The choices an organisation makes 
in these aspects provide valuable insights about the effects that risk appetite 
has on the organisation, and enable decision makers to establish an 
understanding of the acceptable range of risk-taking limits and/or situations 
where a particular choice becomes inappropriate. An accumulation of this 
knowledge for a prolonged period of time can eventually contribute to a 
more comprehensive understanding of the organisation‟s risk appetite.  
 
In conclusion, the „black hole‟ analogy makes a distinct theoretical 
contribution to risk appetite literature by providing a new perspective to 
approach this rather elusive concept. The various behavioural aspects of risk 
appetite suggested by corporate participants (section 5.1.3) can be used to 
identify meaningful risk appetite indicators/measures, which are currently 







3) Proposes a „living organisation‟ framework of factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite 
 
While the use of the term „risk appetite‟ in the business world has seen an 
exponential growth over the last decade (Alix et al., 2015; Baldan et al., 
2016; Gontarek, 2016), limited research has been undertaken on this topic. 
Existing risk appetite literature appears fragmented and mainly concentrates 
on the definition (Aven, 2013; Felton, 2010; Gontarek, 2016) and the ways 
in which a risk appetite statement can be articulated (Alix et al., 2015; 
Baldan et al., 2016; Lamanda and Voneki, 2015). However, little attention 
has been given to investigate the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite. While some practitioner publications (CRO Forum, 2015; FRC, 
2014; Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012; IRM, 2011) have identified a 
number of possible factors (e.g. risk capacity, objectives, risk management 
capability, etc.), it remains unclear as to how and why those factors 
influence an organisation‟s risk appetite. To date there has been no 
academic study that formally investigates the factors that shape an 
organisation‟s risk appetite. Addressing this gap in the literature, therefore, 
can help academics and practitioners better understand and analyse the 
concept of risk appetite. It also helps to raise the awareness of regulators 
that an organisation‟s risk appetite is not „a static picture‟ (Baldan et al., 
2016), but is in constant change, and therefore needs to be monitored and 
regularly reviewed. 
 
Incorporating the case study findings with the literature, a „living 
organisation‟ framework of factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite 
was developed (Figure 5.1, p. 185). The framework illustrates what and how 
a set of „organisational‟, „environmental‟ and „decision-maker‟ factors shape 
an organisation‟s risk appetite. Organisational factors include those relevant 
to an organisation‟s internal characteristics, functions, processes and 
systems, which are further categorised into „identity‟, „knowledge‟, 
„strategy‟, „information and communication system‟, „internal standards and 
processes‟ and „perception of the environment‟ factors. Environmental 
factors contain external forces residing in the organisation‟s business 
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environment, as well as specific processes and/or procedures an 
organisation engages with in order to interact with its environment, which 
are further classified as „triggers‟, „experimentation‟ and „interactive 
processes and communication with the environment‟ factors. Decision-
maker factors, which are also known as „boundary elements‟, encompass 
those relating to the characteristics of an organisation‟s top decision makers 
as well as the design of their remuneration. Overall, the „living organisation‟ 
framework (Figure 5.1, p. 185) extends current risk appetite literature and 
provides a robust means for understanding and analysis of risk appetite. 
 
One distinct feature of the „living organisation‟ framework (Figure 5.1, p. 
185) is the explicit indication of the significance of individual factors to risk 
appetite, expressed through the categorisation of „primary‟, „secondary‟ and 
„tertiary‟ factors. „Primary‟ factors are key or highly important factors 
shaping an organisation‟s risk appetite. They are the prime considerations 
when understanding and/or analysing an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
„Secondary‟ factors are also key or highly important factors, but their 
significance tends to be organisation-specific. In other words, a secondary 
factor that is highly important for one organisation may appear of little or no 
importance for another. As such, secondary factors need to be analysed after 
the consideration of primary factors. „Tertiary‟ factors are those that 
influence the risk appetite, but the level of significance is much less than 
primary and secondary factors. Therefore, tertiary factors need to be 
considered after primary and secondary factors. Overall, this importance-
based classification provides a more structured approach for prioritisation 
and analysis of factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
 
Another key feature of the „living organisation‟ framework (Figure 5.1, p. 
185) is the identification of six interrelationships between different risk 
appetite factors (section 5.3). The factors relevant to these interrelationships 
include „ambitiousness of objectives‟, „CEO risk propensity‟, „EC risk 
propensity‟, „BoD risk propensity‟, „shareholder demands‟, „other 
stakeholder demands‟, „risk capacity‟, „risk culture‟, „performance‟ and 
„leverage‟. The interrelationships demonstrate that factors that shape an 
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organisation‟s risk appetite are not independent from each other but are 
closely related. The relationship between a particular factor and the risk 
appetite may be moderated or mediated by another factor. An understanding 
of these interrelationships can facilitate a better analysis of an organisation‟s 
risk appetite.  
 
6.2.2 Implications for practitioners 
 
As highlighted in the preceding section, this study advances the risk appetite 
literature by making three key contributions to theory. For practitioners (e.g. 
corporate executives and risk managers), these theoretical contributions are 
crucial in helping them better understand the concept and find ways to 
document and monitor their organisation‟s risk appetite. The key 
implications for practitioners are articulated as below: 
 
1) Provides a consensual definition of risk appetite to alleviate 
confusion among practitioners  
 
One of the key challenges that risk managers and corporate executives often 
encounter in relation to risk appetite is the lack of a consistent 
understanding about the concept throughout their organisations (Baldan et 
al., 2016; CRO Forum, 2015; Lam, 2014). This inconsistency is also found 
in this study as the case study participants expressed a range of different 
conceptualisations of risk appetite. Current risk appetite literature has also 
been ineffective in resolving this issue as different contributors appear to be 
insisting on their own definitions (e.g. Aven, 2013; Hillson and Murray-
Webster, 2012; IRM, 2011). By synthesising various conceptualisations of 
the case study participants, this research provides an integrated, consensual 
definition of risk appetite (p.181) that is firmly grounded in the viewpoints 
of the „end users‟. Corporate executives and risk managers may adopt this 
definition and communicate it across all levels of the organisation to achieve 
a consistent understanding. Corporate governance regulators (such as the 
FRC and the FSA), standards organisations (such as the ISO and the BSI) 
and professional risk management bodies (such as the IRM and the RIMS) 
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can use the concept to deliver a consistent message in their future guidance 
on risk appetite. 
 
2) Offers an approach for the identification of risk appetite measures  
 
Apart from the definition inconsistency, the invisible and elusive nature of 
risk appetite itself has made the concept extremely difficult for practitioners 
to comprehend (CRO Forum, 2015; Lam, 2014). Due to the increasing 
regulatory pressure, a key challenge concerning today‟s risk managers is to 
articulate their organisation‟s risk appetite statement (Baldan et al., 2016; 
Gontarek, 2016). The „black hole‟ analogy of risk appetite offers a 
structured approach to tackle this challenge. Corporate executives and risk 
managers can use this analogy to identify key components and/or 
operational aspects of their organisation where the impact of risk appetite 
can be observed and possibly measured, such as setting targets and strategy, 
delegation of authority, capital investment guidelines, allocation of 
resources and structure of governance, and then to record the decision 
choices that are made in these components/aspects on a regular basis. An 
accumulation of these observations over time can contribute to an 
understanding of the types and amount of risk that are deemed appropriate 
for the organisation in various components/operational aspects, i.e. the risk 
appetite measures, so that appropriate quantitative limits and/or qualitative 
narratives can be articulated for the risk appetite statement. 
 
3) Highlights the need for organisations to update their risk appetite 
statement on a regular basis 
 
The increasing regulatory pressure for companies to produce a documented 
risk appetite statement (Baldan et al., 2016; Gontarek, 2016), combined 
with the growing consultancy and academic methodologies on constructing 
such a statement (e.g. Alix et al., 2015; FSB, 2013; Dillon et al., 2011), can 
lead to a misconception among corporate executives and risk managers that 
the risk appetite statement is the final „outcome‟. It appears that many 
regulators, consultants and academics (e.g. Baldan et al., 2016) have 
244 
 
overlooked the idea that an organisation‟s risk appetite is not static, but 
continually changes according to what is happening in the organisation‟s 
internal and external contexts (Georgousopoulou et al., 2014; Gontarek, 
2016; Lam, 2014).  
 
The findings of this research, in particular the „living organisation‟ 
framework of risk appetite factors (Figure 5.1, p. 185), confirm the 
„dynamic‟ nature of risk appetite. Informants revealed that risk appetite has 
an embedded „time dimension‟, meaning that the types and amount of risk 
that are comfortable to take as stated in the risk appetite statement is likely 
to be different at a later point in time. The continuous use of the „out-of-date‟ 
risk appetite statement can therefore result in inappropriate decisions. 
Corporate governance regulators, consultants and academics need to 
recognise this issue and explicitly communicate to organisations that a 
documented risk appetite statement is not the „end product‟ of the risk 
appetite process; instead, organisations must closely monitor their risk 
appetite and regularly update the risk appetite statement in the light of 
internal and external changes. 
 
4) Provides a basis for developing a risk appetite monitoring system as 
well as a tool for modifying the risk appetite 
 
The „living organisation‟ framework (Figure 5.1, p. 185) demonstrates the 
significance and the ways in which a combination of „organisational‟, 
„decision-maker‟ and „environmental‟ factors shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite. It provides corporate executives and risk managers with a basis to 
design a risk appetite monitoring system, where the individual factors 
depicted in the framework can be used to monitor internal and external 
changes that could trigger an immediate review and update of the risk 
appetite statement. 
 
Equally, the „living organisation‟ framework (Figure 5.1, p. 185) also offers 
the opportunity for the development of a managerial toolkit, which can be 
used by risk managers, EC or BoD to proactively modify their 
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organisation‟s risk appetite. Once all factors of the framework are validated 
in the context of an organisation, risk managers and corporate executives 
should be able to identify particular factors over which the organisation has 
control. Because the importance of the factors and the ways in which they 
shape the risk appetite are identified, those „controllable‟ factors can be seen 
as „levers‟ that allow decision makers the freedom to either enhance or 
weaken the organisation‟s risk appetite. Some example „levers‟ may include: 
strategic objectives, performance targets, leverage, risk capacity, 
transparency of actions, performance-based remuneration and CEO 
emotions. Having the ability to proactively alter its own risk appetite to an 
appropriate level is critical to offset any undesirable risk appetite 
fluctuations caused by uncontrollable changes, particularly those arising 
from the organisation‟s external context. 
 
6.2.3 Contribution to methodology 
 
A key methodological contribution of this study is the use of the „living 
organisations‟ thinking and the „living composition‟ model (section 2.4) to 
analyse the concept of risk appetite, which suggests a new way of thinking 
for investigating organisational behavioural phenomenon and its underlying 
mechanism. Although risk appetite was an under-researched topic at the 
organisational level, similar concepts were studied more extensively at the 
individual level. The „living organisations‟ thinking (de Geus, 1997; Tracy, 
1994; Vancouver, 1996; Wheatley and Kellner-Rogers, 1995; Wolfe, 2011) 
provided a robust conceptual basis that enabled the study of organisational-
level concepts to build on individual-level constructs. The findings of this 
study also confirmed the structure depicted in the „living composition‟ 
model (Maula, 2006) as a robust reflection of the practice. The model has 
broad applicability as a descriptive schema for organisations, which can 
serve as a guide for designing and interpreting empirical organisation 





6.3 Research limitations 
 
Acknowledging and discussing the limitations of a study provides the 
researcher with the opportunity to reflect on the research process and 
consider ways in which the research could be improved (Altinay et al., 2015; 
Creswell, 2008; Merriam and Tisdell, 2015). It also enables the researcher 
to recognise the extent to which the research findings can be generalised to 
other contexts (Gummesson, 2014; Mertens, 2014; Willig, 2013). 
 
A limitation that is often discussed in qualitative research concerns the size 
and/or diversity of the research participants (Merriam and Tisdell, 2015; 
Myers, 2013). Perhaps a similar argument could be that this research has 
relied on a relatively small number of participants in both case organisations. 
Although it might be better to interview more participants, the actual size 
(eight participants in each organisation) of the participants in this research 
was the best result the researcher could achieve. Concerning the diversity of 
the participants, while it would be helpful to interview the top decision 
makers in both organisations, i.e. the CEO, CFO and the Chairman of the 
BoD (due to the belief that those people are directly involved in the strategic 
decision making and are likely to have a more insightful view of the 
organisation‟s risk appetite), in reality it was learnt that access to those top 
decision makers was impossible for the researcher. Even the research 
participants themselves were unable to approach those leaders directly, 
despite their seniority within the organisation. Additionally, whilst it might 
be useful to interview participants from operating functions other than Risk 
Management (in organisation A), access to those people was very much at 
the discretion of the „gatekeeper‟, who unfortunately thought that colleagues 
in other functions do not possess the required depth of knowledge on risk 
appetite. 
 
Another traditional limitation of qualitative research is the limited 
generalisability of the research findings (Mertens, 2014; Willig, 2013). Due 
to the scarcity of risk appetite research, an exploratory, qualitative research 
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approach was chosen to achieve the research aim. Whilst this qualitative 
study offers a rich description of the research phenomenon, one can argue 
that the research findings are only valid in the specific research context (i.e. 
two international hotel companies), thus cannot be generalised to other 
contexts, such as to other hotel companies, or to companies in other 
industries (e.g. financial services, healthcare, energy, etc.). However, both 
organisations in this research are publicly listed multinational companies; 
although they operate in the hotel industry, they are essentially no different 
with other companies in the stock market, since all companies have highly 
similar corporate structures and are subject to the same market rules and 
regulations. In addition, all companies in the stock market, regardless of the 
nature of their industries, are often cross-compared by financial analysts and 
investors using the same measures. This suggests that it is possible the 
findings of this research can be generalised to other international hotel 
companies and also to companies of other industries. In particular, the 
proposed risk appetite definition, the „black hole‟ analogy and the „living 
organisation‟ framework of risk appetite factors (Figure 5.1, p. 185) are 
generalisable, although the particular influence and the importance of 
individual factors, as well as the interrelationships may be different across 
companies and industries. 
 
6.4 Recommendations for future research 
 
This exploratory, qualitative study identified and evaluated the factors that 
shape an organisation‟s risk appetite in the context of international hotel 
industry, and proposed a „living organisation‟ framework of risk appetite 
factors (Figure 5.1, p. 185). A natural progression for future research would 
be to conduct a large-scale quantitative study to statistically test the 
framework, either in the hotel industry or in other contexts.   
 
Amid the increasing regulatory demands for organisations to have a 
documented risk appetite statement, to date effective guidance is still limited 
to help risk managers and corporate executives complete this task. The 
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„black hole‟ analogy identified in this research provides a new way of 
thinking to approach this challenge, through a focus on examining the 
impacts of risk appetite on the entire organisation and its various 
components. Future research can employ this „black hole‟ analogy and seeks 
to identify the key organisational components/aspects where the impacts of 
risk appetite are mostly reflected, as well as the specific measures in those 
components/aspects. 
 
6.5 Personal reflection of the research journey 
 
This research endeavour has taken six years, during which there were smiles, 
tears and long periods of isolation and endurance. Nevertheless, it has been 
one of the best six years of my life, during which I was fortunate to have 
had the opportunity and intellectual freedom to explore and try out a range 
of approaches for undertaking this research. For instance, the research 
design of this study has gone through a number of changes. From the 
selection of research approach, research strategy to the selection of sample, 
data collection methods, and finally to the data analysis approach, changes 
were constantly introduced into the study, either by the reflection of myself 
or based on the advice of the supervisors. Even the layout of the chapters 
and the indicative word counts had been significantly different throughout 
the various stages of this journey. While each change meant that more time 
needs to be added to the overall timeline, I was able to take it positively and 
see it as a valuable opportunity for me to become an even better researcher, 
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My name is Xiaolei (Nathan) Zhang and I am a PhD student at the Oxford 
School of Hospitality Management, Oxford Brookes University. I am doing 
a doctoral research on risk appetite and aim to find out the underlying 
factors that shape an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
 
At this stage, I have reviewed the relevant literature and am ready to collect 
data. As a renowned expert and a thought-leader in risk management and 
particularly in risk appetite, it would be immensely helpful if you could 
agree to take part in a face to face interview. It will take about an hour and a 
half. All you need to do is to share your knowledge and experience in 
defining and articulating an organisation‟s risk appetite.  
 
The interview may take place either in a public place at your choice, e.g. a 
cafe, or in your place of work at a mutually convenient date and time. If you 
allow, the interview will be audio-recorded. Full interview transcript will be 
sent to you via email for final approval and/or amendments in 48 hours after 
the interview. You will also receive a copy of the summary of findings 
when the research is completed, which might be useful for you. All 
information you provide in the interview will be anonymous and strictly 
confidential, and your name and your organisation will not be identified 
anywhere in the research.  
 
If you are interested, please let me know by either email or telephone (my 
details are provided below). I will then contact you to arrange a mutually 
convenient time and venue for the interview. I would also be grateful if you 
could forward this email to anyone that you think might be interested in this 
research. 
 
I appreciate that you taking time to read this email. Should you have any 




PhD Student in Strategic Risk Management 
Oxford School of Hospitality Management 
Oxford Brookes University Oxford, OX3 0BP, UK 













As you might have already learn from XXX, I am conducting my doctoral 
research into risk appetite at Oxford Brookes University. XXX has agreed to 
do an interview with me in January to share his perspective on risk appetite. 
Similarly, I would also like to invite you to an interview to talk about your 
understanding of the factors which shape an organisation's risk appetite.  
 
The interview may take place either in a public place at your choice, e.g. a 
cafe, or in your place of work at a mutually convenient date and time. If you 
allow, the interview will be audio-recorded. Full interview transcript will be 
sent to you via email for final approval and/or amendments in 48 hours after 
the interview. You will also receive a copy of the summary of findings 
when the research is completed, which might be useful for you. All 
information you provide in the interview will be anonymous and strictly 
confidential, and your name and your organisation will not be identified 
anywhere in the research.  
 









Appendix 3.2 Information sheet for risk consultants 
 
You are being invited to participate in a research project, exploring the factors that 
influence the risk appetite of an organisation, and to take part in a face to face 
interview on this topic. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The study aims to identify and evaluate the factors that shape an organisation‟s risk 
appetite. Risk appetite is broadly defined as the amount and types of risk an 
organisation is willing to take in pursuit of its strategic objectives. It has recently 
been the focus among regulators and regularly tops the business agendas. Latest 
regulations require that all companies must clearly define and articulate their risk 
appetite in a formal statement. However, most companies have failed to do so, and 
one particular reason is believed to be that the factors that influence a company‟s 
risk appetite are unknown. Existing views from practitioners seem inconsistent and 
intuition-based and also need academic scrutiny. 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You are invited to participate, because you are a recognised expert in risk appetite 
and your experience in its articulation are particularly relevant to the study. The 
perspectives you will provide on developing an organisation‟s risk appetite will be 
highly valuable for the next stage of the research as well as the final development 
of the framework of factors that influence an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
Do I have to take part? 
Your participation in the research is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide 
whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw 
at any time and without giving a reason. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to participate, you will be invited to join a face to face interview, 
where you will answer and comment on a number of questions on articulating an 
organisation‟s risk appetite and share your knowledge and experience with regard 
to this topic. The interview will last for approximately an hour and a half. If you 
allow, the interview will be audio-recorded. Full interview transcript will be sent to 
you via email for final approval and/or amendments around 48 hours after the 
interview. The only cost that will incur to you is the time required for the interview. 
Other than that, it is anticipated that you will not be exposed to any physical, 
psychological, social, legal or economic risks. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Whilst there are no direct benefits of participating in the study, you will contribute 
on various issues related to the articulation of an organisation‟s risk appetite. The 
interview will generate new ideas and create general awareness of the possible 
factors that influence an organisation‟s risk appetite. On the completion of the 
study, a copy of the summary of the findings will be provided to you, which may 




Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? 
All information you provide will be treated as strictly confidential and will be 
subject to legal limitations. It will be anonymous, and you will not be identified 
anywhere in the research, unless you give consent to do so. The data generated in 
the course of the research will only be available to the researcher and will be 
retained in accordance with the University‟s policy of Academic Integrity and kept 
securely in paper and electronic form for the period of up to ten years after the 
completion of the research, after which it will be destroyed. 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
If you decide to participate, please express your interest to the researcher by either 
email or telephone. The researcher‟s contact details can be found at the end of this 
information sheet. You will then be contacted by the researcher to arrange a 
mutually convenient time and venue for the interview. You will also need to sign a 
consent form, which will be forwarded onto the Chair of the University Research 
Ethics Committee at Oxford Brookes University. 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the interviews will be used to test and validate the interview 
questions and the conceptual framework and inform the next stage of the project. 
The results may also be used in work-in-progress papers that will be submitted to 
academic and/or practitioner conferences and subsequently to academic and 
practitioner journals. 
Who is organizing and funding the research? 
This study is being conducted by Mr. Xiaolei (Nathan) Zhang, currently a PhD 
student at Oxford School of Hospitality Management, Faculty of Business. The 
research is self-funded and under the supervision of Professor Conrad Lashley, 
Director of Research and Consultancy (conradlashley@aol.com, tel: 01159233855) 
and Dr. Alexandros Paraskevas, Senior Lecturer in Strategic Risk Management 
(aparaskevas@brookes.ac.uk, tel: 01865 483835). 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been approved by the University Research Ethics Committee, 
Oxford Brookes University. 
 
Contact for further information 
Mr. Xiaolei (Nathan) Zhang, Oxford School of Hospitality Management, Faculty 
of Business, Oxford Brookes University, Gipsy Lane, Oxford, OX3 0BP 
Tel: +44(0) 1865 483858 Fax: +44(0) 1865 483878 
Email: xiaolei.zhang-2010@brookes.ac.uk 
If you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, 
please contact the Chair of the University Research Ethics Committee on 
ethics@brookes.ac.uk 









My name is Nathan Zhang and I am a Senior Lecturer in Risk Management 
within Hospitality and Tourism Industry at Oxford Brookes University.  
 
As you may already know from []'s email, I am in the process of completing 
my doctoral study, part of which is a case study of [case organisation], 
which aims to understand the concept of "corporate risk appetite" and the 
factors that influence it. As an integral part of []'s risk team, it would be 
great if you could take part in the research by sharing your thoughts and 
perspectives on this matter. Your participation will make a difference to the 
risk management community and your thoughts will contribute towards a 
greater understanding of this often difficult and confusing topic. 
 
In order for you to know more detailed information about this research, I 
have attached a 'Participant Information Sheet'. Also attached are the 
questionnaire and the interview questions, if you wish to review them before 
making a decision whether or not to participate. 
 
Thanks for your time in reading this email and I look forward to hearing 







Appendix 3.4 Participant information sheet for case 
organisation participants 
 
You are being invited to participate in a doctoral research study, exploring the 
factors that influence a company‟s „risk appetite‟, i.e. the amount and types of risk 
a company is willing to take to achieve its strategic objectives. Before you decide 
whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what it entails. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The study aims to identify and qualitatively evaluate the factors that influence a 
company‟s „risk appetite‟. So far a list of influential factors has been identified, but 
the nature of the influence and the relative importance of each factor to risk 
appetite remain unanswered. I hope with your help the answer will emerge. 
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited because your knowledge and experience in managing risk at 
project and corporate levels are particularly relevant to this study. The insights and 
perspectives you will provide will be highly valuable for achieving the study 
purpose and for the final development of a framework of factors that influence a 
company‟s risk appetite.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
Your participation in the research is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide 
whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw 
at any time and without giving a reason. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to participate, you will first need to complete a questionnaire, 
followed by a face-to-face interview or Skype interview, where you will comment 
on a number of questions regarding your company‟s risk appetite. The interview 
will last around 40 minutes. If you allow, the interview will be audio-record. Full 
interview transcript will be sent to you via email for final approval and/or 
amendments. The only cost that will incur to you is the time required for 
completing the questionnaire and the interview. Other than that, I am confident that 
you will not be exposed to any physical, psychological, social, legal or economic 
risks. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Whilst there are no direct benefits of participating in the study, the questionnaire 
and the interview will create general awareness and an initial understanding of the 
possible factors that influence your own company‟s risk appetite. Once this study is 
completed, a copy of the findings summary will be provided to you, which may be 
useful for your work and your company. 
 
Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? 
All information you provide will be treated as strictly confidential. It will be 
anonymous, and you will not be identified anywhere in the research. The data 
generated in the course of the research will only be available to the researcher and 
used for academic purposes only. The data will be retained in accordance with the 
University‟s policy of Academic Integrity and kept securely in paper and electronic 
form for the period of up to ten years after the completion of the research, after 




What should I do if I want to take part? 
If you decide to participate, please contact the researcher directly by either email or 
telephone, whose contact details can be found at the end of this information sheet. 
You will then be contacted by the researcher, who will send you the questionnaire 
and arrange a mutually convenient time for the interview. You will also need to 
sign a consent form, which will be forwarded onto the Chair of the University 
Research Ethics Committee at Oxford Brookes University. 
 
Who is organising the research? 
This study is being conducted by Nathan Zhang, Senior Lecturer at Oxford School 
of Hospitality Management, Oxford Brookes University. The study is supervised 
by Mr. David Bowie (decbowie@brookes.ac.uk, tel: +44 (0) 1865 483890) and 
Prof. Alexandros Paraskevas, (alexandros.paraskevas@uwl.ac.uk, tel: +44 (0) 20 
8231 2279). 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been approved by the Research Ethics Committee of Oxford 
Brookes University. 
 
Contact for further information 
Nathan Zhang, Oxford School of Hospitality Management, Oxford Brookes 
University, Gipsy Lane, Oxford, OX3 0BP 
Tel: +44(0) 1865 483801 +44 (0) 7544880012Email: nathan.zhang@brookes.ac.uk 
 
If you have any concerns with regards to the way in which the study has been 
conducted, please contact the Chair of the University Research Ethics Committee 
on ethics@brookes.ac.uk.  
 








My name is Nathan Zhang and I am a Senior Lecturer from Oxford School 
of Hospitality Management, Oxford Brookes University. I am working with 
Professor Alexandros Paraskevas from London School of Hospitality and 
Tourism, University of West London, on a research project that evaluates 
the risk behaviour of some of the biggest hotel companies in the world. 
 
We have designed a short questionnaire, based on a study on organisational 
risk taking propensity by Dr. Ian Harwood and his colleagues from 
Southampton University, to evaluate a company‟s risk behaviour (risk-
averse, risk-neutral or risk-seeking). As a named analyst for [case 
organisation], we are really interested in your views on various aspects of 
[]‟s risk behaviour. Therefore, we would be grateful if you could kindly 
complete our questionnaire, which should not take you more than 5 minutes. 
Your response is completely anonymous. 
 
You can find the questionnaire via 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/R9DKK9B . If you have any queries, 
please do not hesitate to contact either of us. I can be contacted via email 
nathan.zhang@brookes.ac.uk or phone on 01865 483801. Professor 
Alexandros Paraskevas can be contacted via 
alexandros.paraskevas@uwl.ac.uk .Thank you in advance and we look 






Appendix 3.6 Questionnaire for financial analysts 
 
Company Risk Behaviour Evaluation Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire is designed to evaluate a company‟s risk behaviour (risk-
averse, risk-neutral or risk-seeking) in its competitive environment. There 
are 10 risk behaviour attributes, and below is a brief description of each one. 








„Risk approach‟ Extent to which risks are managed proactively, ranging from 
reactive „crisis management‟ to proactive „planned management‟ 
  
„Risk horizon‟ Time period between identifying a potential risk and the 
expected (or actual) realisation of that risk, ranging from „short 




Level of management intervention in strategy implementation, 
ranging from „micro-management‟ where the level of 
intervention is high, e.g. details of implementation are always 
requested by management, to „macro-management‟ where there 





Level of regulation in the external environment the company 




Level of support for risk taking, ranging from „cautious‟ where 
risk taking is generally discouraged or has to be very cautious, to 




Whether the term „risk‟ is viewed as having „negative‟ or 
„positive‟ connotations by the company 
  
„Risk reviews‟ Extent to which risks are frequently updated, ranging from 
„static reviews‟ where risks are only identified and assessed 
once, to „dynamic reviews‟ where identified risks are 
continuously monitored and updated 
  
„Risk rhetoric‟ Nature of language used to communicate potential risks, ranging 
from „indirect language‟, e.g. „there is a potential of X 
happening, but if we do Y and Z, it will be minimised‟, to „direct 









Nature of individual ownership of risks, ranging from „forced 









Positions on the rating scale 
                    Very much                    Very much 
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Appendix 3.7 Questionnaire for case organisation 
participants 
 
An Investigation of Factors that Influence Corporate Risk Appetite 
  
This questionnaire is a part of a doctoral research study being undertaken at 
Oxford Brookes University. The purpose of the research is to explore the 
influence of various factors on [case organisation]‟s „risk appetite‟, i.e. the 
amount and types of risk that [] is willing to take in order to achieve its 
strategic objectives. Although it appears that [] does not have a formal risk 
appetite „statement‟, risk appetite manifests itself in many aspects of []‟s 
behaviour. For example, how risk-taking decisions are made; how risks are 
managed, controlled and governed; what performance targets are set and 
how resources are allocated; what operating „lines‟ the Board and senior 
management would not wish to cross, and where senior management would 
need to be notified. This is the company‟s risk appetite. 
 
As you will see, there are three questions for each factor. Most factors 
should be self-explanatory; some, where a clarification might be needed, are 
marked with an asterisk and an explanation is provided at the end of the 
questionnaire. If you find anything unclear or have any questions, we can 
discuss it in the follow-up interview, which I would like to record with your 
permission. 
 
This questionnaire is anonymous and no personal information will be 
collected. All answers you provide will be treated as strictly confidential 
and used for academic purposes only. 
  
Thank you very much for taking part. 
 
Nathan Zhang 
Senior Lecturer in Hospitality and Tourism 
Oxford School of Hospitality Management 
Oxford Brookes University 
Gipsy Lane 
Oxford OX3 0BP 
Tel: +44 (0) 1865 483 801 














Please answer the following questions for each factor by ticking the relevant 
boxes: 
Q1. Does this factor influence []‟s risk appetite?
1
 
Q2. Does an increase in the factor increase or decrease []‟s risk appetite? 
Q3. How much would you rate the level of the factor‟s influence on a scale, 
ranging from 1 „very low influence‟ to 5 „very high influence‟? 
 
Note: Explanations of factors marked with „*‟ can be found at the end of 
this questionnaire. 
 
Factor Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 
 Yes No Increase Decrease 1 2 3 4 5 




         




         
Degree of masculinity 
in leadership style* 
         
Company debt          
Company self-
awareness and 
knowledge of its 
environment 
         
Company‟s past risk 
taking experience 
         
Ambitiousness of 
strategic objectives 
         
Company risk 
capacity* 
         
Company risk 
management capability 
         
Frequency of risk 
reporting 
         
Perceived riskiness in 
industry sector 
         
Information flow to the 
Board* 
         
Transparency of 
actions* 
         
Board‟s propensity to 
take risk 
         
                                                 
1
 If the answer is no, you may move to the next factor; if yes, please continue to 




propensity to take risk 
         
CEO‟s propensity to 
take risk 
         
Positive mood of the 
CEO* 
         
Board diversity          
Board size          
Management 
incentives for risk 
taking 
         
Board sensitivity to 
environmental change 
         
Company alliances          
Number of brands          
Shareholder pressure          
Other stakeholder 
pressure 
         
Industry reward-to-risk 
ratio* 
         
Global economic 
growth 
         
International industry 
regulation 
         
International industry 
competition 
         
Company overall 
performance* 
         
Investment in 
innovation 








Degree of masculinity in 
leadership 
The extent to which a company exhibits the 
attributes of a masculine leadership, including 
assertiveness, forcefulness, dominance, 
competitiveness and being task-oriented. 
  
Company risk capacity The maximum amount of risks a company can 
afford to take in order to achieve its strategic 
objectives. It is often expressed in monetary 
terms, as the maximum money a company can 
afford to lose in risk taking. 
  
Information flow to the 
Board  
The speed and quality of strategically relevant 
information provided to the Board of Directors 
for decision making. 
  
Transparency of actions  The clarity of corporate-level actions to 
company stakeholders, in terms of decision 
making, strategic planning and implementation. 
  
Positive mood of the 
CEO 
The CEO‟s positive state of mind when taking 




The proportion of expected reward compared 




A company‟s performance level relative to key 
performance targets, which includes but not 
limited to financial targets. 
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Appendix 3.8 Interview guide for case organisation 
participants 
 
Interview Guide for Corporate Respondents 
 
1. Question: What is your role in [case organisation]? 
Probe: What are your responsibilities? How long have you worked in 
this company? Where did you work before? 
 
2. Question: How do you understand the concept of „risk appetite‟? 
 
3. Question: Regarding the questionnaire, are there any factors you find 
unclear and would like me to clarify? 
 
4. Question: Are there any factors which you think influence []‟s risk 
appetite but not listed in the questionnaire? If so, what are they? 
Probe: How would they influence the company‟s appetite for risk? How 
would you rate their level of influence on a scale? 
 
5. Question: What are the most important factors that shape []‟s appetite 
for risk? Why? 
 
6. Opening: This study suggests that organisations behave like humans 
when it comes to risk decision making, hence the term 'risk appetite'. 
 
Question A: In your view, when it comes to risk taking, does [] 
normally behave like a human i.e. exhibits some degree of spontaneity, 
unpredictability and perhaps sometimes a little irrationality, or does the 
company usually operate in an ordered, well-informed and rational 
manner? Can you give me any examples of the company's behaviour 
when taking risk decisions? 
 
Question B: In what way is the risk-taking behaviour of [] similar (or 
different) to human behaviour? Can you explain why this behaviour is 
similar (or different) to human behaviour? 
 
Question C: Are there any similarities or differences between []‟s 
approach to risk taking and your own approach to risk taking? Why do 
you think this happens? 
 
7. Question: What are the most important factors that shape your own 
appetite for risk? Why? 
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Appendix 3.9 Questionnaire response overview for case 
organisation participants 
 
The table presents an overview of the questionnaire responses. The numbers 
in columns of Question 1, 2 and 3 indicate the actual number of participants 
giving that particular answer. The factors are arranged into various „bands‟ 
based on the number of „YES‟ responses in Q1; then within each „band‟ the 




Factor Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 (Q3) 





















8 0 7 1  1 2 2 3 5 4 3.875 
Company risk 
capacity 

























7 1 6 1   2 4 1 4 4 3.857 
Shareholder 
pressure 









7 1 6 5  2 3 1 1 3 3 3.143 
Global 
economic 
































6 2 2 4 3 2 1   1 1.5 1.667 
Company debt 5 3 0 5  1  2 2 4,5 4 4 
Investment in 
innovation 
5 3 5 0  1  3 1 4 4 3.8 
Information 
flow to the 
Board 
5 3 5 1  2 3   3 3 2.6 





4 4 4 0 1 1  2  4 3 2.75 
Transparency 
of actions 
4 4 2 2  1 2  1 3 3 3.25 
Board 
diversity 
4 4 1 4  2  1 1 2 3 3.25 
Number of 
brands 
3 5 2 1  2  1  2 2 2.667 
Board size 3 5 0 3 1 2    2 2 1.667 
Positive mood 
of the CEO* 
2 6 2 0  1  1  2,4 3 3 
Frequency of 
risk reporting 
2 6 1 1  2    2 2 2 
Company 
alliances 




Factor Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 (Q3) 














8 0 8 0    4 4 4,5 4.5 4.5 
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CEO‟s propensity to 
take risk 
8 0 8 0   2 3 3 4,5 4 4.125 
Company‟s past risk 
taking experience 
8 0 8 0   3 4 1 4 4 3.75 
Executive 
committee‟s 
propensity to take 
risk 
8 0 7 1  2  5 1 4 4 3.625 
Board‟s propensity to 
take risk 
8 0 6 2 1 1 4 1 1 3 3 3 
Company self-
awareness and 
knowledge of its 
environment 
8 0 4 4  1 6 1  3 3 3 
Management 
incentives for risk 
taking 
7 1 7 0  1  5 1 4 4 3.833 
Company overall 
performance* 




7 1 5 2   4 2 1 3 3 3.571 
Positive mood of the 
CEO* 







7 1 5 2  4 2 1  2 2 2.333 
Company risk 
capacity* 








6 2 6 0   2 3 1 4 4 3.833 
International industry 
competition 
6 2 6 0  1 2 2 1 3,4 3.5 3.5 
Board sensitivity to 
environmental 
change 
6 2 2 4  1 4 1  3 3 3 
Transparency of 
actions* 
6 2 5 1  2 1 3  4 3.5 3.167 
Perceived riskiness in 
industry sector 
6 2 2 4  1 3 2  3 3 3 
Global economic 
growth 
5 3 5 0  2  2 1 2,4 4 3.4 
Industry reward-to-
risk ratio* 
5 3 5 0  1 3  1 3 3 3.2 
Other stakeholder 
pressure 
5 3 4 1   4 1  3 3 3.2 
Frequency of risk 
reporting 
5 3 4 1  1 3 1  3 3 3 
Information flow to 
the Board* 
5 3 3 2  1 2 2  3,4 3 3 
Company age 5 3 4 1   5   3 3 3 
Number of brands 4 4 3 1   3  1 3 3 3.5 
International industry 
regulation 




Board diversity 4 4 3 1  1 2 1  3 3 2.667 
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3 5 3 0   1 2  4 4 3.667 
Investment in 
innovation 
2 6 2 0     2 5 5 5 
Company debt 2 6 1 1  1  1  2,4 3 3 
Board size 1 7 1    1   3 N/A 3 
General industry 
trends (new) 
1  1      1 5 N/A 5 
Management 
diversity (new) 




Appendix 3.10 Interview transcript example 
 
N: Thank you for agreeing to take part in my research, and I‟d to begin 
by pointing out that the information you give in this interview will be 
treated as strictly confidential and yourself will not be identified 
anywhere in this research. So are you okay with that? [I am happy yes]. 
So you‟ve just heard about the context of my research and what 
triggered my research interest, so I think I can just go quickly into the 
questions. So in terms of the term risk appetite, there are quite a lot of 
similar but different definitions around within the practitioner 
community. So I‟d like to know what is your definition of risk appetite? 
R: Okay so probably I don‟t have a precise definition on top of my head, but 
for me risk appetite it something about the tolerance for risk that managers 
are prepared to accept at a particular time and depending on their objectives. 
So I think that risk appetite is… I believe it is situational rather than, you 
know, managers would always have, even an organisation would always 
have the same appetite for risk. I think it‟s very dependent on other factors, 
but at the heart of it is something about the amount of risk that those 
managers are prepared to tolerate in achieving their objectives. 
N: Right okay. So coming to the central research question, what do you 
think are the factors that determine a company‟s risk appetite? 
R: Okay so, long list. It‟s got to be something about individuals… So I think 
that it‟s something about individuals‟ propensity to take risk, and we know 
that there are psychometric tests can help determined that something may be 
inherently in you and I… that will say generally we are more willing than 
others to take risk. So something about individual managers propensity to 
take risk… 
N: So how does that can affect the company‟s risk appetite? How does 
individual propensity?  
R: Because it‟s the individual propensity of individual senior decision-
makers… So I think… my observation would be that… Depending on 
where the power is in the organisation… So another factor is the aspects of 
the organisation‟s culture that might be to do with, for example, hierarchy, 
power distance, those sort of things. But let‟s say in an organisation that is 
hierarchical, then I would expect the individual… the propensity to take risk 
of the individual managers who are the most powerful, those that are at the 
top of the hierarchy, to have an influence on an organisation‟s risk appetite. 
Because it‟s really the message is that coming from the top, it is those 
people who are making the decisions, it‟s those people who are providing 
leadership to others, so I would expect those individual perspectives to have 
an influence, not the only influence, but an influence. And may be more of 
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an influence in an organisation that is very top-down led, rather than a more 
consensual culture. 
N: So can you give me an example about this kind of individual… So 
normally what kind of individuals are at the top of an organisation? Is 
it the CEO or? 
R: yeah it could be. Depending on the size of the organisation… yes, I am 
thinking about one kind that I‟m working closely with now. I can‟t name the 
client, but I can tell you that the CEO and the top team, the executive 
committee of the organisation have been pursuing a very aggressive growth 
strategy for the past may be two or three years. And that growth strategy has 
been quite countered to the market really, so when some of the competitors 
have been contracting, when some of the other factors in there in the 
industry would suggest that may be they should be tolerant to less risk and 
choose a more cautious approach and they‟ve been pursuing a very 
aggressive growth strategy, and that is so obscured by the market that has 
been down almost single handedly the view of the CEO and a handful of 
people around him. And opposing that was probably career limiting. For 
people who may be seeing a different risk appetite should be adopted, 
different thresholds of risk been adopted, and that would be my experience. 
I can think of other similar situations… Obviously in a public company the 
board would ideally put the challenges in…put the brakes on that sort of 
behaviour on behalf of the shareholders. So also in that organisation I‟ve 
observed, the tension between the board whose risk appetite was less… I 
think one of the problems with risk appetite is we don‟t really have units for 
it… The board would be wanting to accept less risk than may be the 
executive committee. 
N: I would assume that decisions in a company would be made 
collectively by the board members. What if the CEO who is quite 
aggressive, but the other members of the board are quite conservative, 
so what kind of final decisions can be made? 
R: Okay so what happens is probably entirely dependent on the culture of 
the organisation. I‟m sure you have reviewed the literature, and you 
understand something about the organisational culture. Obviously we can‟t 
ignore national culture in organisational culture, so I think what is really 
interesting is when you have…if you are looking at the decisions of risk 
appetite of national companies, I think that is more understandable than if 
you are looking at international companies… the one I‟ve got seems to have 
quite a global presence. Probably you need to go back to what is at the heart 
of the culture of the organisation and beliefs about challenges for example, 
so what is the sort of challenges that‟s going on in the senior management 
decision-making forums? Is there very healthy challenge and debates and all 
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options looked at, or is it more closed and why might that be? I think that‟s 
a major influence on risk appetite. I also think that the experience of the 
people is also a major influencing factor on the wider culture, so the 
experience of company, whether previous decisions seem to have gone well 
or badly, so patterns of action and often organisations that had a stream of 
acquisitions and had gone not so well, then it would lead to the managers 
who have been involved in that to be more cautious. 
N: So you think this negative experience will affect the culture of the 
organisation? 
R: Yes and therefore their risk appetite. So to me the culture is, if you are 
looking at the inputs and outputs, I suppose, I think culture is an input to 
risk appetite, and I think individual tendencies to take risk are also an input, 
and within the context about what‟s happening in industry, [the situation], 
yeah, what are your competitors are doing, obviously the economic situation 
is something that‟s more general, but as you said your research is interested 
why in the same context firms might behave differently. So I mean the 
organisational culture thing is a massive topic, there is research being done 
that looks at how you might determine the cultural… the influences on 
culture. It seems to me that when you are deciding how much risk to take, 
then it would appear that healthy debate is really necessary, so if you look at 
the things that has been done on things like groupthink or other 
psychological influences on teams, then we know that human beings are 
largely programmed to fit in, to build consensus and for harmony, most 
human beings have been actually been in conflict for any period of time is 
an uncomfortable thing which they try to avoid, but when it comes to 
decision making organisations actually… how you create working patterns 
within the group where you can hold the conflict for long enough to have a 
debate, and I think it is vitally important. And without that aspects of culture 
being there, my experiences would suggest is that the risk appetite of the 
most powerful individuals is the most influential factor, if you don‟t have 
enough tension. In the senior governance of an organisation, if you look at a 
publicly listed company, then the controls that offered the tensions between 
the board and the executive committee is vital, and like I said that would be 
an area that you research can look at and how that governance is working 
between the top of the companies… I‟m also thinking, does the risk appetite 
of an organisation, how much of that is influenced from bottom-up rather 
than top-down. I think probably in some organisational cultures there is 
more of a bottom-up influence, because it is more consensual culture. So 
I‟ve done quite a lot of work in companies in Netherlands, the Dutch culture 
tends to be quite consensual and quite flat, so there‟s no real sense of… 
there is a hierarchy but they‟ve got more of an attitudes that everyone is 
equal, and then you would expect more of in Eastern cultures, eastern parts 
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of Europe, I guess also far East, much more of a collective attitude culture 
than the individualistic culture, so I think the whole national culture thing 
must feed in, but I‟m just thinking about all the companies I‟ve worked with 
or worked in, and I think the huge influence on risk appetite of a company 
are the personal attitude of senior leaders… 
N: Right. I have read the book that you‟ve written with David, in the 
book you‟ve mentioned that there are three key inputs: individual 
preferences, the culture, and the situation. But through my literature 
review I have identified a number of factors that I‟d like to go through 
with you to see whether they influence the risk appetite or not. So 
would you think the ownership structure of a company have some 
influence on its risk appetite? 
R: I would thought so, yes I guess so. Certainly anything that is publicly 
listed as we‟ve discussed has got formal governance that provides 
challenges to decision makers from the boards and the executive committees. 
In companies that are privately owned, something that are small or family-
owned, I would imagine…my experiences are all anecdotal, but in that 
situation the influence of the decision maker is even more greater than listed 
companies where there are more checks and balances, and also most of the 
behaviour of the people have been linked to experiences of the sectors, most 
of which will have an influence. 
N: How about the age of the company? Would you think that has 
something to do with the risk appetite? 
R: I‟m sure it probably does, but it‟s probably not a simple relationship. 
Because I think there is probably nothing says that old companies that are 
more or less tolerant to risk… I guess we can all think of companies that 
have been around for a long time…you know, they‟ve seen recessions come 
and go, and they‟ve seen things happening, and maybe that would cause 
them to be… It depends on how well companies have learnt… I know that a 
number of clients that I‟ve worked with will say that they don‟t feel that 
they‟ve really have a corporate memory… So individuals have learnt, has 
the company also learnt?… So you can have complained that is quite old 
but it is not learned a lot, so every new set of managers are going through 
and making the same mistakes over and over, and I think you need to be 
really careful probably about the age of the company. However in the theory, 
we hope that with age comes the experience… But we‟re not necessarily 
wiser because we are older, are we? 
N: Yes maybe “age” is not the proper word, there is another phrase 
which is the life cycle of the organisation, you can divide an 
organisation into four life cycles: start-up, growth, mature and decline. 
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So would companies in any of these stages have different appetite for 
risk? 
R: Yes but I guess nobody has planned to be declining… So I can see that… 
If you‟ve got a start-up company, probably inevitably you will be over 
cautious in a start-up… let me take my own company which is a really small 
consultancy. We probably don‟t have a huge tolerance for risk for the past 
10 years, but that‟s because we were happy to not grow a lot. It‟s not been 
objective to have rapid growth. So I think there‟s probably a direct… There 
is a direct relationship between risk appetite and the desire for growth, so 
when you‟re starting up you need to take enough risk to be established… do 
you expect your approach to be like that depending on your aggressiveness 
of your growth strategy. Although I accept the life cycle of firms, I also 
don‟t think that any firm would say “we start-up, we grow, now we are 
mature and then we will decline”. Because actually what people are 
employed to do is to prevent declining, but to further grow and further 
consolidation. So I suppose I‟m not so… Whilst in theory you can see that it 
might be quite neat to look at different levels of risk appetite in those four 
stages, I‟m not sure whether those four stages are really in the minds of 
firms that have passed their initial start-ups. My experiences would say that 
firms are always making trade-offs between consolidation of what they have, 
so getting more out of what they have or growing it, and which is why you 
then will get cycles of investments and cost-cutting and investments and 
cost-cutting and investments and cost-cutting… So that would be my 
experience. 
N: Okay. A number of people say that the company‟s objectives can 
affect its risk appetite, what do you think about that? 
R: Yes I think there is a direct input of objectives, because the notion of risk 
only means something in the context of objectives. So I think it‟s not 
possible or helpful to try to disconnect risk or any risk constructs from 
objectives. There are lots of things that uncertain… I‟m sure David has said 
this to you, there are lots of things that are uncertain, but there are things 
that we care about that can affect the achievement of our objectives. So I 
think what‟s is interesting is that some companies that are better than others 
at articulating what their objectives are, and you know the amount of risk 
they are prepared to tolerate around their objectives, so a lot of my 
consulting work is helping firms to do that, and even some quite large 
companies are not very good at articulating… You know they‟ve got 
strategy at the very high level, but when you comes to crisp articulation of 
what objectives are, and that is more difficult for people, to me that is the 
first step, so you know if you can be clear about your objectives, then you 




N: for me I think objectives and risk appetite… they can have a two-
way relationship. One way is that objectives are a reflection of the 
company‟s risk appetite. Companies that are aggressive are more likely 
to set objectives which are risky; And for some companies may be in 
times of crisis or bad economy, they might also set some very risky 
objectives, which might have an influence on their risk appetite. So I 
think there is a two-way relationship. 
R: My prejudice in this is that when we are talking about the constructs at 
the organisational level, of which risk appetite is one, and you‟ve seen risk 
appetite as an organisational concept, and objectives is an organisational 
construct, it is a bit of philosophical question. But it is really the degree of 
the organisational construct can exist outside of individual perspectives. So 
is the risk appetite a thing or is it a social construction? If it is a social 
construction, then who is it socially constructed by, and what is influencing 
the people who is socially constructioning? So I guess that is what‟s 
interesting for me and I do have a prejudice I suppose, this is actually where 
David and I may differ in the way that we work, so David has got more of a 
logical, positivist view of the world than I have, I‟ve got more of an 
interpretivist view of the world, so we have some interesting discussion, for 
David he likes to have diagrams which has got inputs and outputs, and I see 
them as more of a mess; and that‟s what makes it fascinating isn‟t it? You 
know you started companies in mind and you‟ve observed through… I don‟t 
know your sector, I don‟t know tourism and hospitality at all. I‟ve never 
worked in the sector, so maybe that‟s useful for the discussion, but you 
would see it as having a bigger appetite for risk than others. And I‟d say that 
how much of that is something about the company as opposed to individuals 
in the company at that time, and that would be my questions, which are not 
really answers for you…but reflections, so I agree with you that it is not a 
one-way, objectives and risks is not one way, it is a very combined and so 
what would make the group say “well our risk appetite is X”. In fact what 
you need to describe is…If someone said our risk appetite is high, whatever 
“high” means, I can absolutely accept that if a group of decision-makers are 
in an agreement in that their risk appetite is high, then they are more likely 
to set objectives that are challenging targets, than if they see it. So I think 
there is a two-way street on that. 
N: Thank you. How about a company‟s risk management capability? 
R: Okay, really interesting. I think probably it matters a lot, but that there is 
a maturity thing that maybe a little bit counter-intuitive. So I would say that 
firms that have got a mature risk management capability will recognise the 
value of doing risk management. So if they are mature, let‟s say they‟re 
going into a risky investment, e.g. capital investment or acquisition, so if 
they‟ve got high risk management capability, then they are gonna have data, 
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because they would value getting data. So they will have done their analysis, 
and they will update them to base their decisions on. If there is no risk 
management capability at all, then it is much more likely to be intuitive, that 
doesn‟t mean that intuition doesn‟t form apart…you got data, you‟ve always 
got data… I think there are somewhere in the middle that in a journey from 
no capability to good capability, where a lot of my clients are at a 
potentially dangerous place to be, which is that risk management is seen as 
being a compliance issue, not a business value sort of issue, so organisations 
have got into the risk management either through regulation, financial 
regulation, health and safety regulation, you know I do a lot of working 
highly regulated industries, oil and gas and mining those sort of places, they 
would tend to be very very mature in terms of health and safety risk, but 
then that actually means that risk management is seen as being a compliance 
issue, and therefore they would not think about risk data if they were to 
make an investment decision, or they would in a fairly half-hearted way. So 
I think the risk management capability and maturity of that is a fundamental 
influence on decisions that organisations take. And my observations are that 
very few organisations have got true risk management maturity, because 
they have invested in the mechanics of doing risk management, but have not 
really made it work for them. So a lot of my consultancy work is with 
highly regulated companies to get their risk management work for their 
decision making as opposed to just get them through an audit. So it‟s almost 
something that‟s always get worse before it gets better… In theory we want 
informed decision-making, so we want risk appetite to be informed, and 
without any risk management capability then you can‟t even start. 
N: Okay thank you. What about the risk capacity? 
R: Well it must have an influence. You saw decision makers have not got an 
understanding of what their risk capacity is, although the newspapers would 
tell us that the banks were taking risks beyond their capacity a few years ago, 
so that‟s all been in the news. I‟m not sure to what degree… I think it‟s 
probably impossible that a company that makes money doesn‟t understand 
their capacity in terms of its ability to borrow money or to bear a lot of risk 
in fiscal terms. And it‟s gets a lot more interesting when its capacity for all 
sorts of objectives…so unless you are very sophisticated, if you take BP and 
Deepwater Horizon, at one level you could say the influence on BP in terms 
of its reputation has been significant, but actually looking back, BP is an 
organisation is not really… You know all the big oil majors can, does have 
a capacity to stand a major disaster, because the impact of that risk, however 
much the company is fined or deal with the environmental impact, the 
massive organisations can withstand that and their reputation can withstand 
it. So I think probably in terms of risk capacity, it is a more complex idea 
than just money, I think there are some more intangible aspects of risk 
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capacity, and probably then it is linked to size, maybe… the size of the 
organisation…so you can imagine a major …something that goes very 
wrong in a medium-sized organisation…. [Do you measure by revenue?] 
Yeah you could measure it by its revenue or number of its employees, I 
think there are ways to look at what constitutes… I think probably it‟s not 
only how much money they‟ve got, it‟s something to do with the age of the 
organisation and the degree to which the organisation is…If you take a hotel 
chain for example, you would imagine that really big players like Hilton or 
some other big chains, their capacity to bear risk, not just financial, in terms 
of their status in the industry is much greater than a small player. If they did 
something really bad, it‟s must be the same with the airlines… the size 
protects somehow, and it‟s not just about the balance sheet… there is 
something about size that affects the risk capacity. 
N: So can I say that higher risk capacity, the higher risk appetite? 
R: I think is not as simple as that. I think the higher the risk capacity, the 
higher risk appetite you could have. If you‟ve got a big capacity to bear risk, 
then you could have a higher risk appetite, and I guess this may be an 
argument that says may be you should have a big risk appetite as you are 
making your assets working for you. So if you get your return on your 
assets, you should have… But whether that actually works like that…. 
N: Because there are other influential factors you have to take into 
account… 
R: Yeah the whole mix, and it‟s probably not wrong to have an appetite that 
is challenging your capacity as long as you know you are doing 
that…because if you own a company and you want to work hard and you 
run the risk of going bankrupt, and there might be moral issues in terms of 
your employees, but if you are the owner, then there is a view that you have 
the right to do it, isn‟t it? I guess that‟s down to culture as well. 
N: Alright thank you. Would you think that the number of senior 
decision makers, normally it‟s the board, because the board is making 
all the decisions, do you think that the number of the board members 
will have something to do with the risk appetite? There is actually an 
argument that the more people you have within the group, and the 
more difficult to reach a consensus… 
R: Yes, that‟s right. So I would say yes, unless it is very hierarchical and the 
people are not equal members…so the bigger the group size…if you look at 
some of the psychological effects on group decision making and you look at 
the culture shift and risk shift those sort of features, then I think they will 
say that the desire to be part of the group is a major influence and the 
more…if you are an individual in a bigger group, then your ability to 
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influence the whole is more difficult than if you are in a smaller group, so 
that in a bigger group probably you get less meaningful challenge, but the 
big question for me is if that‟s the case, if you‟ve got a bigger board, and 
you don‟t have much challenge, then what is the major influence? Is it “we 
always do this, so we will do again” or is it the most influential members of 
that, is it the chairman or the people who are…is it the exec members who 
have more power than the non-execs. I mean I‟m not an expert in board 
construction, but whether it is the board or executive committee or any team, 
even if you look at in a project team, the bigger the group the more likely it 
is that you won‟t get effective challenge, because it is easier to conform and 
easier everyone will just say yes. 
N: So if we want to make a decision which is risky, it may not be 
approved by everybody… 
R: Yeah, may be that groups that recognise their ability to break out what 
they normally do, that‟s where senior teams to use consultants to help them, 
to just provide challenge or help take them through that decision making 
process. 
N: What about the remuneration of the top management? 
R: Well absolutely depends on bonus plans. So yes. What their incentives 
are? So if people are incentivised to grow and they‟ve got big bonus plans 
associated with it, then I would imagine that it would be a major 
determinant on behaviour. 
N: But may be the incentives might influence the individual risk 
preferences… 
R: Well it won‟t influence…my understanding is that as individuals we 
have inherent preferences and then there are environmental factors that 
influence our behaviour. And what we are incentivised to do would be an 
influence on that people…I think it is where in terms of performance 
measures and getting balance of objectives. Again I have experience using 
highly regulated industries, in oil and gas and mining, the largest part of the 
executive bonus plan will be about the safety of their employees before it‟s 
about performance, and they have to do that, because you know they are 
doing really dangerous things, and they‟ve got to safeguard the communities 
they‟ve worked in and the environment, etc. So I think incentives absolutely 
do drive behaviour.  So it‟s about objectives isn‟t it? So what‟s your strategy, 
what‟s your objectives, what are you gonna measure, what are you gonna 




N: How about the company's current performance? So whether it is 
performed well or underperformed, would that affect the company‟s 
willingness to take risk? 
R: well I think it probably does, but… there is research I think has been 
done on individual level again to show how…if we‟ve been successful in 
something, can we get positive feedback, and that would fuel our ability for 
risk taking. So it‟s almost a virtual cycle. If you go back to the prospect 
theory and loss avoiding, then how much you can then transfer from that 
individuals to corporations? I don‟t know. 
N: There is actually research at organisational level about performance 
that shows similar things. The relationship between performance and 
the tendency to take risk is not definitive. Some say that if you are 
performing well, you might take more risk; but some say that well 
performed companies tend to take less risk because the fear that the 
more risk taking would lead them to reduce the performance, which is 
the loss aversion. 
R: Well yes. Loss aversion. Probably, I am thinking about my own firm 
which is really small. But some of the patterns of the decisions we take in 
the years that we‟ve been successful, we tend to take incremental steps, not 
really huge steps, whereas I can see that if the things were declining, and 
you sort of get slightly more desperate, you are more willing to do 
something like really… you know my major interest is organisational 
change and what the drivers are from those incremental small change to like 
massive change, sometimes maybe big risk taking is more of a response to 
either actual or perceived declined performance rather than great 
performance. It‟s all just observations really, I don‟t have any data. 
N: Well yes what you have said is also confirmed in existing research as 
well. Some people find underperforming companies tend to take more 
risk because they think that the more risk taking will be likely to bring 
them back to normal…[Yes, it is more of a desperation isn‟t it?]. Okay, 
what about the company‟s stakeholder requirements? 
R: Certainly…If you‟ve got shareholders, that will have an influence on 
your board and that‟s a factor isn‟t it? But how influential shareholders are, 
the bigger you get is an interesting thing. I can see how shareholders, if 
you‟re relatively small, might be more vocal and influential at one level. I 
think regulators definitely have a voice depending on your industry, you 
know regulators are more or less influential. Customers are an interesting 
thing, aren‟t they? How much influence customers will have on risk 
taking… I guess customers aren‟t often directly influential…if customers 
choose to go to competition, they have an indirect voice because of 
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consumer behaviour obviously changes your performance. Whereas I guess 
customers don‟t tend to be hugely vocal in what they do, and I mean 
governments usually play through regulators largely. I think that it would be 
wrong to say that stakeholders are not influential. I‟m trying to think of a 
situation where employees would have an influence on the decision making, 
you know the risk appetite of the company. I see employees are like 
customers… they can cause trouble, so they could… I‟m not saying that 
they have no influence; I don‟t see them being a major influence. 
N: Well normally employees can demand a higher pay? 
R: Depends on the culture, the country that you are in. An employee of all 
British company who is demanding a higher pay would have no power. The 
power of the employees was broken in the UK in the 80s really I would say. 
They can be nuance, they can cause trouble, but I don‟t see them as being 
the most influential stakeholder. 
N: There is an interesting problem. You see you‟ve got different types 
of stakeholders whose expectations can be contradictory, [Absolutely], 
how can a company balance that and decide what they are going to do 
finally? 
R: Well. I suppose that‟s the challenge for all organisations. They‟ve got 
competing stakeholders. Their objectives need to reflect all of the 
stakeholders. I mean what I see mainly is organisations who are pursing the 
fiscal growth objectives, but trying to do that in a way that satisfies 
regulators and employees…so I would see employees probably in the same 
group as regulators…Companies can do things wrong can either result in a 
legal challenge, employees who are not motivated, so you start to see 
indicators of absenteeism and people leaving… I‟m not saying that 
employees are not matter to performance, they do massively, but do I see 
employees being the direct influence on the risk appetite? No. Minor 
influence, not major influence. Share ownership is probably, and the 
ambition of the people at the top for market share. 
N: Yeah I think those factors we‟ve said are mainly internal factors to 
an organisation, so let‟s talk about the external, the environmental 
factors… You‟ve mentioned earlier about the competition, so can I say 
that the higher the competition, the company tends to take higher level 
of risk? 
R: At one level that seems logical, doesn‟t it? If you‟ve got lots of 
competition, it takes more to stay ahead. And taking less risk would 
probably mean you would slip behind. But it probably depends on the sector 
and how much innovation is expected…so if you are in consumer 
electronics, then it would be fairly easy to see that if you don‟t take any risk 
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you would be out of business pretty soon. So yes I think as a general rule 
maybe, but probably in some sectors there is less. I don‟t know, if you take 
banking or insurance, does more competition drive risk taking? Not 
necessarily does. I personally think the ego of the senior managers drives 
risk taking. If you look at some of the studies that have been done on 
individuals who take massive risks, then they would say that things that 
drive risk taking are ego, fear, and can‟t remember the third thing. But again 
that‟s done at the individual level. But if you‟ve got competition between 
firms can often manifest itself as competition between senior executives… 
N: What other environmental factors can you think of?  
R: Yeah, regulations, competition, obviously global economic situation… 
well depending on where you‟ve got a very large organisation that is very 
diversified, then obviously you would expect it to not have a single risk 
appetite to than it would be diversified across its portfolio…you know, I am 
sure that lots of global companies have got a very high tolerance for risk, if 
they are expanding into new markets, new geographies, but then more 
cautious appetite, so I think there are also factors about how much these 
companies are working as one unit, so this is not my area but I know there is 
research which says companies can never truly be global companies, so 
whether they are actually collections of local companies…whether they are 
behaving globally or actually they are behaving locally. Therefore, in very 
large companies, if you take Hilton lets say, but to what degree is their risk 
appetite at the senior levels or actually their risk appetite in American 
markets as opposed to risk appetite in African markets, as opposed to Far 
East market, I don‟t know. I think that‟s interesting as well…So it‟s about 
size again. And therefore where you are competing, so are you trying to 
make market, are you trying to consolidate… I think they are all factors. 
And there will be financial things, there will be sociological things, there are 
things about infrastructure depending on your… let‟s take on gas which I 
know well, they will have a whole portfolio, some investments going on, 
some of them will be quite safe, and some of them will be hugely risky, and 
so risk appetite isn‟t a single thing. It might be influenced by some common 
cultural aspects, but I think it is situational. So at what level of the 
organisation is risk appetite most influential on decision making? I think it‟s 
not always at the top. 
N: I like to talk about more of the cultural aspect, when I was doing my 
literature review about risk taking at the individual level, there was 
quite a lot of debate about the gender influence on the level of risk 
taking. It is said that men tend to take more risk than women normally, 
and I was thinking that would an organisation be more of a masculine 




R: Yeah absolutely. I personally would think that anything that looks purely 
on gender is not that valid. There are inherent personality factors that are not 
gender specific. I think that influence of gender is more cultural and if 
you… And I think it can work both ways, because often females who…I 
mean in most organisations around the world, in senior levels females will 
be in the minority to males for some reasons, but there is some evidence 
certainly in western organisations, when you get women in those jobs, they 
are fighting harder to show their worth, and that can leads to more risk 
taking, that‟s one aspect. Also when we talk about Scandinavian, if you look 
at the Hofstede‟s masculine and feminine, you would expect to see a lot of 
feminine traits in managers in that culture which is about observation, 
adaptation, harmony, than is about power and leading from the front. So I 
think the gender is a too simplistic variable, because there are too many 
cultural and social influences on that. 
N: Yeah there is one more factor which just pops in my mind which is 
about the Board again.  It is the homogeneity of the Board, whether the 
board members have similar backgrounds, experiences, etc… 
R: I think it does make a massive effect, yes. I think that all of the factors 
that either enable or reduce challenge are the ones that matter. Because if 
you‟ve got a very homogeneous group of people with similar backgrounds 
and similar experience, then we know that it will challenge harder, and we 
know that there is value of diversity, but actually we are all drawn to people 
like us, “oh look we all agree”, “we must be right”, and that is really a 
dangerous place for any people to get into. So anything that restricts 
challenge is a bad thing, and I think in terms of having a risk appetite to be 
set at an appropriate level, because if you‟ve got a big risk capacity and a 
low risk appetite, and you would argue that you are not taking enough risk. 
So I think the homogeneity of the board is a factor. And ideally you would 
have less similarity and more differences, if you want to get good decisions. 
So you need a little bit of tension there, so something that enables the 
discussion and challenges. 
N: Okay. The last factor is the level of rewards. When you look at a 
particular risk, you think about the potential rewards for that risk. If 
the level of risk is beyond your appetite but the reward is very high and 
attractive, would that makes you do something that is beyond your 
appetite for risk? 
R: You would sort of hope that it would be correlated, wouldn‟t you? Yes if 
it is really a big prize, you would be prepared to take more risk to achieve 
the prize. So it‟s a conscious trade-off, so I think that‟s a conscious process 
and how much is risk appetite actually a sub-conscious or pre-conscious 
process. I guess David and I‟s work, and this is where we differentiate risk 
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appetite and risk attitude is that if you are gonna get good decision making, 
that we would argue that people need to override their sub-conscious, their 
inherent tendencies, and to say, “actually in this situation, the reward is X, 
therefore, maybe we should take more risk and that would be logical.” So 
that it‟s brought to the conscious level out of the sub-conscious and 
emotional level… 
N: So you also need to think about not only the level of rewards but also 
your ability to manage it… 
R: That‟s right. It‟s really a complex…. 
N: Yeah the decision of taking risk is really a complex and a 
combination of all the factors to make that decision. 
R: Yes, that‟s right, and you need a focus of that and therefore you need 
your senior leaders to really be quite open …. It‟s about the decision makers‟ 
ability to understand all of those various factors that might influence the risk 
appetite and be able to stand apart from that. 
N: Yes this is one of the purposes of my research. I want to first identify 
the factors which influence the risk appetite as many as possible, and 
their relative importance to risk appetite on decision making, so that 
decision makers can use this work to help them think through… 
R: Yeah. So I have a prejudice to human factors, rather than non-human 
factors, personally. 
N: So after all the factors that we have discussed, can you name five 
factors that you think are the most important for influencing the 
company‟s risk appetite? 
R: I would say, not in this particular order, the perspectives of most 
powerful people, that would be a combination of inherent preference and 
experience and personal thing; Second thing, something to do with tradition, 
something in the culture to do with the patterns of actions, this is what we 
normally do here…Third thing is probably risk management capability of 
the organisation. So the degree to which good risk data as an input to 
decision making is valued or not valued. Fourth thing in terms of the 
environmental factor…the competition I think has an influence, because it 
also influences the senior leaders behaviours…there is some evidence 
between big IT companies that their competitions between the leaders is 
actually prevalent even though they are massive companies. Yeah they are 
the main ones. 
N: So I guess this is it. Do you have any final comments about the 
interview or my research? 
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R: No I am really interested in what you come up with. So do keep me in 
touch with. It‟s a really important area, fascinating area, misunderstood at so 
many levels, even down to… we don‟t even have any words or units 
to…you know, is risk appetite from big to small, we don‟t have a language 
to describe it. And that‟s David and I‟s work said that we therefore need to 
have, we need to create a language, we need to have thresholds, we need to 
have measures. 
N: For me fundamentally the purpose of the risk appetite is that at the 
end of the day we want to make informed and optimised decisions and I 
hope my research can help with that… So thank you very much for 





Appendix 3.11 Quality criteria for case study research 
 
Quality principles Explanations 
1. Readers can follow the 
research process and draw 
their own conclusions. 
 A comprehensive account of the research process 
 A statement of the problem, purpose, and research 
questions of the study 
 A description of methods of data collection, coding, 
analysis, and interpretation procedures. 
 Motives for the selection of cases 
 Limits of the research project 
 Clear presentation of results and conclusions 
2. The researcher should 
present the paradigm and 
pre-understanding. 
 Personal and professional values and if these have 
changed in the course of the research 
 Theories and concepts that govern the project together 
with the reasons for the choice of these theories and 
concepts 
 The researcher‟s prior experience and other pertinent 
information on the researcher 
3. The research should 
possess credibility. 
 Correct data, including correct rendering of statements 
and views of informants 
 Demonstrate how analysis and interpretation are 
supported by data 
 Demonstrated confidence in theory, concepts, and 
conclusions used or generated in the research 
 Honest presentation of alternative interpretations and 
contradictory data 
 The conclusions should accord with one another 
 The actors in the cases should be able to recognise what 
is presented in the research 
 Presentation of all relevant data and information used in 
the case study 
4. The researcher should 
have had adequate access. 
 Methods and techniques used to ensure access 
 Account of any difficulties in deploying desired access 
methods 
 Account of any problems and limitations in access that 
arose through denied access 
 Account of any problems and limitations in access that 
arose through time and money limitations 
 Explain how access limitations have possibly impaired 
the research 
5. There is an assessment 
on the generality and 
validity of the research. 
 To what areas the results apply 
 How closely the research represents the phenomenon 
that the researcher aimed to study 
 If other research confirms or disconfirms the findings 
 If results bear out or disagree with extant theories and 
concepts 
6. The research should 
make a contribution. 
 Contribute to increased knowledge 
 Deal with relevant problems 
 Optimise the trade-off between methods, techniques, 
and results 
 Be of value to the scientific community, the client, and 
the public 
 Actively made available to the scientific community, the 
client, and the public 
7. The research process 
should be dynamic. 
 The extent to which the researcher has continuously 




 Demonstrated creativity and openness to new 
information and interpretations 
 The ability to switch between deep involvement and 
distance 
 A demonstrated awareness of changes of research 
design, methods application, and so on during the 
research process. 
8. The researcher should 
possess certain personal 
qualities. 
 Commitment to the task of research 
 Integrity and honesty, being able to voice his or her 
conviction 
 Flexibility and openness, being able to adjust to changed 
conditions and new-even disturbing-information 
(Source: Gummesson, 2000: 186-187) 
 
 
 
 
